Plan

1. Plan • I will talk a bit about Ukraine’s foreign policy and how it is linked to its national identity. • First I give a concise chronological overview of their FP initiatives • Secondly I will briefly assess them by extrapolating the main characteristics of Ukrainian foreign policy. Putting these characteristics together, I will come to definition of Ukrainian FP • Lastly, after summarising Ukrainian foreign policy and the different takes on FP by the different presidents, I will raise some questions on the link between Ukrainian FP and national identity that are then up for discussion

2. National Identity and Statehood under Kravchuk 1991-1994 • Kravchuk was elected president of Ukraine in December 1991. 7 days later, he signed the Belavezha Treaty together with the Belarusian speaker of Parliament Oleksandr Shushkevich and Boris Yeltsin, thereby founding the Commonwealth of Independent States (perceived as a follow-up to the USSR minus the Baltic States) • One shouldn’t think however that establishing the CIS was Kravchuk main policy priority – not at all! • Before setting out structured foreign policy lines, Kravchuk had to deal with some rather urgent issues, like the delineation of the new borders and the codification of border agreements (because the borders with USSR republics were not well-defined as such and had to be internationally established  and this turned out to be a problem with Russia, that was being difficult), the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the agreements with Russia who planned to take over the Soviet nuclear arsenal stocked in Ukraine, the delicate issue of the division of the Black Sea Fleet which turned out to be a source of strife between Russia and Ukraine, etc etc • Apart from dealing with all these issues, and moreover actively working on state – and nation building (Ukrainisation), Leonid Kravchuk also made sure that Ukraine joined the crucial international organisations and agreements in the world.

3. Main FP Initiatives under Kravchuk 1991-1994 1994 START I treaty in force for Ukr and others 1992 Ukr signs Lisbon protocol of START I (strat arms reduction ) treaty 1994 Ukr-NATO Partnership for Peace (first among CIS states! 1994 PCA with EU 1991 Ukr joins North Atlantic Cooperation Council 1992 OSCE member WEST 1991 founding of CIS. !!! Belavezha treaty never ratified! EAST

4. One can see here that the FP initiatives in the first years of independence were mainly aimed at the West – this is the result of several factors: • - on the one hand, Ukraine needed to keep pace by integrating itself in the international system as a newly independent state, so activity was high on that side; • - on the other hand, relations within former Soviet space were maybe a bit more strained in light of the Soviet breakdown and all the border, nuclear, and other arrangements it brought about • Kravchuk’s FP towards Russia: one of clear pragmatism (Umbach)  that’s maybe why the Black Sea Conflict took a while to arrange – Ukraine wasn’t giving in that easily. • Kravchuk’s FP towards the West and towards international organisations: a policy of openness. Many initiatives, which gave president Kravchuk a bit the reputation of being a pro-Western president, while most of all, he was a pro-Ukrainian president, and that is still a different thing. • When presidential elections came up in 1994, the candidates made their pro-western or pro-eastern orientation one of the pinpoints of their campaign. Leonid Kuchma profiled himself as a more pro-Russian candidate. His origins lie in Dnepropetrovsk, a city in the – mostly pro-Russian – East of Ukraine. Kravchuk was born in Volhynia, the region that was part of Poland but became part of Ukraine after WWII. He was therefore quickly perceived as the candidate of Western Ukraine. • Kuchma professed a pro-Eastern course when elected. Did this translate into his foreign policy? Look at timeline

5. Ukrainian Foreign Policy under Kuchma 1994-2004 1998 PCA entered into force 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter on Distinctive partnership 1998 Ukr publishes Strategy of integration in the EU 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan WEST 1995 CoE member 1997 GU(U)AM initiative 2000 Ukr joins Eurasian Economic Community 2001 Ukr ratifies EvrazES 2003 Ukr (partly) joins Common Economic Space initiative (successor of EvrazES) EAST 1997 Friendship Treaty with Russia

6. Assessment of Kuchma’s Foreign Policy • When looking at this timeline; Ukraine did not really take a pro-Russian turn under Kuchma. • Black Sea Fleet conflict was resolved and Friendship treaty signed • In the course of two presidential terms, Ukraine joined a couple of initiative sin the framework of CIS, but the general attitude was not enthusiastically pro-CIS , moreover, maybe even a little bit restrained; founding of GUUAM as counterweight to Russian dominance in the region!! • More enthusiasm towards Western initiatives? • relations with EU & NATO become more serious; • PCA goes into force, EU ambition clearly expressed • Partnership with NATO materialises a bit more  not to say that these initiatives qualify Ukraine as a purely pro-Western nation, not in the least because NATO and EU are rather reticent and have tried to keep Ukraine at a distance – up until this day • BUT this shows that Ukraine definitely did not take a purely eastern course as professed by Kuchma before his election; it takes a bit of courage to take these initiatives in a time that Russia was fiercely opposing NATO-enlargement

