Coordination Needs and Realities Between Militaries and CSOs:

1. Coordination Needs and Realities Between Militaries and CSOs: A Perspective from the Philippines Prof. RAYMUND JOSE G. QUILOP Focal Person for International Policy Department of National Defense Philippines

2. A Quick View • Realities : Differences and Commonalities • Needs : Coordination and Collaboration • Some Concluding Thoughts

3. Some Realities to Consider:Differences and Commonalities

4. Differences Between Militaries and CSOs • Hierarchical and close (less participatory) • Strict chain of command • Risk and casualty averse • Organizational structure and culture • Flat and open (more participatory • Loose chain of command • Less concerned with personal safety

5. Differences Between Militaries and CSOs • Risk and casualty averse • Prefers quickest approach to a problem • Organizational structure and culture • Less concerned with personal safety • Tedious way of problem solving process

6. Differences Between Militaries and CSOs • Combat and combat operations • Intelligence collection • Quick response and reaction • Reason for Being and capacity • Delivery of services • Information sharing • Relief provision

7. Commonalities Between Militaries and CSOs • Same clientele: the public / people • State budget • Dependence on extra-institution resources • Funders and donors (international and domestic) • Misperception that all militaries are homogenous and CSOs are all the same

8. Commonalities Between Militaries and CSOs • Misreading of each other’s purpose of action • CSOs out there to undermine the state and its forces • CSOs as helping the “enemies” of the state • Presence of CSOs could mean more “chaos” on the ground • Military as being after CSOs • Military as the state’s foremost tool to restrict freedom • Involvement in HADR of military crowds out CSO space

9. Commonalities Between Militaries and CSOs • Varying capabilities and sizes • Formed their respective networks • Reservations (involvement of the other in HADR, loss of identity [CSO as watchdog, etc]) • In search of appropriate niche with regard to disaster response • Presence on the ground

10. Needs of Militaries and CSOs for consideration

11. Laying the Foundation for an effective and productive partnership • Receptivity to the idea of partnership (open-mindedness, do away with reservations) • Developing platforms for the interface of militaries and CSOs • Build trust and confidence bet. militaries and CSOs • Capitalize on the each other’s presence on the ground (community) and strengths

12. Mitigation Implementing measures to minimize the impact of disaster or calamity in terms of casualties and damage to properties Preparedness Pre-disaster actions to minimize the loss of lives and properties Response Concerted effort by two or more agencies to provide emergency assistance or relief to persons affected Rehabilitation Process of restoring to a normal condition the public infrastructures damaged by the disaster or calamity (but beyond infrastructures is the need to rebuild lives) • Identifying appropriate niche for both the military and CSOs (policy formulation, program development, and operational implementation)

13. e.g. Calamities and Disaster Preparedness Plan of 1988 • Pre-disaster activities • Planning • Drills • Public information drive • Stockpiling of materials • Organizing and training • Communication and warning activities • Emergency phase actions • Rescue and engineering • Evacuation • First-aid and medical services • Disaster relief services • Police auxiliary service • Auxiliary fire service • Emergency transportation services • Assessment of resulting damage • Post-emergency phase activities • Cross-checking data • Determining requirements for rehabilitation and availability of labor to restore • Repair and construct damaged infrastructures

14. The ultimate objective: From coordination to collaboration • Coordination – merely working together by having actions synchronized; for efficiency • Collaboration – working WITH each other; for effectiveness • Going through and not going / working beyond government • CSOs must be informed of the military’s complex command structure for disaster-relief operations • Need for one government agency as focal point for interfacing with CSOs

15. Taking stock of what exists on the ground • from needs assessment to capability assistance stock taking • Consciousness and appreciation of national and local nuances • Beyond registry of CSOs are experts associated with CSOs -> friends of the ASEAN Sec Gen in his enhanced role • Early warning – from technical networking to social networks • CSOs as providers of technical andvice beyond the material goods that are usually provided

16. A Final Note • Credibility of plans and programs (where defense establishments and CSOs work together) could only be tested / enhanced when their execution in times of disaster shows they work • but we would rather not have them tested than to be subjected to the wrath of disasters