Managing the execution of contracts. Julie de Brux IAE – University Paris I Panthéon – Sorbonne Permanent member of the Chair on the Economics of Public-Private Partnerships http://www.chaire-eppp.org CICA – IFI 2010 Conference Efficient construction and sustainable development
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Julie de Brux
IAE – University Paris I Panthéon – Sorbonne
Permanent member of the Chair on the Economics of Public-Private Partnerships
CICA – IFI 2010 Conference
Efficient construction and sustainable development
World Bank, Washington D.C.
February 11th, 2010
Previous presentations examined PPP challenges arising BEFORE the signature of contracts:
What happens AFTER the signature of contracts is also very important
All the more important than many potential opportunistic behaviours may arise
Renegotiations appear as a symbol of the difficulties arising during the execution of contracts…
…with different theoretical approaches
losses… as a sign of institutional weakness
to relax the fiscal constraint
Cost over-runs/ opportunism/ principal source of PPP failure
Under which conditions will parties cooperate during the execution of contracts, whereas, at first sight, they have different utility functions?
Starting point: Hart, Shleifer, Vishny 
DeBrux, Desrieux ’s goal:
i.e. Private provision of public services remains efficient
Intuition of the model:
probabilities of renewal
Putting theory to test… reaching testable propositions
Why an application to the car park sector?
Some variables and their expected signs