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Kosovo War

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Kosovo War

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  1. Kosovo War • Group 5

  2. Topics 1. Historical Background 2. Key tipping points 3. Failures of the international community 4. Wheeler’s criteria

  3. Historical Background

  4. Historical Background • Capital: Pristina • Ethnic: 88% Albanians 7% Serbs 5% others • Area: 10,908 km2 • Population: 1,733,872

  5. Historical Background Albanians Strive for Independence • Albanians opposed Serbia’s attempts to relocate Serbs into Kosovo • The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution: received substantially increased autonomy, including de facto veto power in the Serbian parliament. • The 1989 Serbia Constitution: limited Kosovo‘s autonomy. • 1991: Albanians accounted for 90% of the population of Kosovo. Kosovo’s Albanian leaders attempted to break free from Serbia using non-violent resistance. • The government of Serb president: Slobodan Milosevic

  6. Historical Background Kosovo Conflict • 1996 -1999: YugoslavArmy and Serbianforces and the people, for independence of Kosovo Albanianterrorist organization in Kosovo Liberation Armyfighters. • 1999: March 24from June 10was held over to NATOby the Allied Force operation. • Attacks in rural areas by a small, clandestine Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) formed by Kosovo Albanian radicals brought heavy retaliation by Serbian security forces; fighting across the Kosovo countryside through 1998 (killing most of the villagers which were attacked e.g. Dorenitsa) leaving 1,500 Albanians dead, 400,000 homeless by October.

  7. Historical Background • President of Serbia and Yugoslavia. He served as the President of Socialist Republic of Serbia and Republic of Serbia from 1989 until 1997 in three terms and as President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. • In 1999, NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, Milosevic was charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in connection with the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Slobodan Milosevic (1941-2006)

  8. Tipping points and important decisions

  9. beginning • LDK( ) underground referendum 9.1991 • Dayton negotiation 1995 • UCK employed clandestine tactics during 1996-1998 and finally launched an offensive in 1998

  10. Reaction • The Clinton Administration condemned Kosovars. 3.1998 • UN Resolution 1160 31.3.1998

  11. During the war • NATO “we will act” 9.1998 • UN Resolution 1199 23.9.1998 • Kofi Annan’s report 5.10.1998 • NATO activation order for air strikes 13.10.1998 • October Agreement 10.1998 • UN Resolution 1203 24.10.1998 • Breakdown of Paris talk 15.3.1999

  12. End of War • NATO’s air strike 23.3.1999 • EU-Russian peace plan and NATO-led multinational force 3.6.1999 • A big Russian-led debate on NATO’s lack of authorization of SC.

  13. Failures of the International Community

  14. Exclusion of Kosovo during the Dayton Agenda • 1995-Dayton Agreement: peace accord between Bosnia and Herzegovina and former Yugoslavia • This agenda could have been an opportunity for the international community to bring up the problems in Kosovo and initiate an earlier start to preventing conflict

  15. Lack of Conviction from the Contact Group • The Contact Group: group of nations (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) that had interest and influence in the Balkans. • The Contact Group, with significant military power, did not take any direct action, but only condemned both the Serbs and the UCK.

  16. Lack of Media Coverage • There was not much media interest regarding the cases in Kosovo • It was mainly Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign minister Robin Cook who initiated the argument for Britain and the Alliance to prepare using force to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing.

  17. Resolution 1199 • The resolution demanded for cessation between FRY and Albanian leadership, but it was not backed up by military force • The resolution was not a big enough threat for preventing the conflict between the two groups.

  18. NATO Bombing Escalated Serbian forces • Once NATO started bombing Serbian forces, ethnic cleansing was escalated. • ….However, without NATO force, the Serbian force may have not stopped ethnic cleansing

  19. NATO Bombing Targets • In order to avoid NATO causalities, the bombing was conducted from high air, making it difficult to accurately target Serbian forces. • NATO harmed not only Serbian forces, but also innocent civilians.

  20. NATO was unable to restore peace • Even though NATO intervened and restored political rights to the Albanians, it was unable to restore peace and security to Serbs, who felt a great threat of revenge from the Albanians.

  21. Lack of Assistance after intervention (Long-term Consequences ) • There still remains tension between Kosovars and Serbs • Kosovo was under control of the international community from 1998-2008, yet its economy suffers from weak political institutions. Law, government corruption, unemployment, etc..

  22. Wheeler’s Criteria

  23. 1・Supreme Humanitarian Emergency Yes • Over people killed

  24. 2・Necessity, last resort Yes • NATO tried to seek other measures to avoid use of force →October Agreement • Failure of October Agreement

  25. Failure of October Agreement • Albanians were not involved in the October Agreement. • They were dissatisfied of the conditions • UCK continued attacking Serb forces • Serbs responded by killing civilians • Cease fire failed to hold

  26. Failure of October Agreement • Peace talks in Rambouillet with Serbs and Albanians • Milosevic objected the proposal • Negotiation breaks down • Serbs start new round of ethnic cleansing • All options gone Last resort

  27. 3・Proportionality No • Limitations of air p.270 • “Air power alone cannot stop paramilitary action” – Gen. Wesley Clarke • International community reluctant to send ground troops after Somalia • Civilian casualty • Ineffectiveness of air strike, with Serbs hiding weapons

  28. 4・Positive humanitarian outcome short term Yes • Although far bloodier than expected, saved millions of lives (p.274) • Kosovo gained independence

  29. 4・Positive humanitarian outcome Long TermNo • Failed to stop new round of ethnic cleansing(p.274) • Tension still continues today

  30. 5・Humanitarian Motives Yes • They argued that their action was first aimed at “averting an impeding humanitarian catastrophe”

  31. 6・Humanitarian Justification • “Risk-free” limited intervention. • Russia questioned US motive • “Bill Clinton wants to win… He hopes Milosevic will capitulate, give up the whole of Yugoslavia, make it America’s protectorate”- Boris Yeltsin • NATO’s face keeping