CDM . . . Critical Decision Making Bill Peterson Fire Chief Plano, Texas Fire - Rescue. CDM References. An adaptation of human factors issues from the following aviation sources: AC 60-22 Aeronautical Decision Making (from www.faa gov/avr/afs)
Critical Decision Making
Plano, Texas Fire - Rescue
An adaptation of human factors issues from the following aviation sources:
(from www.faa gov/avr/afs)
CDM is a systematic approach to the mental process used by fire fighters to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of circumstances.
Builds upon the foundation of conventional decision making . . .
Conventional Decision Making Process
Crew (if present)
ManagementCritical Decision Making Process
All experienced fire fighters have fallen prey to, or have been tempted by, one or more of these dangerous patterns of tendencies or behavior in their fire service careers.
Poor decision making based upon emotional response to peers rather than evaluating a situation objectively.
The inability to recognize and cope with changes in the situation different from those anticipated or planned.
Clouds the vision and impairs judgment by causing a fixation on the original goal of aggressive interior attack - combined with a total disregard for any alternative course of action.
Tendency to continue an interior attack after the low air warning sounds on the SCBA.
Based on a belief that there is a built in “fudge” factor.
An unwillingness to admit defeat and exit the structure before extinguishing the fire.
Often occurs when IC calls for evacuation of interior crews.
Pushing the fire fighter and crew capabilities to the limit by trying to maintain interior operations under rapidly deteriorating conditions.
Often leads to spatial disorientation and eventually loss of direction and situational awareness.
Even more dangerous when operating alone or without a hose line or safety line.
Allowing events or the situation to control your actions rather than the other way around.
not knowing where you are,
an inability to recognize deteriorating circumstances, and
the misjudgment of the rate of deterioration.
Another case of getting behind the incident which results in . . .
Ignoring minimum air reserve requirements is generally the result of overconfidence, lack of incident action planning, or ignoring Standard Operating Procedures.
Unjustified reliance on the (usually mistaken) belief that the crew’s performance capability meets the demands imposed by the most experienced (usually overestimated) member’s skills.
The “Oops” Factors”. . .
Stress is a term used to describe the body’s nonspecific response to demands placed on it, whether those demands are pleasant or unpleasant in nature.
Major and minor stressors have a cumulative effect which constitutes your total stress-adaptation capability which can vary from year to year.
Stress is an inevitable and necessary part of life that adds motivation to life and heightens a fire fighter’s response to meet any challenge.
Accidents often occur when fire fighting task requirements exceed an individual (least qualified or experienced) crew member’s capabilities.
Margin of Safety
Low Air Alarm
TimeThe Margin Of Safety . . .
Risk management is the responsibility of everyone involved in fire fighting.
Detect that change has occurred.
Estimate the need to react to the change.
Choose a desirable outcome for operation.
Identify actions which control the change.
Do take the necessary action.
Evaluate effect of action on the change.
Most preventable accidents have one common factor - humanerror, rather than an equipment malfunction.
A fire fighter does not have to be a genius to be a safe fire fighter.
The development of good decision making skills is far more difficult than developing good fire fighting skills . . .
. . . but it CAN be done!
How are critical decisions being made on your fire scene?