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Well MC 252 #1 Teamleader: Dick Swart 16-02-2011 Presentation to the Petroleum Geologische Kring

Blowout BP Gulf of Mexico The Dutch Hurricane Proof Solution Registered at Horizon Support and BP #BPCC-29893. Well MC 252 #1 Teamleader: Dick Swart 16-02-2011 Presentation to the Petroleum Geologische Kring Meeting at TNO facility Utrecht. Hurricane proof Dutch solution team. Dick Swart

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Well MC 252 #1 Teamleader: Dick Swart 16-02-2011 Presentation to the Petroleum Geologische Kring

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  1. Blowout BP Gulf of MexicoThe Dutch Hurricane Proof SolutionRegistered at Horizon Support and BP #BPCC-29893 Well MC 252 #1 Teamleader: Dick Swart 16-02-2011 Presentation to the Petroleum Geologische Kring Meeting at TNO facility Utrecht

  2. Hurricane proof Dutch solution team • Dick Swart • International drilling expert / teamleader • Willem Heijnen • International production/well technology expert • Professor Ruud van der Hoorn • Centre for Advanced Technical Solutions • Wouter Schiferli • TNO Oil & Gas division • Flow & pressure calculations • Arie Vliegenthart • Swellable packer expert

  3. Presentation • What happened and what went wrong • The Dutch Hurricane Proof Solution • The BP solution • Findings and lessons learned • Impact to the industry 

  4. What happened • Drilling had been completed • Well was to be closed and temporarily abandoned • Production can restart once production platform arrives • Riser mud displaced to sea water • Normally only done after second cement plug is set • Decrease in bottom hole pressure (ca. 250bar) • Influx of reservoir fluid (oil+gas) • Failure of BOP’s to close in well • Ignition and following explosion • 11 fatalities • Drilling platform burned for 2 days and sank • Oil spill > 60 – 80,000 barrels/day

  5. What happened Explosion 20 April 21.56 hrs Rig sunk 22nd of April 10.21 CSTam

  6. Contributing factors • Effectiveness of well barriers not ensured • Mud displaced to seawater • Caused 250 bar pressure drop, mud barrier ineffective • Normally not done without first placing additional barrier (plug) • 300bbls Kick not detected on surface whiles drill pipe pressure was reported rising. • Well barriers failed, either: • Bottom cement plug, and/or • Wellhead seal • BOP shear ram did not close • Coupling or high strength drillpipe between rams? • Raised 9 7/8”casing? • Hydraulic leak? • Hydrate forming in BOP stack

  7. Some accusations… Preliminary results from investigating committees • Behind schedule 5 weeks • Corners cut to improve speed & lower cost • Not repairing BOP hydraulic leak (12-48 hrs) • Cementation (BP/Halliburton) • Insufficient centralizer placement (10 hrs) • No Cement Bond Log (CBL) (12 hrs) • Mud (BP/Transocean) • Not circulating ‘bottoms up’ (12 hrs) • Well design (BP) • Single full production string ($10 million) • Rejected option: • Two stage production string with liner hanger and tieback • No lock down Casing hanger (BP/Transocean) • No lockdown sleeve installed • Reduces effectiveness of wellhead seals

  8. Who did (not do) what? • BP • Cutting corners in design, operations, supervision and management • Halliburton/BP • Performed cement job in contrast to own guidelines • Bad quality • Transocean/BP • Inability to detect 300bbl kick timely and react properly • Not closing in well (wrong equipment between shear rams or other causes) • MMS • Did (not dis)approve well design • US Government • Reduced the MMS budget and control options

  9. Initial Cause of Blowout bad cement job or ?

  10. Hurricane Proof Dutch solution (Short term 4-8 weeks) • Stop drilling the relief wells immediately, because cratering possibilities (BP will intersect above cap rock) • Oil& Gas tight connection to Horizon BOP stack • LMRP cap riser stump or flange connection • Swellable seals or flange connection or combination • Tie in to nearby infrastructure • Connection to eg Na Kika pipe line (@ ca. 5miles) • Flow MC 252 well to Na Kika pipe line with 80,000bbl/day minimum capacity • System Hurricane proof i.s.o. disconnect and tie back systems with 14 days unrestricted maximum oilflow again

