slide1 l.
Download
Skip this Video
Loading SlideShow in 5 Seconds..
ANALYSIS ON THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES PowerPoint Presentation
Download Presentation
ANALYSIS ON THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES

Loading in 2 Seconds...

play fullscreen
1 / 33

ANALYSIS ON THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 99 Views
  • Uploaded on

ANALYSIS ON THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES. Derek Favret, Michael Stabin, Frank Parker, Jim Clarke and David Kosson. Introduction. September 11, 2001 Nuclear Industry targeted

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'ANALYSIS ON THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES' - zeal


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
slide1

ANALYSIS ON THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT U.S. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES

Derek Favret, Michael Stabin, Frank Parker, Jim Clarke and David Kosson

introduction
Introduction
  • September 11, 2001
  • Nuclear Industry targeted
  • Successful attack would potentially cause devastating release of radioactive material

(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:WTC_attack_9-11.jpg)

headlines
Headlines
  • “…could cause contamination problems significantly worse than those from Chernobyl”
  • “…could release up to 20 times the 137Cs released from Chernobyl”
  • “…disaster of catastrophic proportions”
background
Background

Circles represent sites with one reactor, squares represent plants with two, and stars represent three. Open symbols represent sites with at least one shutdown reactor (Source: Alvarez, et al., Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States, 2003).

light water reactors
Light Water Reactors

(Source: National Academies, “Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, 2006)

spent fuel pool sfp
Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)
  • “Pool within Pool”
  • Building: Industrial-type design
  • Steel superstructure above pool
  • Pool depth: 12-15m
  • Pool volume: ~4000m3
  • No drains or low-level pathways

(Source: NRC, Spent Fuel Pool, 2003)

probability of successful attack
REALISTIC THREAT

“Severe consequences and unpredictability of terrorists”

National Academies:

“difficult but possible”

“additional analysis needed”

UNREALISTIC THREAT

“Robust construction and stringent security requirements”

“Critics overestimate consequences and underestimate ability to cool fuel in damaged pool”

Probability of Successful Attack
scenario
Scenario
  • Loss of Coolant Event – “Zirconium Fire”
  • “Realistic” worst-case analysis
  • SFP located in rural and urban areas
dispersion modeling
Dispersion Modeling
  • Defense Threat Reduction Agency
  • CBRNE modeling tool
  • Gaussian Puff model “SCIPUFF”
  • Joined with RASCAL and climatology database for Nuclear Reactor modeling
hpac incident models
Chemical/Biological Facility Damage

Chemical/Biological Weapon

Industrial Facility

Industrial Transportation

Nuclear Weapon

Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident

Radiological Weapon Incident

Missile Intercept

HPAC Incident Models
slide12
HPAC
  • High-resolution weather, terrain, and land cover data
  • Surface and Upper air climatology
  • Historical, real-time or forecast weather options
hpac parameters
HPAC Parameters
  • Spent Fuel Release
    • Zirconium Fire
    • Fuel Cladding Failure
  • Worst-case settings
  • Historical Weather
parameters cont
Parameters (cont.)
  • Release Height – effective release height
  • Buoyancy
    • Vertical Exhaust Velocity
    • Temperature above Ambient (20oC)
    • Exhaust Area
resrad
RESRAD
  • Argonne National Lab
  • Calculates site-specific residual radiation levels, lifetime dose and excess lifetime cancer risks to chronically exposed on-site residents
  • Pathway Analysis
resrad parameters
RESRAD Parameters
  • Default parameters
  • Radionuclides determined by HPAC
  • Soil density =1.5 g cm-3
  • Contamination depth = 0.1 m
slide20
RURAL SCENARIO

April, May & December yielded areas of contamination ~ 560 km2 (0.037 GBq m-2 contour)

April yielded area of contamination ~ 55 km2 (0.37 GBq m-2 contour)

Majority of plumes released in generally Northern direction

April represents worst-case dispersion

URBAN SCENARIO

January yielded area of contamination ~ 202 km2 (0.037 GBq m-2 contour)

January yielded area of contamination ~ 14 km2 (0.37 GBq m-2 contour)

Majority of plumes released in generally Northern-Eastern direction

January represents worst-case dispersion

HPAC
slide21

Rural Scenario

Ground Deposition

37 GBq m-2

3.7 GBq m-2

0.37 GBq m-2

0.037 GBq m-2

N

Urban Scenario

N

Annual Dose Rate:

70 Sv y-1

7 Sv y-1

700 mSv y-1

70 mSv y-1

slide22
HPAC
  • Total Activity Released = 4.8E+08 GBq (13 MCi)
  • Radionuclides contributing to ground deposition:
    • 137Cs = 33.08%
    • 134Cs = 17.69%
    • 90Sr = 1.54%
    • 106Ru = 0.26%
    • 125Sb = 0.22%
    • 144Ce = 0.08%
    • 147Pm = 0.02%

NOTE: (Noble Gases = 12.31%, external dose contribution only)

activity release gbq hpac vs chernobyl
HPAC Scenarios (Mean)

137Cs = 1.48E+08

134Cs = 7.96E+07

90Sr = 7.03E+06

Chernobyl

137Cs = 8.50E+07

134Cs = 5.40E+07

90Sr = 1.00E+07

Activity Release (GBq): HPAC vs. Chernobyl
resrad dose
RESRAD: Dose

Rural Scenario: 0.37 GBq m-2 (10 mCi m-2) contour

resrad dose25
RESRAD: Dose

Urban Scenario: 0.37 GBq m-2 (10 mCi m-2) contour

protective action guidelines pag
Protective Action Guidelines (PAG)

Source: Federal Registrar, Vol 71, No. 1, 3 Jan 06

resrad dose27
RESRAD: Dose

Rural Scenario: 0.037 GBq m-2 (1 mCi m-2) contour

resrad dose28
RESRAD: Dose

Urban Scenario: 0.037 GBq m-2 (1 mCi m-2) contour

resrad 137 cs contributions to dose
RESRAD: 137Cs contributions to Dose

Rural Scenario: 0.037 GBq m-2 (1 mCi m-2) contour

resrad 90 sr contributions to dose
RESRAD: 90Sr contributions to Dose

Rural Scenario: 0.037 GBq m-2 (1 mCi m-2) contour

headlines in review
Headlines in Review
  • “…could cause contamination problems significantly worse than those from Chernobyl”
  • “…could release up to 20 times the 137Cs released from Chernobyl”
  • “…disaster of catastrophic proportions”
conclusions
HPAC analysis of worst-case incident results in contamination levels in general agreement with Chernobyl.

RESRAD analysis shows potential for acute effects are unlikely.

Dose levels in the worst case analysis are high in some zones, showing that restrictions on worker access and temporary relocation of some populations will be necessary.

Conclusions

Although significant, an incident that results in a zirconium fire at a SFP may not be as catastrophic as suggested.

for more information
For More Information:
  • HPAC
    • http://www.dtra.mil/toolbox/directorates/td/programs/ acec/hpac.cfm
  • RESRAD
    • http://web.ead.anl.gov/resrad/home2