Fourth Moment & Deduction

1. Fourth Moment & Deduction Debate about: location of Deduction (§9, 21, 38, dialectic) What it is supposed to legitimate (possibility of jt or actual jt) Whether it succeeds, and if so as what (epistemological versus aesthetic reading of §21 as a deduction of ‘common sense.’ Can we distinguish between Analytic/Deduction by task rather than location: Quid facti vs. quid juris. Q of fact vs right: i. What must be the case for judgements of taste to count as pure? ii. With what right do I demand agreement for such judgements? Anything fulfilling the latter, wherever located, part of the Deduction. That is, anything establishing the normativity of the norm laid down by former. If so, substantial debate as to whether 4th Moment part of former or latter project.

2. 4th moment: quid facti or quid juris? Guyer: quid juris (part of Deduction); moreover it fails as such ‘to come to particulars’. That is, fails to provide grounds for predicting that others will agree (under ideal conditions) with any actual aesthetic judgements. Cf. Hume. Allison: quid facti: deduction proper (§38) succeeds in securing the possibility of aesthetic judgements. That is, demonstrating the right to demand agreement of others for jt by showing it is grounded in subjective principle of judgement that is a necessary presupposition of experience. Two positions are in fact compatible. Failing to do i. is compatible with achieving ii. But what is Kant’s goal as a transcendental philosopher? Should he be concerned with providing decision mechanism for arbitrating between judges on matters of taste, or merely securing the possibility of the kind of judgement under dispute?

3. 4th moment: modality 4th moment: modality: concerns actuality, possibility and necessity. Jt possess ‘exemplary necessity.’ jt are not objective, cannot be proved, so cannot have objective necessity. Their necessity, if they possess it, must be subjectively grounded. Nonetheless must be more than statements of mere personal preference. Jt of taste serve as examples: in making a jt I claim to be judging the object as it ought to be judged: ‘judge as I do!’ My judgement looks like (has the form of) a ‘rule’ for judging a given object, even though no actual rule can be produced (if it could judgement would be objective). Because we cannot produce any objective rule that our judgement instantiates for others to follow Kant posits the idea of a ‘sensus communis’ (shared feeling) to take the place of the rule we cannot produce. Kant regards this idea as a necessary presupposition of making judgements of taste.

4. “Sensus communis” What does this mean? Not ‘common sense’ (sound understanding) but shared sentiment or feeling. Wenzel: intra and inter-subjective dimension. Unites faculties in one individual and unites those of different individuals. Allison: ‘shared feeling for what is univesrally communicable’ (‘a sense (or feeling) for what is universally communicable, which can also be assumed to be universality shared’). Guyer: ‘both a shared feeling of pleasure and the faculty for judging that such feeling is shared.’ So, a shared feeling for the communicability of one’s own mental state. But isn’t this precisely what needs to be demonstrated, rather than merely presupposed, if Kant is not to beg the question? This is the task of §21, which many see as Kant’s most thorough attempt a Deduction

5. “Sensus Communis:” Regulative or Constitutive? Is this idea of a sensus communis is to be understood as constitutive: a necessary precondition for the possibility of such judgements, hence without which such judgements would not be possible, or; merely regulative: an action guiding idea or principle that we are rationally constrained to act in accordance with, and try to instantiate in making such judgements? (cf. significance of the idea of freedom for moral action) This is subject of much debate. Depends on whether one reads §21 as a Deduction. Wenzel/Allison don’t so take it to be merely regulative (a rational idea). Guyer thinks §21 a badly flawed deduction, but doesn’t come to a firm view on C vs R. But he does take §21 as an attempt to deduce common sense as justification for judgements of taste.

6. §21: Deduction of common sense? Is it a deduction? Guyer/Ameriks: several presuppositions guiding the argument as a whole: General: If knowledge is communicable (shareable) so too are its subjective conditions Specific: Same effect (same cognition) presupposes same cause (same underlying mental state) So: “communication” involves having matching mental states: e.g. I understand you when we share the same mental states Guyer: reads argument as largely, though not exclusively epistemological. Attempt to head off aesthetic scepticism (scepticism about possibility of jt) by showing its epistemological consequences: conditions for intersubjective validity of jt are same as those for cognition in general. So aesthetic scepticism entails epistemological scepticism. Allison: no, it’s a purely epistemological argument that seeks to derive epistemic conclusions from epistemic premises; no direct bearing on taste. At best, a necessary propadeutic to deduction of taste proper.