7. Ukraine’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy • How can we define Ukraine FP then? Ukraine has a multi-vector foreign policy balancing between Europe and the CIS. • Kuchma and his government gladly used this idea of a multi-vector FP since it is an elegant way of putting things • The whole East-West divide is therefore severely overstated! This is also illustrated in the timelines I showed you  there is in no way a clear focus on the West or the East, especially since the mid’90s when Ukraine actively started developing its FP. Reasons behind multi-vector FP? • economic reasons no way around it; Ukraine still economically dependent on Russia, especially after 2000 (Gongadze Scandal), when West turned its back to Ukraine.  multi-vector FP is a handsome way of saying ‘we’re pro-Western, but still work with Russia too – for pragmatic reasons’ • Indecisiveness?  sometimes blatantly contradictory FP actions of Ukraine within a short time span eg in 2003: Ukraine joins Common Economic Space and within same month confirms its European ambitions and announces it will officially apply for NATO membership – gives not only impression of multi-vector, but also of inconsistency and betting on different horses at same time  does not give the West the impression of taking its ambitions seriously (but more of being in it for personal-economic gain)  bipolar disorder?  • trying to keep everybody happy? •  national identity plays a role in it as well

8. National Identity & Foreign Policy • We can clearly see the role of national identity in FP surfacing every time presidential elections draw near. At these moments, it becomes very clear how intertwined nat identity and FP are, and how national identity continues to influence many aspects of society. • 1994 Kravchuk-Kuchma: Kuchma runs as pro-Russian candidate; Kravchuk is considered pro-Western; nevertheless, as soon as he is president, Kuchma intensifies contacts with EU, NATO and CoE • 1999 re-election Kuchma (against Simonenko (communist) in 2nd round): here East – West divide was not main pinpoint of campaign, possibly because of re-election? campaign framed as a choice between stability or return to the Soviet past (Simonenko 38%; Kuchma 56%)  FP: re-election right after Kosovo crisis which severely strained East-West relations: Ukraine tried to balance and (not very successfully tried to take up a mediating role between NATO and Kosovo-Russia  in the end NATO elected Russia ofr this mediaitng role (Chernomyrdin)  anyway, Kuchma cited EU membership as Ukraine’s primary goal in his inauguration speech – so kuchma now more pro-european, whereas simenenko depicted as pro-Soviet past  • 2004 Yushchenko-Yanukovich: here again: Yushchenko pro-Western candidate, Yanukovich as pro-Russian candidate. Again ostenstative visits to Moscow and Putin who came to watch the military parades with Kuchma and Yanukovich in Kiev; Yushchenko who criticises Russia and get considerable financial support form the West, ... BUT: when elected, annoucnes a multi-vector policy

9. National Identity-FP • Yushchenko named Russia a ‘strategic partner’, as Kuchma did before him. • Just like Kuchma, and despite what he says right now, Yushchenko will most probably embark on the path of a ‘multi-vector foreign policy’ balancing between East and West. •  national identity surfaces as an important factor during the elections, because a lot of symbolicvalue is attached to it: presidents identify themselves with an eastern or western choice, which implies that voting for this candidate is making a pro-eastern or pro-western choice.  one can also say that therefore, presidential candidates use their so-called geopolitical preferences as an instrument to get votes from a certain part of the population! • Yet after the elections, we can see that most leaders balance their FP between East and West and that all the pro-Eastern or pro-Western promises do not materialise. Not only because of economic considerations, or indecisiveness, but also for reasons of national identity  Ukraine’s multi-vector Foreign Policy reflects if balancing between East and West reflects it dual national identity. The duality of Ukraine national identity is so omnipresent in all layers of society and politics that it also translates itself into geopolitical preferences. It is considered so important that presidential candidates kind of abuse this issue of national identity linked to FP preferences to win votes!

10. Topics for Discussion • The question is now: how will this be under Yushchenko? he has made decisively pro-European promises and since he’s become president has repeatedly expressed staunch European ambitions, while professing to limit relations with Russia to a very pragmatic level (strategic partnership), and not even speaking of the CIS • Scenarios: •  pro-West •  balancing • Do you think this will materialise? Or do you think Ukraine will be forced anyway to balance again between East and West? Why would this inherent duality engrained in Ukraine’s society and reaching out to its FP change with the advent of Yushchenko?