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This chapter delves into the historical context and recent developments in conventional encryption. It addresses key issues such as authentication, integrity, and the vulnerabilities associated with traffic analysis and key distribution. The focus on end-to-end encryption highlights the importance of maintaining data confidentiality at both ends of the communication link. The chapter also discusses various encryption strategies, the role of Key Distribution Centers (KDC), and the significance of random number generation in securing data. Key features include the differences between link and end-to-end encryption.
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CONFIDENTIALY USING CONVENTIONAL ENCRYPTION– Chapter 7 • Historically – Conventional Encryption • Recently – Authentication, Integrity, Signature, Public-key • Link • End-to-End • Traffic-Analysis • Key Distribution • Random Number Generation
Confidentiality • Link • - both ends of link • - many encryps / decryps - all links use it • - decrypt at packet switch (read addr.) • - unique key / node pair • End- to-End • - only at ends • - data encrypted, not address (header) • - one key pair • - traffic pattern insecure • - authentication from sender
Characteristics of Link and End-to-End Table 7.1
Both Link and End-to-End • - Data secure at nodes • - Authentication • LINK – low level (physical/link) • END-TO-END – network (X.25) • End0 • End1 (ends separately • End2 protected) • Cannot service internet traffic
E-mail Gateway • OSI email gateway TCP • no end-to-end protocol below appl. layer • networks terminate at mail gateway • mail gateway sets up new transport/network • connections • need end-to-end encryp. at appl. Layer • - disadvantage: many keys
Identities • Message Frequency • Message Pattern • Event Correlation • Covert Channel • Link • Headers encrypted • Traffic padding (Fig 7.6) • End-to-End • Pad data • Null messages Traffic Confidentiality
Physically deliver • Third party physically select/deliver • EKold(Knew) → • 4. End-to-End(KDC): • A EKA(Knew) C EKB(Knew)B • N hosts → (N)choose(2) keys – Fig 7.7 • KDC – Key hierarchy – Fig 7.8 • Session Key – temporary : end ↔ end • Only N master keys – physical delivery KEY DISTRIBUTION
User shares Master Key with KDC Steps 1-3 : Key Distribution Steps 3,4,5 : Authentication KEY DISTRIBUTION
Key Distribution Centre (KDC) Hierarchy LOCAL KDCs KDCX KDCA KDCB A B Key selected by KDCA, KDCB, or KDCX
LIFETIME Shorter Lifetime → Highter Security → Reduced Capacity Connection-oriented: - change session key periodically Connectionless: - new key every exchange or #transactions or after time period
Key Distribution (connection-oriented) End-to-End (X.25,TCP), FEP obtains session keys
Decentralised Key Control Not practical for large networks - avoids trusted third party
KEY USAGE key types : Data, PIN, File key tags : Session/Master/Encryp/Decryp Control Vector: associate session key with control vector (Fig 7.12)
Linear Congruential Generator • Xn+1 = (aXn + c) mod m • Encryption : DES (OFB) – (Fig 7.14) • Blum Blum Shub (BBS) • X0 = s2 mod n • for i = 1 to infinity • Xi = (Xi-1)2 mod n • Bi = Xi mod 2 Random Number Generation