Indispensability of Judea & Samaria Mountain Ridges in the Era of Modern Weaponry

1. Indispensability of Judea & Samaria Mountain Ridges in the Era of Modern Weaponry Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

2. Table of Contents 1. Mideast Turmoil and Israel’s Security Requirements 3. US Generals on J&S mountain ridges 2.Centrality of ground barriers Is High-Tech a Substitute for High-Ground? 4.Land , Deployment of Reservists & Surprise Attack 8.The Indispensability of Judea & Samaria Mountain Ridges 6. Judea & Samaria vs. Sinai. 9.Israel's unique vulnerability 8.Uniqueness of Israel's security predicament 10. Peace boundaries in the Mideast.

3. The impact of the Tunisia and Egypt turmoil on Israel’s security predicament, especially “The Eastern Front.” Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

4. The impact of the Tunisia and Egypt turmoil on Israel’s security predicament, especially “The Eastern Front.” • Israel’s most vulnerable flank is “The Eastern Front” - the Jordan Valley and the Judea & Samaria mountain ridges - over-towering Israel’s “Soft Belly.” • The Tunisia/Egypt turmoil reflects the shifty, tenuous, violent, non-compliant nature of Mideast regimes. • Obama’s 2011policy of engagement with rogue regimes, and his announced retreat from Iraq, are perceived – by rogue regimes - as weakness, thus fueling violence. • Saddam's regime was perceived doom in 1991, became a non-conventional threat in 2002 and was eliminated in 2003. When will a brutal regime resurface in Baghdad? NEXT

5. back The impact of the Tunisia and Egypt turmoil on Israel’s security predicament, especially “The Eastern Front.” NEXT • The 1993 Oslo Accord produced unprecedented Palestinian hate-education, terror and non-compliance. • The 1989 demise of the USSR triggered illusions of peace, but the world has become less certain and more violent. • In 1990 King Hussein supported Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. In 1968-70 he provided the PLO a terror platform. In 1973, 1967 and 1948, King Abdullah and King Hussein joined wars against Israel in violation of commitments. • In 1969 and1979, Libya and Iran were abruptly transformed from pro-US to anti-US regimes.

6. back content The impact of the Tunisia and Egypt turmoil on Israel’s security predicament, especially “The Eastern Front.” NEXT • In 1967, Israel defeated Egypt, Syria and Jordan, producing a "No Threat" delusion. But, in 1973 Israel barely escaped annihilation. • How will the Mideast be impacted by a demise of the current Hashemite, Yemenite, Saudi or Egyptian regimes? • Mideast precedents - in the most unstable, unpredictable, volatile, treacherous and violent region in the world - require Israel to possess a uniquely high threshold of security and be prepared for the worst case scenarios, including "The Eastern Front Threat."

7. The Centrality of Ground Barriers in Defeating Enemies Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

8. Topographic inferiority of Pre-1967 Israel, a sliver along the Mediterranean

9. The Centrality of Ground Barriers in Defeating Enemies NEXT • Thousands of tons of daily bombing did not end the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 70% of the bombing was inaccurate. • Saddam was brought to submission by the US ground forces. • Ballistic missiles cause damage, but they don't conclude wars. An Arab tank battalion in Tel Aviv would be more significant than thousands of missiles on Tel Aviv. • The centrality of ground forces suggests the centrality of ground barriers (geographic depth and topographic edge).

10. back The Centrality of Ground Barriers in Defeating Enemies • "Enduring Relevance of Land Power", US Army Institute of Land Warfare, Oct. 2003: "Land force (is) the cornerstone of deterrence...Ground units can both destroy and occupy...as was demonstrated (in Afghanistan and Iraq)...Determined adversaries are seldom defeated quickly. Achieving a lasting decision requires the ability to conduct sustained, multidimensional joint operations. Land forces provide these qualities...During the Afghan campaign of 2002, precision air strikes were critical, but they neither annihilated opposition nor finished the enemy...In the 1999 Kosovo operation, the air war created the conditions for negotiations, but it was the ground forces that created the stability that now exists. NEXT

11. back content The Centrality of Ground Barriers in Defeating Enemies In 1995 Bosnia, the threat of airpower did not deter Serbia. It took the ground forces to create the conditions for the Dayton Accords…In 1991, months of strike operations did not achieve decision. The four-day ground war led to Iraqi surrender...(In 1989 in Panama), the surrender of Noriega was the result of soldiers on the ground..."  • The US stations 200,000 GIs (125% increase since 2001) in overseas military land installations in 120 countries. • All wars are conventional, requiring ground forces (India-Pakistan, US-Afghanistan, US-Iraq, US-Panama, Britain-Argentina, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Iran-Iraq, Morocco-Mauritania, etc.). NEXT

