Does Illegality Breed Violence? Drug Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets

1. Does Illegality Breed Violence? Drug Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets Richard Snyder and Angelica Duran-Martinez Department of Political Science Brown University USA

2. Illegality and Violence: What is the Relationship?

3. Conditions for Emergence of State-Sponsored Protection Rackets • The State: The Capacity to Enforce • Make a credible threat to enforce the law • Criminal Organizations: The Capacity to Comply • Make payments to state officials • Carry out agreed on behaviors, such as sharing information, refraining from violence, controlling “public hazards”

4. Protection in Time and Space • The likelihood that state-sponsored protection rackets will form depends on the time horizons of public officials. • The Geography of Enforcement and Criminality

5. i ii a b 3 c d iii iv The Geography of Enforcement and Criminality a. One protector, many organizations b. Many protectors, one organization i ii iii iv d. Changing the boundaries: Many protectors, many organizations c. One protector, one organization (per jurisdiction) 1 1 2 ii i a 3 c b a b d c d iii iv 6 4 5

6. The Geographies of Criminality and Enforcement in Mexico: Areas of Cartel Influence and Dispute Juarez Cartel Sinaloa Cartel GulfCartel GulfCartel, Sinaloa Cartel

7. Preferences of Protectors and Criminal Organizations Over Number of Actors, and Hypothesized Likelihood of Violence Ratio of Protectors to Criminal Organizations Rank Order of Preferences Likelihood of Violence Protectors Criminal Organizations (a) One protector, many organizations (b) Many protectors, one organization (c) One protector, one organization (d) Many protectors, many organizations Moderate 4 1 2 3 1 4 2 3 Moderate Low High

8. The Breakdown of Protection in Mexico: From Stable Pacts to Strategic Violence • Increase in Political Competition: shortens the time horizons of public officials • New Entrants into the Illicit Market: makes coordination between public officials and illicit organizations more difficult • Anti-Corruption Reforms: reconfigures the geography of enforcement, causing a dealignment with the geography of criminality

9. Redrawing the Boundaries of Enforcement in Mexico: New Jurisdictions Created by the Reform of the PGR in 1996

10. The Geographies of Criminality and Enforcement in Mexico: Areas of Cartel Influence and Dispute Tijuana Cartel Juarez Cartel Sinaloa Cartel GulfCartel GulfCartel, La Familia Sinaloa Cartel Sinaloa Cartel Los Zetas

11. Does Illegality Breed Violence? • Not always, and never directly. The relationship between illicit markets and violence depends on institutions of protection. • If state-sponsored protection rackets form, then illicit markets can be peaceful. • Conversely, the breakdown or dismantling of state-sponsored protection rackets can lead to violence.

13. The Geographies of Criminality and Enforcement in Mexico: Areas of Cartel Influence and Dispute Tijuana Cartel Juarez Cartel Sinaloa Cartel GulfCartel GulfCartel, La Familia Sinaloa Cartel Sinaloa Cartel

14. The Geographies of Criminality and Enforcement in Mexico: Areas of Cartel Influence and Dispute Tijuana Cartel Juarez Cartel Sinaloa Cartel GulfCartel GulfCartel, La Familia Sinaloa Cartel Sinaloa Cartel Los Zetas