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Spotlight Case July 2006

Spotlight Case July 2006. Moving Pains. Source and Credits. This presentation is based on the June/July 2006 AHRQ WebM&M Spotlight Case See the full article at http://webmm.ahrq.gov CME credit is available through the Web site

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Spotlight Case July 2006

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  1. Spotlight Case July 2006 Moving Pains

  2. Source and Credits • This presentation is based on the June/July 2006 AHRQ WebM&M Spotlight Case • See the full article at http://webmm.ahrq.gov • CME credit is available through the Web site • Commentary by: Hildy Schell, RN, MS, CCRN, CCNS, and Robert Wachter,MD, University of California, San Francisco • Editor, AHRQ WebM&M: Robert Wachter, MD • Spotlight Editor: Tracy Minichiello, MD • Managing Editor: Erin Hartman, MS

  3. Objectives • Appreciate the risk posed by intrahospital transport • Identify key features of current transport practice and policies • Propose interventions that might improve safety of intrahospital transport

  4. Case: Moving Pains A 90-year-old woman, whose son was a prominent non-clinical member of the medical school faculty, was admitted to the acute care ward with a urinary tract infection and pneumonia. After developing hypoxemia, on hospital day 2 she was placed on 2L oxygen by nasal cannula. On hospital day 3, her hypoxemia worsened, as did her mental status. A head CT was ordered. She was placed on a non-rebreather mask (NRM) at 15L/min to maintain her oxygen saturations.

  5. Case: Moving Pains This change in respiratory status occurred while the primary nurse was occupied by the critical needs of another patient, so another nurse and the respiratory therapist placed the patient on the NRM. At the nurses’ station, the primary nurse completed the Transport Stability Scale (TSS, a local instrument to assess a patient's stability for transport and determine whether a nurse or physician must travel with the patient) in preparing the patient for transport to the CT scanner.

  6. Case: Moving Pains Since the nurse was unaware of the change in the patient’s respiratory status, she recorded that the patient required only 2L oxygen by nasal cannula. Accordingly, the TSS score did not signal a need for a nurse or physician to accompany the patient. Therefore, the patient was taken to the CT scanner by two transport personnel/escorts and her son, the physician-faculty member.

  7. Risks During Patient Transport • Increased risk of morbidity and mortality during intrahospital transport of critically ill patients is well described • Society of Critical Care Medicine and American College of Critical Care Medicine developed guidelines for such transport

  8. Transport of Non-ICU Patients • However, no current guidelines or peer-reviewed articles cover transport of non-ICU patients • Recognizing risk of intrahospital transport, many hospitals have developed policies Warren J, et al. Crit Care Med. 2004;32:256-262.

  9. Transport Policies for Non-ICU Patients • Lack clear standards for patient assessment, including the elements, timing, and responsible party • Do not outline intervention required nor contingency plans should patient’s status change during the course of transport • Unclear who should transport patient under a variety of circumstances • Rarely have systems in place to ensure policies are enforced

  10. Case (cont.): Moving Pains As the transporters prepared to leave the floor with the patient, one of them noticed that the patient had labored breathing. He suspected that a nurse should travel with them, but did not question the nurse’s assessment on the transport stability form. During transport, the patient continued breathing through her NRM, which was connected to an oxygen tank.

  11. Case (cont.): Moving Pains Once the patient arrived in radiology, the CT technician noticed that NRM bag was deflated, and the oxygen tank limited oxygen delivery to 4L/min. The technician connected the NRM to the wall oxygen source at 15L/min for the study, and located an appropriate tank (which would allow higher flow oxygen) for the trip back to the unit. After the study, the patient was switched to this new tank at 15L/min and awaited transport. The CT technician noted that the tank had 1000 lbs of pressure.

  12. Case (cont.): Moving Pains The two transporters arrived and took the patient to return to her room. In the elevator, one of the transporters realized that she no longer heard the flow of oxygen and that the NRM bag was deflated. When they returned to the floor, she immediately called for help. The patient was reconnected to the wall oxygen source in her room at 15L/min. However, by that time, the patient was noted to be severely hypoxemic and markedly short of breath.

  13. Case (cont.): Moving Pains Over the next hour, the patient’s condition continued to worsen. Because she did not wish to be intubated, she expired approximately 30 minutes after arrival to the floor. A root cause analysis later attributed the death, at least in part, to inadequate delivery of supplemental oxygen and insufficient observation during the transport process.