12. Photo: Yehoar Gal צילם: יהואר גל Haderah Power Station: A View from J & S

13. U.S. GENERALS ON J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

14. U.S GENERALS ON J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES NEXT • The late Admiral Bud Nance:” The eastern mountain ridge of the West Bank is one of the world's best tank barriers. Invading tanks will have to climb a 3,000ft steep slope from the Jordan Valley. The western mountain ridge, which is a 2,000ft gentle slope, constitutes a dream platform of invasion to Israel's narrow (8-15 miles) coastal plain. Control of the West Bank provides Israel the time to mobilize reservists, which are essential to its survival during a surprise attack.” • General (ret.) Al Gray, former Commandant, US Marine Corps: “Missiles fly over any terrain feature, but they don't negate the strategic significance of territorial depth. The key threat to Israel will remain the invasion and occupation by armored forces. Military success requires more than a few hundred missiles. To defeat Israel would require the Arabs to deploy armor, infantry and artillery into Israel and destroy the IDF on the ground. That was true in 1948, 1967 and 1973, and it remains true in the era of modern missiles.”

15. back U.S GENERALS ON J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES NEXT • Lt. General (ret.) Tom Kelly, Chief of Operations in the 1991 Gulf War: "I cannot defend this land (Israel) without that terrain (West Bank)...The West Bank mountains, and especially their 5 approaches, are the critical terrain. If an enemy secures those passes, Jerusalem and Israel become uncovered. Without the West Bank, Israel is only 8 miles wide at its narrowest point. That makes it indefensible." • 100 retired Generals and Admirals (Oct. 1988, Washington Times): Israel should not withdraw from J&S, lest it fail to provide security to its People. It is impossible to demilitarize J&S effectively • The late Admiral Bud Nance: “I believe if Israel were to move out of the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it would increase instability and the possibility of war, increase the necessity to preempt in war, and the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used to prevent an Israeli loss, and increase the possibility that the US would have to become involved in a war."

16. back content U.S GENERALS ON J&S MOUNTAIN RIDGES Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earl Wheeler: The minimum required for Israel's defense includes most of the West Bank, the whole of Gaza and the Golan Heights (June 29, 1967). Wheeler realized that Mideast peace is based on deterrence.

17. Tel Aviv: A view from the Judea & Samaria Mountain Ridges

18. LAND , DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS & SURPRISE ATTACK Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

19. LAND , DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS & SURPRISE ATTACK NEXT • The transition from Mideast peace to war is as abrupt and unpredictable as is Mideast politics. • A surprise attack provides Arab regular forces (tanks and infantry) a 7:1 edge adjacent to the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area. 50 hours are required to mobilize Israel's reservists (75% of IDF). • The more advanced the Arab military, the faster and more destructive is the surprise offensive, the longer it takes to mobilize Israel's reservists, the more essential are J&S mountain ridges for halting the invasion. Control of the mountain ridges enables a small Israeli force to block the invasion until the arrival of reservists • The slimmer the geographic depth, the less time is available to mobilize reservists, and the more critical is the control of the mountain ridges. The demilitarization of J&S would provide Israel with merely 5-10 hours early warning time (insufficient to mobilize the reservists), before the invasion could reach Israel's "Soft Belly."

20. back content LAND , DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS & SURPRISE ATTACK • Most of Israel's reservists reside in the "narrow waistline" of Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area (70% population, 80% of infrastructures), whichis dominated by the J&S mountain ridges. The control of J&S determines the time available for the deployment of reservists and for blocking a surprise invasion. • Primitive Scud missiles created havoc in Israel’s “Soft Belly” during the 1991 Gulf War. The more advanced the missiles, the more vulnerable are population centers and air force bases (which are crucial for fending off invasion). • Security arrangements, as a substitute for ground barriers, require geographic depth, which provides early warning time, should a peace accord collapse (as happens often in the Mideast). Israel does not possess such a geographic depth. Ground barriers was tactically pertinent in 1948. In 2003 - due to modern weaponry - ground barriers are strategically critical. NEXT

21. IS HIGH-TECH A SUBSTITUTE FOR HIGH-GROUND? Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

22. IS HIGH-TECH A SUBSTITUTE FOR HIGH-GROUND? • High Tech today will always be Low Tech tomorrow. But, High Ground always remains High Ground. • One can, eventually, jam any technology. However, one cannot jam the topographic edge of Judea & Samaria mountain ridges. • A country does not alter its boundaries in accordance with the weapon system and technologies de-jour. • The best US surveillance systems, stationed in the Persian Gulf, failed to detect Iraq's invasions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990). • In 1973, Israel's technology detected Egypt's and Syria's plans of invasion, but the human factor failed to comprehend the data. Ground barriers, rather than technology, enabled Israel to regroup, stopped the invasion and prevented Israel’s annihilation NEXT

