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L09-01-15-14-205

L09-01-15-14-205. Today, brief review of double-divided line Work on commentaries: the start of Parmenides Tomorrow: Parmenides and the Third Man Argument. QUIZ on Republic Books 6 & 7. Intelligible Realm. Eidos/ Form. NOUS. Diagram. DIANOIA. PISTIS. Object. EIKASIA/

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L09-01-15-14-205

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  1. L09-01-15-14-205 • Today, brief review of double-divided line • Work on commentaries: the start of Parmenides • Tomorrow: Parmenides and the Third Man Argument. • QUIZ on Republic Books 6 & 7

  2. Intelligible Realm Eidos/ Form NOUS Diagram DIANOIA PISTIS Object EIKASIA/ picture thinking Visible Realm Image

  3. I: Hierarchy & Correspondences A Intelligible a Eidos Most Real b Diagram a Object B Visible b Image Least Real

  4. Interpreting the Double Divided Line EPISTEMOLOGICALLY* Logic.Note first that all of the divisions and relations on the figure are analogous: each presents an original and a representation. We will call this the O-R relation. The assumption is that ‘true‘ knowledge is of the original. It is further assumed that the O-R relation is uniformly One-to-many: One and only one original, unchanging and universal, governing an innumerable many. INTELLIGIBLE (Double-divided line) EIDOS NOUS (mind) εἶδοςνόος,νοῦςΑττικ Diagrams Dianoia (thought) διάγραμμαδιανοίᾱ VISIBLE Objects Pistis(opinion, belief) Images Eikasia εικαισια (picture thinking) Interpreting the Double Divided Line *Epistemology: theory of knowledge πίστις,trusted opinion πιστός confidence, ἐπιστήμη, acquaintance or knowledge

  5. Interpreting the DD Line Metaphysically as Ontological presumes that each FORM (EIDOS, EIDEA) exists (is said “to be”), continent (that is, contained within edges or boundaries), situated in a separate ontological realm. Thus, within each realm (Intelligible and visible), the ‘being’ of each element in a couple (EIDOS- Diagram; or Object-Image) is pro- portional. The EIDOS is more real than the diagram; the OBJECT, more real than the image). INTELLIGIBLE (Double-divided line) EIDOS NOUS (mind) εἶδοςνόος,νοῦςΑττικ Diagrams Dianoia (thought) διάγραμμαδιανοίᾱ VISIBLE Objects Pistis(opinion, belief) Images Eikasia εικαισια (picture thinking) Ontology^ / Metaphysics* * Treating first principles, Beyond the physical, ^ ὄντα , things which actually exist

  6. The Causal interpretation presumes that all derivatives (1. The visible, from the intelligible; 2. the diagram from the eidos; 3. the image from the object) are as they arebecause of the original from which they are held to derive. Thus the EIDOS of triangle is responsible for the shape of the diagram; the OBJECT is re- sponsible for the features of the Image. In full scope, the whole of VISIBLE realm is derivative from the INTELLIGIBLE. The CAUSE of the visible world is the intelligible world. MIND:the cause of all things & it’s GOOD INTELLIGIBLE (Double-divided line) EIDOS NOUS (mind) εἶδοςνόος,νοῦςΑττικ Diagrams Dianoia (thought) διάγραμμαδιανοίᾱ VISIBLE Objects Pistis(opinion, belief) Images Eikasia εικαισια (picture thinking) Causal, Atiological(αἰτία,responsibility, cause) The Good This appears to settle Phaedo

  7. Plato’s Problems First, logical. He has no critique of either the actual domain of the sensible (it is not related to the intelligible by opposition), nor of the intelligible (which is not related to the visible as causal ). Both problems are mind bending, if not breaking. Second, metaphysical. What kind of theory of reality is this? Note first that it has four degrees of reality: Eidos most real, diagram next most real, object third most real, and image/shadow/representation fourth most real. Do these degrees never interact? Is reality a diagram? Third, teleological: what is his purpose? If he wants to show that knowledge of the highest principles, EIDOS in each instance, it is so that the philosopher-king can actually be trained to know the absolute and unchanging Truth about all objects of knowledge. And why? So he can govern.

  8. Opening of Parmenides • * * * • Socrates listened to the end, and then asked that the first thesis of the first treatise be read again. When this had been done, he said: [127e] “Zeno, what do you mean by this? That if existences are many, they must be both like and unlike, which is impossible; for the unlike cannot be like, nor the like unlike? Is not that your meaning?” • “Yes,” said Zeno. • “Then if it is impossible for the unlike to be like and the like unlike, it is impossible for existences to be many; for if they were to be many, they would experience the impossible. Is that the purpose of your treatises, to maintain against all arguments that existences are not many? And you think each of your treatises is a proof of this very thing, and therefore you believe that the proofs you offer that existences are not many are as many as the treatises you have written? Is that your meaning, [128a] or have I misunderstood?” • “No,” said Zeno, “you have grasped perfectly the general intent of the work.” • “I see, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “that Zeno here wishes to be very close to you not only in his friendship, but also in his writing. For he has written much the same thing as you, but by reversing the process he tries to cheat us into the belief that he is saying something new. For you, in your poems, say that the all is one, [128b] and you furnish proofs of this in fine and excellent fashion; and he, on the other hand, says it is not many, and he also furnishes very numerous and weighty proofs. That one of you says it is one, and the other that it is not many, and that each of you expresses himself so that although you say much the same you seem not to have said the same things at all, appears to the rest of us a feat of expression quite beyond our power.” • “Yes, Socrates,” said Zeno, “but you have not perceived all aspects of the truth about my writings. You follow the arguments with a scent [128c] as keen as a Laconian hound's, but you do not observe that my treatise is not by any means so pretentious that it could have been written with the intention you ascribe to it, of disguising itself as a great performance in the eyes of men. What you mentioned is a mere accident, but in truth these writings are meant to support the argument of Parmenides against those who attempt to jeer at him and assert that [128d] if the all is one many absurd results follow which contradict his theory. Now this treatise opposes the advocates of the many and gives them back their ridicule with interest, for its purpose is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one. It was in such a spirit of controversy that I wrote it when I was young, [128e] and when it was written some one stole it, so that I could not even consider whether it should be published or not. So, Socrates, you are not aware of this and you think that the cause of its composition was not the controversial spirit of a young man, but the ambition of an old one. In other respects, as I said, you guessed its meaning pretty well.”

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