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CAPT James Fraser MC USN Naval Safety Center

HUMAN FACTORS COUNCILS AND BOARDS in Naval Aviation. CAPT James Fraser MC USN Naval Safety Center. 776 aircraft destroyed in 1954. 25 aircraft destroyed in 1997. Naval Aviation Mishap Rate. FY50-97. 60. Angled decks Aviation Safety Center

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CAPT James Fraser MC USN Naval Safety Center

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  1. HUMAN FACTORS COUNCILS AND BOARDS in Naval Aviation CAPT James Fraser MC USN Naval Safety Center

  2. 776 aircraft destroyed in 1954 25 aircraft destroyed in 1997 Naval AviationMishap Rate FY50-97 60 Angled decks Aviation Safety Center Naval Aviation Maintenance Program established in 1959 (NAMP) RAG concept initiated NATOPS Program initiated 1961 Squadron Safety program System Safety Designated Aircraft ACT ORM 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 60 70 80 90 Fiscal Year

  3. All Navy/Marine Corps Mishaps CY 1977-92 16 14 12 Human 10 8 Class A, B,& C Mishaps/100,000 Flight Hours 6 4 Mechanical 2 0 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 Year

  4. Human Factors CouncilsHuman Factors Boards WHY DO WE NEED HFC/HFB? • Aircrew error is the leading cause of mishaps • In many instances, mishap causal factors were previously known to supervisors or peers, but unknown to the CO • The insidious nature of human factors requires that they be reviewed on a regular basis

  5. Human Factors CouncilsHuman Factors Boards WHAT ARE WE LOOKING FOR? • Performance trends, training currency and proficiency • Psychological, physiological, social and professional factors • Medical conditions, emotional and interpersonal stressors

  6. Human Factors CouncilsHuman Factors Boards PURPOSE • To provide a formal mechanism of human factors feedback to the CO • To provide the CO with the information necessary to make decisions regarding the mishap potential of personnel

  7. Human Factors CouncilsHuman Factors Boards • GOALS • Identify potentially hazardous factors before they become causal factors in a mishap. • Assist aviators in the recognition and successful elimination of these safety hazards.

  8. Human Factors Councils • Informal and quarterly (USN) or monthly (USMC) review of all aircrew • Chaired by the CO • Recommended composition: CO, ASO, Flight Surgeon, Operations/Training Officer, Junior Officer, Leading Chief/MCPOC or enlisted aircrew • No unrelated business shall be discussed

  9. Human Factors Councils • Strictly confidential and not to be used in disciplinary action • CO may defer discussion of detailed sensitive, personal, or professional matters to a more appropriate forum

  10. HFC Assessment Process • Operations: Provide flight data for documentation as needed • OPTEMPO • Individual flight time summaries • Training: Provide data to assess • Aircrew qualifications and professional progress • NATOPS/instrument/physiology survival swims quals/upgrades

  11. HFC Assessment Process • All members should discuss the following as related to each individual: • Skills and Qualifications • Systems Knowledge • Aircrew Coordination Performance • Professional Discipline • Risk-taking Behavior • Career Development

  12. HFC Assessment Process • Critical Assessment Process • Declining performance: failure to meet required standards or qualifications process • Known violations or instances of poor flight discipline • Presence of major job or life stressors • Recommended Action - shall not be disciplinary in nature

  13. Convened for cause by the CO Focused reviews of an individual Shall provide a plan of action Composed of the Executive Officer (chairman), Flight Surgeon, ASO School graduate, and another experienced officer Human Factors Boards

  14. If enlisted member is subject, a senior enlisted shall be a member Members from outside command may be used Human Factors Boards

  15. HFB Assessment Process • Notify individual that HFB will be convened • Identify specific problem areas to be considered • Presence of aircrew under review is required • Document performance deficiencies and recommend to CO an appropriate course of action

  16. THE FNAEB/FNFOEB • Administrative Boards convened to evaluate performance, potential and motivation • Convened by superior in command: • Faulty judgement in flight situations • Lack of general skill • Habits, traits, tendencies that make his/her flight status questionable • Minimum flying requirements not met • Questionable AA • FNAEB: Three pilots and FS • FNFOEB: Three NFOs and FS

  17. FNAEB/FNFOEB Outcomes • Type A: Continuation in flight status • A1: Retain in present duty assignment • A3: Transfer to another activity not within same command operating same or different aircraft • A4: Probationary flight status (with appropriate Type B associated) • Type B: Termination of flight status • B1:Retention of right to wear insignia • B2:Revocation of insignia

  18. THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR • Below average nugget or • New transition aviator

  19. THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR • Below average nugget or • New transition aviator • Overconfident senior aviator

  20. THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR • Below average nugget or • New transition aviator • Overconfident senior aviator • “Best pilot”

  21. THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR • Below average nugget or • New transition aviator • Overconfident senior aviator • “Best pilot” • Persistent poor performer

  22. THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR • Below average nugget or • New transition aviator • Overconfident senior aviator • “Best pilot” • Persistent poor performer • Overstressed aviator

  23. “Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He...made a judgment. He believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is a tragedy,... Every instructor, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had the opportunity to influence his judgement, so a little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we lose.” Anonymous USMC Rotary Wing, 1997

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