23. Tel Aviv/Ramat Gan Stock Exchange as Viewed from the Judea & Samaria mountain ridges

24. back content IS HIGH-TECH A SUBSTITUTE FOR HIGH-GROUND? • Technology is fallible. Ground barriers enables one to overcome technological, intelligence and operational fallibility. In 1973, Sinai, Golan and J&S were the cushion, which spared Israel oblivion. • US technology could not destroy Iraq's missile launchers in 1991. • In 1999, "Newsweek" reported that China might have developed a technology, capable of neutralizing the US Air Force and paralyzing Taiwan's air defense. • The supply of advanced technology has been tempered by suppliers, sometimes leveraged in order to pressure Israel. • The US does not consider high-tech a substitute for vital land. Therefore, it operates military land installations in 120 countries. NEXT

25. Ben Gurion Airport dominated by the Judea & Samaria mountain ridges

26. JUDEA & SAMARIA vs. SINAI Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

27. JUDEA & SAMARIA vs. SINAI NEXT • The Sinai giveaway has constrained Israel's strategic maneuverability and Israel's potential of concessions in other fronts, including J&S. • Sinai borders the Negev, but J&S borders Israel's "Soft Belly," home for 70% of Israel’s population and 80% of its infrastructures. • Sinai does not possess a topographic edge over the Negev, while J&S possess an over-towering edge over Israel's coastal plain. • The Negev (2/3 of pre-1967 Israel) is sparsely populated, constantly accommodating most of Israel's reserve maneuvers, and therefore can absorb a surprise offensive through Sinai. The densely populated sliver coastal plain is unable to absorb a surprise offensive - through Judea & Samaria - by a resurrected Eastern Front.

28. back content JUDEA & SAMARIA vs. SINAI NEXT • A demilitarized Sinai (22,000 sqm) accords a 50 hours early-warning -time for the deployment of Israel's reservists. A demilitarized J&S (2,200sqm) would accord 5-10 hours, while 50 hours are required for full deployment . • Retaking Sinai would be less difficult due to the Negev's similar topography. Retaking J&S would be extremely costly due to J&S' topographic edge • The Sinai giveaway was a calculated risk. A J&S giveaway might be a lethal gamble. • A J&S giveaway would transform Jerusalem into an enclave, connected to the coastal plain by a narrow 5 mile corridor, over-towered by the J&S mountain ridges.

29. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF JUDEA & SAMARIA MOUNTAIN RIDGES Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

30. Ben Gurion Aiport landing strips dominated by the Judea & Samaria mountain ridges

31. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF JUDEA & SAMARIA MOUNTAIN RIDGES NEXT • The eastern mountain ridge of J&S constitutes one of the world's best tank barriers (a 3,000ft steep slope over the Jordan Valley). The five roads traversing it are easily controllable by a small regular force. • The western mountain ridge of J&S (a 2,000ft moderate slope) constitutes a dream platform of invading the sliver coastal plain, for the firing of shoulder launched missiles at civilian aircraft, and for daily terrorism, which would transform the terror reality of the Gaza area to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and the entire coastal plain. • The J&S mountain ridges constitute a platform for air defense, jamming and surveillance systems, which can reach the Persian Gulf, and is essential for the "Arrow" anti-missile system. A Jordanian bomber could reach Israel in 4 minutes from the Jordan Valley, which is the minimum time required to deploy Israel's interceptors.

32. back THE INDISPENSABILITY OF JUDE & SMARIA MOUNTAIN RIDGES NEXT • J&S mountain ridges prevent Israel's coverage by Arab surveillance systems, thus enhancing Israel's defensive and offensive capabilities. • A J&S giveaway would exacerbate terrorism, dwarfing the 1994-2003 losses. • Until 1967, Israel forced Jordan to limit its military force in J&S to 5,000 soldiers, in order to preclude a lethal threat. In 2003, there are 40,000 armed Palestinian terrorists in J&S, which are equal to 4 infantry divisions .

