1 / 10

Unraveling the "Dacha Amnesty": Informal Property Rights Formalization in Russia

Explore the phenomenon of informal property rights in Russia through the "Dacha Amnesty" reform, analyzing its impact on development and the factors influencing reform outcomes. Delve into the literature on formalization's effects and barriers to entry, assessing the significance of property rights institutions. Investigate demand and supply-side hypotheses, highlighting the government's role and potential bureaucratic capture. Future steps involve survey data analysis and examining land registry trends. Contact: ekaterina.khmelnitskaya@gmail.com

wilona
Download Presentation

Unraveling the "Dacha Amnesty": Informal Property Rights Formalization in Russia

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Property Rights Formalization: The Mystery of “Dacha Amnesty” Ekaterina Khmelnitkskaya ForChicago Workshop on Institutional AnalysisMay 15-21, 2011

  2. Motivation • Why Informal sectors are so widespread in developing countries, although they likely hinder their development?

  3. - “Dacha amnesty” reform in Russia • We intend to single out the main factors affecting the progress of reform … • and to assess their relative significance in affecting reform outcomes .

  4. Literature • Formalization of property rights has long-run positive effects on development (De Soto (2004); Galiani et al. (2009)) • High barriers to entry benefit bureaucracy and other special interest groups (Djankov et al. (2002)) • “Property rights institutions” and “extractive institutions” (AJR(2001)) • Open access social orders and limited access social orders (North, Weingast, Wallis (2009)) • Informal property rights systems can be efficient in providing secure and transferable property rights (JacobyandMinten (2005); Lanjouw, Levy (2002))

  5. Basic facts (1) • Every second Russian has a dacha or a land plot (VCIOM, 2009) • As of 2006, about 40 mln. dachas were not formally owned by their de-facto owners; • Over 4 years of reform less then 10% of such dachas owners obtained secure property tiltes for their land and dweiings

  6. Basic facts (2)

  7. Hypotheses: demand side • Strong informal property rights • Value of a land plot • Other social effects • Bandwagon effect • land plots are not perceived as assets • Strong formal property rights

  8. Hypotheses: supply side • Government support for the reform is inadequate (investments in creating specialized property-related institutions) • Local registration offices may be “captured” by bureaucrats and other special interest groups

  9. Next steps • Survey data analysis • The purpose of survey is to study factors influencing individual decisions about formalization • Land registry and other sources of dafta • The purpose is to study trends and factors influencing the pace of reform

  10. Thank you for your attention! • Contacts – ekaterina.khmelnitskaya@gmail.com

More Related