  11. Hurricane Proof Dutch solution (Long term6-12 month) • Drill reservoir production wells • 4 highly inclined wells in circle around flowing well • Reduce pressure on the reservoir • Production from reservoir through 4 wells via newly to be installed subsea infrastructure • Stop flow in uncontrollable well after a certain production period by • Killing well with relief well(s) • Plug and abandon well MC 252 and recover Horizon BOP stack

  12. Advantages of the Dutch solution • Oil could be produced and sold. • Ample time to investigate/repair and recover • No need for further quick fixes such as top kill’s, junk kill’s, intersection above the cap rock Disadvantages of the Dutch solution • Cost money, had to pay NaKika for production loss • Not invented by Us • Would not show that one worked on the spill

  13. The BP Solution Is the situation now OK ? • Start the PR, allowing the media to observe the seafloor, open up a response centre allowing people to contribute, hiring local people to clean-up the beaches etc… • Cap the well asap to stop the spill • Use detergent to prevent the spill to come on shore • Kill the well asap to enable removal of the BOP demonstrating the well is dead and no longer dangerous. • The well is killed using a top kill and not a bottom kill • There is no data available regarding the well bore condition in the cap rock, hence erosion • There is no data available showing that the cap rock is sealed

  14. BOP Relief Well Frack’s ? Cap Rock 150 bar Reservoir INTERNALBLOWOUTSCENARIO ? • BP Top Kill Scenario • BOP was closed • The well was killed • Well was intercepted above the cap • rock • Cement was pumped from the top • and has sealed the well • No evidence that: • The cement did enter the cap rock • annulus • There is sufficient cement to withstand • the 150 bar pressure differential. • The overburdon is not fracked.

  15. BP 8 Findings • The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons. • The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons. • The negative-pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not been established. • Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser. • Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well. • Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig. • The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition. • The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.

  16. Government Findings

  17. Lessons learned • MMS was lacking control due to industry pressure • Safety culture is lacking • Equipment might not be suitable for deep water • No emergency response plans and adequate equipment • Risk assessments are lacking and/or inadequate

  18. Recommendations in the USA divided in caragory A-G • Improving the safety of offshore operations • Safeguarding the Environment • Strengthening Oil Spill Response, Planning and Capacity • Advancing Well-Containment Capabilities • Overcoming the Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Spill and Restoring the Gulf • Ensuring Financial Responsibility • Promoting Congressional Engagement to Ensure Responsible Offshore Drilling The total recommendation section of the report to Obama is 40 pages……

  19. BP Blowout Consequencesfor the Dutch industry This results in more inspections, more documentation, more evidence for performance which includes even the drilling of geothermal wells.

  20. QUESTIONS • Why was the Dutch help not accepted and implemented ? • Why was a bullhead cementation performed instead of circulating cement as usual ? • Why was the relief well not drilled into the reservoir ? • Why was the second relief well not used ? • etc………..

  21. Backup viewgraphs

  22. New LMR Cap with 18” pipeline tieback and 3ea 10” bypass valves Clamping tool or Flange connection

  23. STEP 1 Hang new LMR cap with 18” diverless connector and 3ea 10” bypass valves close to MC 252 well Remove old LMR Cap

  24. STEP 2 Install LMR Cap with all valves open on the riser stump or flange

  25. STEP 3 Tie in MC252 into PLET to Na Kika pipeline STEP 4 Open valves to Na Kika pipeline close 3 ea 10” valves 1 by 1 remove Drilstring RESULT : A HURRICANE PROOF SYSTEM Presently installed subsea methanol system to be used Pipe heating to be investigated If necessary 3 ea 10” bypass valves can be used for floating Production systems as backup

  26. Picture taken of removed riser bottom by ROV 2 pieces of 5 ½” drill pipe sticking up inside riserstump If the inside of the 9 7/8”casing would have been clean than the Drill Pipe should have fallen to bottom or blown out of the well 9 7/8”casing hydrauliced out of casing hanger by 250 bar pressure difference when displacing mud with seawater and/or temperature expansion with slip &seal assembly not locked 2 pieces, because of chainsaw cut and one because of final shear, is our assessment, on what is pipe resting???? We assume on crushed casing by the shearrams All rams do not function with hotline on seabed, technical failure or other obstructions inside the Horizon BOP stack?

  27. Ongoing containment activities

  28. Picture Slide 16 Partly failed, had to cut with shears

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