1 / 22

Slides for Class #4 ASU Technology Standards Seminar February 15, 2010 Brad Biddle

Slides for Class #4 ASU Technology Standards Seminar February 15, 2010 Brad Biddle. Introduction. Taxonomy / “How”. Business strategy / “Why”. Antitrust. IPR: RAND v. RF. IPR(+): “Openness”. IPR: Patent pools. Policy: private stnds & law. Policy: Role of government. Case study: China.

ulysses
Download Presentation

Slides for Class #4 ASU Technology Standards Seminar February 15, 2010 Brad Biddle

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Slides for Class #4 ASU Technology Standards Seminar February 15, 2010 Brad Biddle

  2. Introduction Taxonomy / “How” Business strategy / “Why” Antitrust IPR: RAND v. RF IPR(+): “Openness” IPR: Patent pools Policy: private stnds & law Policy: Role of government Case study: China Student presentations Student presentations Student presentations *

  3. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST / COMPETITION STANDARDS LAW Two primary ingredients

  4. IP: monopoly Standards: joint action by competitors Antitrust: anti-monopoly Antitrust: suspicious of joint action [1] [2]

  5. PATENT CLAIM A • SSO • PARTICIPATING FIRMS PATENT CLAIM B NON-PATENTENED TECHNOLOGY • PATENT OWNERS PATENT CLAIM C PATENT CLAIM D STANDARDS-COMPLIANT PRODUCT • SSOs OR PARTICIPATING FIRMS (POTENTIALLY) BEHAVING BADLY • Price fixing • Monopsony • Refusals to deal • TRANSACTION COST / COORDINATION ISSUES • Anticommons • Royalty stacking • Disclosure rules • Ex ante licensing • Patent pools • PATENT OWNERS (POTENTIALLY) BEHAVING BADLY • Patent hold-up / ambush

  6. Sherman Act Section 2 monopolization claims • FTC Act Section 5 unfair/deceptive practices claims

  7. PATENT OWNERS (POTENTIALLY) BEHAVING BADLY • Patent hold-up / ambush “During the standards setting process, Party A deceptively represented that they [had no relevant patents]/[would license on RAND terms] but now is seeking excessive post lock-in royalties.” “Party B said it would license under certain terms in the past, but now has changed its mind and is demanding more.”

  8. V. • FTC wins administrative process, wins in district court, LOSES in appellate court, Supreme Court denies cert. • FTC: JEDEC either would have (1) chosen differently, or (2) ensured RAND; in either case, it’s a Section 2 problem • DC Cir.: if “(2)” then just a price-for-patents issue; not for antitrust law to decide

  9. V. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1460997 http://biddle.us/uploads/QCOM_v_BCOM_548_F3d_1004.pdf

  10. V. V. Apple: Nokia's "false" F/RAND promise "enabled Nokia to obtain the 'hold up' power it now abusively seeks to wield." http://standardslaw.org/AAPL-NOKCountersuit.pdf

  11. N-DATA

  12. SSOs OR PARTICIPATING FIRMS (POTENTIALLY) BEHAVING BADLY • Price fixing • Monopsony • Refusals to deal “The SSO has excluded my technology.” “The SSO is conspiring to set my royalties too low.”

  13. Golden Bridges v. Nokia

  14. (Soundview eventually loses, though) Soundview v. Sony

  15. TRANSACTION COST / COORDINATION ISSUES • Anticommons • Royalty stacking • Disclosure rules • Ex ante licensing • Patent pools

  16. http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf

More Related