33. back content THE INDISPENSABILITY OF JUDEA & SAMARIA MOUNTAIN RIDGES NEXT • The Judea & Samaria mountain ridges transform Israel from a consumer – to a producer - of national security. J&S mountain ridges enhance Israel's strategic profile in the USA and in the Mideast. A J&S giveaway would induce Arab belligerence. Without J&S, Israel wouldn't have been able to roll back the 1970 Syrian invasion of Jordan, and would not be able to bomb Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981. • The signing of the Oslo Accord radicalized Israeli Arabs. The current stage of Palestinian terrorism (since 2000) has exacerbated Arab-Jewish relations. A J&S giveaway would further deteriorate Jewish-Arab co-existence.

34. UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

35. Ben Gurion airport - a view from the Mountain ridges of Judea & Samaria

36. UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT NEXT • The world expects Israel to yield land, which it scarcely possess. Israel's area is 0.196% of the area of the Arab countries, which is 150% larger than the US and 130% larger than Europe. The West expects the Arabs to accord Israel peace, which they scarcely accord to one another (Arieh Stav, the Ariel Center for Policy Research).

37. back UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT • The geographic depth of J&S, Golan Heights and Sinai (three times as large as pre-1967 Israel) enabled Israel to survive the 1973 surprise offensive. The absence of such a geographic depth would deny minimum security requirements and would require more preemptive wars. • Geographically and topographically Israel has a uniquely limited margin of error during wartime. • Topographic and geographic inferiority mandates Israel to transfer war, promptly, to enemy's territory. NEXT

38. back content UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT • Unlike other countries - and due to Arab track record - Israel can’t afford to lose a war. The Jewish nation was exiled following its defeat 2,000 years ago. But, in view of the official daily Arab hate-education, media and clergy, Jews would not be exiled, should Israel be defeated by the Arabs... Jews would be massacred! • Israel's pre-1967 borders were the longest in the world per sqm, and therefore less defensible. They were 360 kilometers (225 miles) longer than the current borders, characterized by more complex geography, which requires more personnel and hardware NEXT

39. ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

40. Ben Gurion Airport and Israel’s coastal plain Dominated by the Judea & Samaria mountain ridges

41. ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY NEXT • The width of Israel's coastal plain (8-15 miles) is equal to the distance between JFK and La Guardia airports in NY. + =

42. back ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY NEXT • The width of Israel's coastal plain (8-15 miles) is equal to the length of DFW airport in Texas, to the width of Washington DC, San Francisco and Miami and to the distance between Wall Street and Columbia University in New York .

43. back ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY The width of pre-1967 Israel (8-15 miles) is less than the downtown London – Heathrow Airport distance, equal to Albert Hall – Tower of London roundtrip and the distance between Bois Du Boulogne - La Place De La Bastille and the Kennedy Center - RFK Stadium in Washington, DC. : “Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State?” Dr. Michael Widlansky

44. back ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY NEXT • The late Admiral Bud Nance: "The entire state of Israel - including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights - is smaller than the gunnery range at Nellis Air Force Base...Israel is only 9 miles across at is center close to Tel Aviv. This is scarcely more than the distance from the Pentagon to Mount Vernon. A modern tank can traverse this distance in about 15 minutes...With the West Bank included, Israel is approximately 40 miles across at its mid-point. Atlanta is more than 40 miles across. • Israel's area - before 1967 - was just 6 times more than the largest ranch in Texas, King's Ranch. • The US declared a 25 kilometer radius area, in Bosnia, as a "killing zone", in order to ensure the safety of its soldiers.

45. PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.

46. Flight time by a Jordanian combat plane from the Jordan Valley to Tel Aviv : “Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State?” Dr. Michael Widlansky

47. PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST NEXT • The Mideast: 1,400 years of no comprehensive intra-Arab peace, no ratification of all intra-Arab borders, no compliance with all intra-Arab agreements/treaties, not a single Arab democracy. Is it logical to assume that the Arabs will accord to the ("infidel") Jewish State that which they have yet to accord to one another?! • Peace in the Mideast is Peace through Deterrence . • The prime test of a Middle East peace accord is its capability to withstand a worst-case Midast scenarios, such as an abrupt violation by a concerted unpredictable attack, including an Arab uprising within Israel. Would Israel be able to fend off a 1973-like surprise offensive without the cushions of Sinai, Judea, Samaria and the Golan Heights? ??

48. back PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST NEXT • Mideast peace accord is as durable as Mideast politics, which is the shiftiest, and the most treacherous and tenuous in the globe. • Peace accord enhance security as long as the parties adhere to the agreement. Peace accord undermines security, once it is violated, as a result of the territorial concessions made. • “Land for Peace" is logically flawed: While Israel is urged to concede land in return for peace, would Arab violations of peace entitle Israel to retrieve land?!

49. Second Thought: A US-Israel Initiative Written and edited by Yoram Ettinger Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute the “Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.