7. §21: 7 step argument See Guyer book and Ameriks articles on reading list Step 1. Sentences 1 & 2 ‘[…] as scepticism would have it’ Shareability of knowledge is a necessary condition of anything counting as knowledge. What must shared is both its propositional content and propositional attitude toward it (belief, assertion etc) – what Kant here calls ‘conviction’. Step 2. Sentences 3 & 4 ‘But if cognitions… could not arise’ For cognitions to be communicable then so too must the mental state (proportion or relation of the cognitive faculties) accompanying them. This ‘subjective condition’ is what underlies the possibility of any given cognition (which is its effect). Introduces the thought that some particular proportion or relation of the cognitive faculties underlies both propositional content and attitude. Such a relation is the condition of any given cognition; if a cognition is to be shared then so too must this state.

8. §21: 7 step argument (cont.) Interim conclusion from steps 1-2: Sentence 5: ‘and this attunement… manifold in concepts’ Conditions outlined in steps 1-2 are met whenever we have a determinate cognition of an object. That is, must be met given thatwe have knowledge – and no one but the epistemological sceptic doubts this, and it’s not the task of the third Critique’s deduction to refute the epistemological sceptic. That we have determinate objective knowledge is here presupposed. Step 3. Sentence 6: ‘but this attunement… given’ Relation of the cognitive powers has a different proportion according to the object given. Roughly: different mental states accompany different objects. Step 4. Sentence 7; first half only) ‘And yet there is… in general;’ Although any such relation is suitable to knowledge there must be one (why?) such state (relation between imag/und) which is most conducive for their ‘mutual quickening […] with a view to cognition of objects in general.’

9. §21: 7 step argument (cont.) Q Re step 4: does Guyer smuggle in to reference to free play here? Guyer: ‘there is a particular proportion that is most suitable for ‘enlivening’ them, i.e., freely disposing them to the relation appropriate to knowledge in general without any determinate concept.’ Kant says there is an ‘optimal attunement’ for cognition of objects in general, but does he commit himself to aesthetic free play, in the way that Guyer suggests? But is Guyer not entitled to read Kant this way given the context (cf §20)? Step 5 Sentence 7; second half) ‘and the only way… (rather than concepts)’ This ideal proportion (of the cognitive powers) can only be known by feeling. Again, see question above. Re steps 4-5: Effectivey, in steps 4-5 Guyer claims what Allison denies -- that ‘ideal proportion’ is “clearly” free play of the faculties, and the feeling by which it is known is “clearly” pleasure in the beautiful. But is this clear?

10. §21: 7 step argument (cont.) Step 6 Sentence 8, first half) ‘moreover this attunement… must be universally communicable’ This special proportion of the faculties most suited to cognition in general must itself be shareable. If some proportion between the faculties is the subjective condition of knowledge, and such subjective conditions are generally communicable, then so too must this special instance be. Step 7 (Sentence 8, second half) ‘while the universal communicability… common sense’ If this special disposition is shareable, then the feeling that reveals it to obtain must also be shareable (same effect, same cause). This amounts to saying that such a feeling may be rationally imputed to everyone capable to knowledge at all, which is what the ‘deduction’ set out to establish (a justification for the a priori attribution of feeling to others). A common sense has been deduced.

11. 3 Problems with this argument 1. Same effect presupposes same cause (step 2) Why assume that if a cognition is valid for all there must be one subjective state uniquely associated with it also valid for all? Can people only share a particular judgement if the subjective state explaining their possession of that knowledge is the same? E.g. ‘there is a red book on the table in the next room’; you’ve seen it with your own eyes, I’ve heard a reliable report about it; we share the same knowledge, but is it based on the same subjective conditions? Causal conditions of knowledge can vary without this undermining its shareability. 2. Notion of ideal proportion (step 4) Why must anyone capable of objective knowledge of the world be capable of this state of ideal proportion/attunement. Where’s the argument for this (is it meant to be a substantive claim or just a thin ‘logical extrapolation’)? How can Kant know that there is only one such attunement and that it must be the same in everyone? Is he entitled to infer from the fact (if it is a fact) that attunement is shared in determinate judgements that it must also be shared in indeterminate judgements?

12. Problems with this argument (cont.) 3. This ideal attunement is necessary for cognition in general Last step appears to make asserted capacity for optimal attunement a necessary condition for cognition in general. But if this optimal attunement is identified with aesthetic pleasure, does this commit Kant to the ridiculous conclusion that all objects of cognition are beautiful? Can this result be blocked? What is the basisfor this last, generalizing move – making the notion of ideal attunement underlie cognition in general. Why should it follow from the fact, if it is a fact, that there is an ideal attunement for aesthetic judgements that this must underlie cognitive judgements on pain of scepticism? Why should its denial occasion epistemological scepticism rather than merely aesthetic scepticism?