  14. What Went Wrong? • Hospital did have system for assessing and communicating a patient’s clinical stability, but assessment did not reflect patient’s immediate, pre-transport condition • Enforcing an acceptable timeframe for pre-transport assessment is essential • Because the assessment occurred prior to deterioration, patient was accompanied by two “transport personnel/escorts” • Transport personnel are usually unlicensed and have variable training and responsibilities

  15. What Went Wrong? • Transporters see the dyspneic patient and wonder whether a nurse should be present, but the transport scale says that it isn’t necessary • Transporters would have to be empowered to question assessment

  16. What Went Wrong? • Son may have shared concerns about stability, but not comfortable questioning scenario • Role as family member, not health care provider • As a faculty member at the institution, may have worried about being too demanding

  17. What Went Wrong? • Oxygen therapy during intrahospital transport of non-ICU patients is frequently interrupted • High levels of variability in responsibilities of respiratory care practitioners and nurses for oxygen therapy on acute care units • Critical care guidelines recommend that oxygen source have adequate supply for the patient’s needs (flow rate over time of transport to and from destination), plus a 30-minute reserve Warren J. et al. Crit Care Med. 2004;32:256-262.Stubbs CR, et al. Respir Care. 1994;39:968-972.

  18. Improving the Safety of Intrahospital Transport • Assess current practice and policies • Which patients are being transported, and to which locations • Pre-transport assessments • Transport personnel competency and responsibilities • Handoff communication • Necessary equipment and supplies • Transport monitoring safety practices

  19. Assess Current Practice and Policies • Which patients are being transported? • Focus on most frequent source units and patient types • To which locations are patients transported? • Are they in main hospital, adjacent buildings, across the street? • Are there special safety hazards in any of the units (eg, MRI magnets)?

  20. Assess Current Practice:Pre-transport Patient Assessment • What criteria are used to determine patient stability, patient risk, and level of monitoring during transport? • Who is responsible for this assessment? • What is the recommended timing for this assessment? • How is assessment communicated to the care team, the transport personnel, and destination personnel?

  21. Assess Current Practice:Pre-transport Patient Assessment • Do the assessment criteria include risk factor assessment based on the type of procedure/diagnostic, patient positioning during transport, and length of transport time? • Does the assessment take into account the possibility of decline in clinical condition and the need for additional support? • How is compliance monitored?

  22. Assess Current Practice: Transport Personnel • Who transports patients (unlicensed and licensed personnel)? • What are their specific responsibilities before and during transport? • What level of training and competency assessment is done related to patient safety during transport? • Are they required to have Basic Life Support (CPR) certification? • What is the content of their training?

  23. Assess Current Practice:Handoff Communication • How are the patient’s condition, potential safety risks, and needs communicated? • Is a checklist used? • Is patient identification included? • What is the responsibility of the sending and receiving providers and/or transporters?

  24. Assess Current Practice:Necessary Supplies and Equipment • What equipment is required to accompany the acute care patient during transport? • Who ensures that therapies are maintained during transport? • Would the transport personnel know how to use or troubleshoot any accompanying equipment/supplies, if needed?

  25. Assess Current Practice:Transport Monitoring • What basic level of monitoring is expected during transport ? • Are the transporters qualified or adequately trained for this? • What is the expected level of intervention?

  26. Examples of Best Practices • Use of a transport stability scale/tool and develop structure for how, when, and by whom it is used • “Ticket to Ride” system • Checklist system used by the sending RN Ward M, et al. National Teaching Institute and Critical Care Exposition; May 15-20, 2004; Orlando, FL.

  27. Implications for Future Study • Transport tends to “fall between the cracks” of divisions, departments, and providers • Too little research, too few innovative quality improvement practices • Identify risk factors for negative outcomes associated with intrahospital transport of acutely ill patients • Evaluate system improvements, eg, transport teams or innovative communication systems

  28. Take-Home Points • Intrahospital transport is probably quite risky, but has been understudied • Focus should be on standardized assessments, use of checklists, ensuring that the appropriate providers and technology accompany the patient, creating contingency plans for changes in patient condition, and enforcing the standards

  29. Take-Home Points • The issue of respiratory assessment and oxygen delivery is frequently poorly handled, and would benefit from the engagement of respiratory therapists in the planning process • Pay attention to cultural issues that may get in the way of individuals raising appropriate concerns regarding the transfer process

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