230 likes | 465 Views
. . Motivation. GPS/FMS equipment with accuracies better then 0,3 nm is standard todayGPS/FMS-RNAV SIDs and STARs have positive impact in TMA-Ops in all aspectsGPS-NPAs are the primary NPA-procedures over outdated (offset) NDB/VOR approaches. . . Motivation. GPS is the system for ermerging airport
E N D
1. Database IntegrityThe issue for making RNAV a real success Capt. Jürgen SchadtChief Technical Pilot
Capt. A-320
Lufthansa German Airlines
Chief Technical Pilot Office, FRA OY
2. Motivation GPS/FMS equipment with accuracies better then0,3 nm is standard today
GPS/FMS-RNAV SIDs and STARs have positive impact in TMA-Ops in all aspects
GPS-NPAs are the primary NPA-procedures over outdated (offset) NDB/VOR approaches
3. Motivation GPS is the system for ermerging airports with "problematic" infrastructure---> CIS: see Samara - UWWW AFI: see Addis Abbeba
Operators experience every AIRAC - Cycle Nav-database problems
4. The primary motivation for any
"Database controlled approach"
is - enhanced flight safety
- economic benefits
- positive environmental impact Motivation
5. Definition: Database Integrity
6. Database quality management
7. Problems of Database Integrity Navigational data are generated today and in short to medium future by unsecure/uncertified processes
no "usable" standards exists for generation of databases with guranteed integrity---> RTCA DO-200A cannot be implemented today
8. Problems of Database Integrity there will be no fully implementable procedures for database integrity available for the next years by any non airline organisationNegative example: Implementation of WGS-84
the implementation of GPS/FMS-RNAV procedures depends on the availabilty of procedures to ensure database integrity
9. Database process plus DbIT Database generation
1. AIP
2.Databse supplier
3. Database packer
3. User ---> Airline
"UNSECURE" PROCESS
10. Database Integrity for Operators To ensure a high level of database integrity ---> GPS - NPA and GPS/FMS-RNAV - procedures.---> 5 level integrity concept ("multilayered system")
1. Training for all pilots Tool: simulator, aircraft, training handouts Time: permanent ---> all fleets
2. Check of NavDatabase prior effectivity to detect changes of Ops - critical" data incl. an immediate reaction scheme Tool: DbIT (Database Integrity Tool) ---> inservice 08/2000 Time: 2 - 5 days prior database effectivity
11. Database Integrity for Operators 3. Check of "critical" data prior starting the procedure (e.g. GPS-approach) by the flightcrew Tool: charts, crew operating procedures Time: 10 - 15 minutes prior starting approach
4. Plausibilty check during approach Tool: charts, crew ops. procs., training Time: during approach
5. Administrative seperation of database integrity- checks and data handling ---> Flightops Tool: internal organisation Time: permanent ---> all fleets
12. JAA TGL - 3 ---> GPS Procs. "Notification of certification and operations of GPS - receivers"
---> primary certification document for LBA
I.6.2 Use of GPS for NPABullets (a) to (g) describe the requirements for GPS-NPA
Database integrity ---> (h):"The approach procedures has to be used as stored inside the navdatabase. The database must contain the offical published procedure"
13. JAA TGL - 10 ---> PRNAV 10.6. Database Integrity10.6.1: Database has to be obtained by RTCA DO-200A certified database supplier
10.6.2: If supplier not certified additional checks have to be carried out through software or approved manual means (for all procedures below MOCA) by the operator
10.6.4: Operators should consider additional checks even if database is obtained by certified supplier ---> JAR Ops 1.035 Quality System
10.6.5: See Annex B for specification of database integrity software
14. RNAV(GPS) - Procedures
15. Implementing Database Integrity
16. DbIT- (Database Integrity Tool) Goal Ensure database integrity in regard of Ops critical" data prior database effectivity
Way Implementation and maintenance of a reference- database, which will be run by flightops. All changes in comparison to the referencedatabase will rated as "critical" or "non critical".
"Philosophy" Detected data changes of critical data will lead to immediate disauthorization of the applicable procedures. Parallel the database supplier will be informed and required to present a solution.
17. DbIT- Main Menü
18. DbIT- Input Database
19. DbIT- Reference Database
20. DbIT- Edit Ref Waypoint
21. DbIT- Critical Data Report Critical Data Report ---> CDR
22. Sum up ---> DbIT automated check of any database against a reference database ---> database quality index
reference database contains "flight critical" data
automated generation of "Critical Data Report"
action scheme in terms of checklist augments DbIT
full encrypted log file for reference data control
DbIT is available for any operator
23. Conclusion - Operators are forced to act due to the increasing number of published RNAV - Procedures and insufficient database integrity processes
- Operators even have to apply higher standards in respect of less experience with RNAV procedures and database integrity issues
- Training in all respects for all involved personel is vital for the success of RNAV
- One incident or accident stops the whole RNAV Movement
24. Point of contact Lufthansa German Airlines
Jürgen Schadt Chief Technical Pilot, Capt. A-320 Chief Technical Pilot Office, FRA OY Lufthansa German Airlines Phone: +49-69-696-2360 Fax: +49-69-696-7070 E-Mail: Juergen.Schadt@dlh.de DbIT - Infos: www.database-integrity.com