Missile Threat Assessment Russia’s MOD View

1. Missile Threat Assessment Russia’s MOD View

2. Missile threats and challenges Слайд2 Слайд2 2 Nation’s missile capabilities Using rocket technologies to make missiles Missile challenge Military and political intentions of a nation to deliver a missile strike Missile threats

3. Strategic BM arsenals reduction Слайд2 3 Strategic nuclear warheads reduction Shorter and intermediate range missile reduction

4. Activities required to build ICBMs Слайд3 4 • having all necessary resources available at the national level while establishing adequate R&D, production and testing capacity • manufacturing key high-tech ICBM components and integrating them into a single operational product - carrying out a number of comprehensive tests of each individual system and the product as a whole

5. Activities required to produce ICBMs based on space launch vehicles Слайд4 5 • developing a new missile flight control system that would guarantee delivery of a high-precision warhead to intended surface targets by ballistic trajectory; • ensuring conditions for high operational readiness; • providing long-term warranty period operation; • ensuring HDBT conditions for ICBMs; • securing ICBMs from unauthorized launch.

6. Слайд5 Proliferation of liquid-propellant missile technologies to south-east 6 Game-changing designs are not visible Obsolete missiles are upscaled and upgraded

7. Factorsimpacting military and political intentions of south-east nations Слайд6 7 - war potential of these nations significantly yields to that of states and nation coalitions, which they may view as potential adversaries; - relatively low level of economic self-sufficiency and capacity to hold on under economic sanctions in case missile challenges turn into a missile threat; - self-reliance in national security, often times in the conditions of relative international isolation; - inevitability of “retaliation strike”in case of self-started missile attack; - lack of sufficient resource base enabling them to withstand a “retaliation strike”; - participation in key WMD non-proliferation regimes (NPT Treaty,Convention on Prohibition of Chemical and Biological weapons etc). Incentives for a self-started missile attack on the territory of Europe are absent

8. Summary of comprehensive assessment of present missile threats Слайд6 8 • At present it is shorter-range and tactical missiles that are mostly spread around the world. • For some countries missile systems primarily mean assets to win international recognition or to achieve supremacy over neighbors. • Adirect missile attack threat to leading states of the world including NATO member-states look very insignificant. • At this stage the problem of missile proliferation can and should be addressed not solely by the use of force and not through building expensive BMD assets, that are not always adequate to existing missile threats, but by engaging preventive diplomacy and strengthening arms control and non-proliferation regimes as well as reducing weapon systems.

9. Elimination of potential missile threats Слайд6 9 Priority – to employ political and diplomatic methods