13. Solutions? The ‘All objects are beautiful’ problem Can one save Kant from the ridiculous conclusion that all objects of cognition are beautiful by distinguishing the claim that all objects require a proportion between imagination and understanding from the claim that some objects are ideally suited to that proportion because easier for the imagination to unify than others. What distinguishes between objects is the ease with which they can be unified – when intuition presented by imagination so well adapted to understanding’s need for unity it can be felt to be unified without subsumption under a concept. Problem: This solution could risk psychologizing Kant. For why assume that everyone possesses same facility for perception of unity, or same facility with respect to the same objects (e.g. varying ability to solve visual puzzles, mathematical proofs, etc.). Some people have greater capacity to perceive harmony, pattern, etc. Psychological reading undermines normativity. But that people differ in such regards does not undermine universality of (e.g.) mathematical proofs; why should it undermine taste? Some objects just are better suited to free play than others, even if not everyone equally well-versed in spotting this.

14. Allison’s response This is not a deduction of taste. Guyer’s objections arise from attributing to Kant the wrong goal. Kant not trying to deduce common sense. Not called a deduction. Guyer faults Kant as a result of overburdening §21. Look at §22: if §21 a deduction why is Kant in §22 still not sure whether common sense is constitutive or regulative? If a deduction Kant (assuming he has faith in his own argument) would have to regard it’s constitutive nature as established. Alternative reading is therefore to see §21 as propadeutic: a ground-laying of sorts for deduction proper, by showing we have reasonable grounds for assuming purely epistemic common sense as condition of communicability of everyday determinate empirical cognition. So Allison reads it as purely epistemological not aesthetic/epistemological. A lot turns on whether Guyer is or is not smuggling in reference to free play in notion of ideal attunement.

15. Allison’s response (cont.) So on this reading: §21 not a deduction of taste, but an attempt to secure reasonableness of postulating strictly cognitive common sense. But why is that relevant here? Shouldn’t it be the province of CPR? Allison’s response: cognitive common sense a nec but not suff condition of possibility of judgements of taste. All it shows is necessity of presupposing a common sense on the basis of epistemological premises, it does not make any explicit reference to taste (arguably strained as an interpretation of the this stretch of text). The claim is that the price of denying this presupposition is scepticism about cognition (not taste). Allison contra orthodox reading: i. Seems to collapse determinate/aesthetic judgement around the idea of shared mental state (feeling) accompanying shared cognition ii. Suggests aesthetic common sense a condition of cognition: but this is implausible view to attribute to Kant. A feeling resulting from cognitive free play could not serve as a condition of determinate cognition for Kant.

16. Allison’s alternative Cognition itself requires assumption of a common sense. So Allison needs to give a thoroughly cognitive interpretation of §21. Step 3 is psychological: some manifolds are easier to bring under empirical concepts than others (but for just this reason – psychological observation – it’s not part of a transcendental deduction). Step 4 optimal attunement: to be understood as that which maximally facilitates cognition through disposing the faculties in way best suited for cognition (eg when intuitive content and conceptual rule seem made for one another). But what about Kant’s claim that this can only be felt? [schematism chapter of CPR: no rules for the application of rules on pain of infinite regress. That some particular falls under some concept must be immediately apparent (if we need a rule to apply the rule, regress opens). But is this equivalent to feeling? Judgement (CPR) a peculiar talent that can be practiced but not taught. On this reading common sense appealed to is just this inexplicable capacity for judgement in absence of rules for applying rules.

17. Allison’s alternative (cont.) So §21 does not concern taste but capacity to see without appeal to further rules that a given intuition accords with some concept. This peculiar talent a (necessary) condition of our ability to recognise fit between imagination/understanding in free play. If one could not feel/see/see accord of an intuited manifold with a particular concept it is hard to see how one could sense its accord with the conditions of the exhibition of concepts in general (ie without det. cognition) when it comes to judgements of taste. So common sense a necessary but not sufficient condition of taste. §21 not an unsuccessful deduction but a ground-laying for deduction proper. Hence Kant’s equivocation in §22 on constitutive/regulative issue. This issue remains open. If regulative it only dictates how everyone ought to judge (not how they must). But if §21 a deduction that weaker option no longer open.