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Research on teacher pay-for-performance

Research on teacher pay-for-performance. Patrick McEwan Wellesley College pmcewan@wellesley.edu. (Also see Victor Lavy, “Using performance-based pay to improve the quality of teachers,” Future of Children, vol. 17, no. 1.). Pay-for-degrees-and-years-of-experience.

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Research on teacher pay-for-performance

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  1. Research on teacher pay-for-performance Patrick McEwan Wellesley College pmcewan@wellesley.edu (Also see Victor Lavy, “Using performance-based pay to improve the quality of teachers,” Future of Children, vol. 17, no. 1.)

  2. Pay-for-degrees-and-years-of-experience • Little evidence that degrees and experience are systematically correlated with student outcomes • But, growing evidence that teachers vary in their ability to increase student test scores or “value-added” • So what? • Weak monetary incentives for current teachers to improve or maintain effectiveness • Weak monetary incentives for highly-effective teachers to enter teaching profession

  3. Pay-for-performance? • An attempt to (partially) tie remuneration to objective measures of student performance, often test scores • Many short-lived and poorly-researched experiences with “merit pay” in U.S. • More international experiences, especially Israel, Kenya, Mexico, and Chile • This presentation briefly summarizes extant research

  4. Policy ingredients • Incentives for individuals or groups? • What outcome measure(s)? • Unadjusted or adjusted student test score(s) • Principal or peer evaluations • What performance targets? • Absolute targets vs. relative “tournaments” • What reward? • How much? • “One-shot” bonus vs. permanent wage bump • Pecuniary vs. non-pecuniary awards

  5. Potential benefits of pay-for-performance • Increased teacher effort • Increased alignment between school and classroom activities and goals • Improved recruitment and retention of highly-effective teachers

  6. Potential pitfalls • Inaccurate measurement of teachers’ or schools’ “value-added” • School(s), teacher(s), peers, families, noise? • Negative effects on motivation or cooperation • “Gaming” behavior to win awards • Focus on few or easier-to-affect outcomes • Focus on “bubble” children close to proficiency thresholds • Test coaching • Strategic exclusions from testing • Outright cheating • Twinkies on test day!

  7. Criteria for evaluating research (on performance incentives) • Internal validity • Does pay-for-performance cause short-term and longer-term increases in student test scores? • Does pay-for-performance cause longer-term improvements in recruitment and retention of highly-effective teachers? • Key question: What is the counterfactual? • External validity • Can causal research findings be generalized to new students, districts, and variations of the policy?

  8. Group incentives: U.S. evidence • Dallas (Ladd 1999) • School-based bonus in early 1990s • Ranked schools by aggregated outcomes, adjusting for “socioeconomic status” • Awarded bonuses to top 20% of schools, $1000 per principal/teacher • Test score pass rates increased more quickly than comparison cities, for whites and Latinos

  9. Group incentives: other evidence • Kenya (Glewwe et al. 2003) • Of 100 primary schools 50 randomly assigned to participate in incentive program • Participating schools ranked by test score levels and gains • About 50% of participating schools receive awards (1/3 monthly salary per teacher) • Small, short-run increases in test participation and test scores • No test score differences after program end • Increase in test prep, but no change in pedagogy

  10. Group incentives: other evidence • Israel (Lavy 2002) • 62 schools competed for $1.5 million in awards • 1/3 of schools received awards, based on relative gains in test • 75% of school award going to teacher salary, rest to school fund • Compared to “similar” group of comparison schools, participating schools showed gains in test scores

  11. Individual incentives: U.S. evidence • Not much (yet!) • National sample (Figlio and Kenny 2007) • Rough measures of merit pay usage are correlated with student achievement • Small effects that could simply indicate that “good” schools also tend to implement merit pay

  12. Individual incentives: other evidence • Israel (Lavy 2004) • Individual teachers, by subject, compete for bonuses • Ranked according to SES-adjusted class performance, half received awards • Mixed evidence of effects on test scores • Mexico (McEwan and Santibanez 2005) • “Teacher Ladder” awarded large, permanent wage increases for meeting evaluation criteria • Including teacher test scores, student test scores, peer evaluations • Weak evidence that incentives improved test scores

  13. A summary • Some evidence of short-term test score effects, but mixed and best evidence outside U.S. • Some evidence of unintended consequences • Little evidence on long-term impacts on teacher recruitment and retention • Little evidence on policy costs, or relative cost-effectiveness

  14. Necessary but not sufficient conditions to implement pay-for-performance • School and teacher performance measures • That include a range of outcomes • That provide unbiased measures of schools’ or teachers’ contributions to outcomes • That minimize “noise” • That are (relatively) transparent, and perceived to be fair by participants

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