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Basing Pseudorandom Generators on Regular One-way Functions

This paper explores the construction of pseudorandom generators (PRGs) using regular one-way functions (OWFs). It discusses the concepts of regular functions, known-regular functions, and unknown-regular functions. It also explains the relationship between PRGs and OWFs and presents different constructions and proofs for PRGs from known-regular OWFs and unknown-regular OWFs. The paper concludes with lower bounds and a new construction for PRGs from unknown-regular OWFs with linear seed length.

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Basing Pseudorandom Generators on Regular One-way Functions

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  1. Basing Pseudorandom Generators on Regular One-way Functions 基于规则单项函数的伪随机产生器构造 郁昱 上海交通大学 计算机系

  2. One-way Functions (单向函数) • One-way function(OWF) • Simplifying notation: f • Definition: f is an -OWF if f is efficient (computable in time poly(n)) and for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A: • Standard definition: is negligible in, denoted by • Folklore: OWFs can be assumed to be length-preserving, i.e., m=n.

  3. Regular Functions (规则函数) • f is a regular function if the preimage size α= is fixed (independent of y). • Known-regular function: a regular function f whose regularity α is polynomial-time computable from security parameter n. • Unknown-regular function: a regular function f whose regularity α is inefficient to approximate from security parameter n. one-way permutation: a special case of known-regular OWFs.

  4. Pseudorandom Generators (伪随机产生器) Pseudorandom generator (PRG) A function (< ) is an -PRG if is efficient and every PPT distinguisher tells from with only negligible advantages: =negl(n) x g(x) y

  5. OWF  PRG : a central problem in cryptography • The BM-Y generator Theorem (BM-Y 1982): Any one-way permutation implies a PRG for any =poly(n). Theorem (generalized): Any PRG implies a PRG for any =poly(n). Manuel Blum Turing Award 1995 Silvio Micali Turing Award 2012 Andrew Yao Turing Award 2000 f f f f output

  6. Min-entropy and pseudo-entropy • implies every (even unbounded) algorithm A satisfies • (Unpredictable) Pseudo-entropy: denoted by if every PPT algorithm A satisfies Question: what is the (pseudo)entropy of x given f(x) for OWF f ?

  7. Statistical and computational distances • Statistical distance: between X and Y, denoted by SD(X,Y) is defined by SD(X,Y)= • SD(X,Y) implies every (even unbounded) distinguisher D satisfies • Computational distance: between X and Y, denoted by CD(X,Y) if every PPT distinguisher D satisfies

  8. (pseudo)randomness extraction • Leftover hash lemma: let (X,Z) be any r.v. with and let h: be a universal hash function, then : uniform distribution over , d:entropy loss • Goldreich Levin theorem: let (X,Z) be any r.v. with then there exists efficient hash (with linear description) : k= and thus =negl(n)

  9. Pseudoentropy of regular one-way functions • Unpredictable Pseudoentropy (UP) : X has m bits of UP given f(X) if every PPT A wins the following game with probability no greater than • Question: what’s the UP of X given f(X) if f is a regular -OWF with regularity • Claim: • Rationale: Challenger C Adversary A

  10. PRGs from Known Regular OWFs • g (X, h1, h2,hc) =(h1(f(X1)), h2(X1),hc(X1), h1, h2,hc) A complicated and long proof is given by Goldreich in his crypto textbook volume1,Sec3.5.2(pp. 141-147)

  11. PRGs from Known-Regular OWFs by three extractions (a three-line proof) • Assumption: f is -one-way and 2k-regular, i.e. • Construction and Proof. • extract () bits using h1 • extract bits using h2 • chain rule: extract bits using hard-core function hc • This completes the proof for the folklore construction, i.e. g (X, h1, h2, hc) =(h1(f(X)), h2(X),hc(X), h1, h2, hc) is a PRG. • Optimal parameters: seed length linear in n, and a single call to f .

  12. Tightening the security bounds • g (x, h1, h2,hc) =(h1(f(x)), h2(x),hc(x), h1, h2,hc) The proof for 3rd extraction: consider f ‘(x,h2)=(f(x), h2(x), h2) • A tighter approach?

  13. PRGs from unknown-regular OWFs the randomized Iterate • Goldreich, Krawczyk and Luby (SICOMP 93) : PRGs from known regular OWFs with seed length O(n3) • Haitner, Harnik and Reingold (CRYPTO 2006): PRGs from unknown regular OWFs with seed length O(n ·log n) f h1 f h2 f output h1, h2, … are random pairwise independent hash, hc is hard-core function

  14. Lower bounds by Holenstein and Sinha (FOCS12) • Asymptotic setting: Any black-box construction of PRG must make calls to an arbitrary (including unknown regular) OWF. • Concrete setting : Any black-box construction of PRG must make calls to an arbitrary (including unknown regular) -secure OWF.

  15. PRGs from unknown-regular OWFs: a new construction • Assumption: f is -one-way and 2k-regular ( k is unknown). • The goal: a PRG construction oblivious of k. • The idea: transform f into a known-regular OWF • is also an -one-way function • is a 2n-regular function, i.e.

  16. PRGs from unknown-regular OWFs: a new construction (cont’d) • Given a one-way function with known pre-image size 2n • Similarly, has bits of UP given . • We get a special PRG • Done? No, n bits needed to sample from (i.e. ) stretch : To make it positive: iterate • In summary: a PRG from unknown regular OWF with linear seed length (hybrid argument) and OWF calls. • Tight (Holenstein and Sinha, FOCS 2012): BB construction of PRG requires OWF calls, and calls in general.

  17. Summary • PRG from any known-regular : seed length and to the underlying OWF • PRG from any unknown-regular : seed length and OWF calls Question: remove the dependency on ? Yes, by paying a factor in seed length and number of calls. Why? Due to the entropy loss of the Leftover Hash Lemma. Given (without knowing ) Run q= copies of f , extracting 2logn hardcore bits per copy, followed by a single extraction with entropy loss set to q · logn . calls

  18. The ultimate: PRGs from any OWFs • The HILL generator: Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby (SICOMP 1999) gave a construction of PRG from any OWF but with seed length O() • The HRV generator: Haitner, Reingold and Vadhan (STOC 2010) gave a PRG with seed length O() from any OWF. • The Vadhan-Zheng generator: Vadhan and Zheng(STOC 2012) gave a PRG with seed length O() from any OWF. • Open problem: how to construct PRG with seed length o() from any OWF?

  19. More details Extend abstract in the proceedings of Asiacrypt 2013 also available at eprinthttp://eprint.iacr.org/2013/270 ECCC Report TR14-082 Contact: yuyu@yuyu.hk

  20. Thank you!

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