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Banco Central e Democracia

Banco Central e Democracia. Aula 5 Ciencia Politica CGAE EAESP-FGV Kurt von Mettenheim. Estrutura da aula. Introdução “A Construção de Autoridade Monetária” vs ortodoxia ( pré-crise!) Momentos políticos e oportunidades de evitar crises financeiras em mercados emergentes.

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Banco Central e Democracia

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  1. Banco Central e Democracia Aula 5 Ciencia Politica CGAE EAESP-FGV Kurt von Mettenheim

  2. Estrutura da aula • Introdução • “A Construção de Autoridade Monetária” vs ortodoxia (pré-crise!) • Momentos políticos e oportunidades de evitar crises financeiras em mercados emergentes. • “de uma economia da política para uma ciência política da construção da autoridade monetária” Duas anomalias brasileiras: * BACEN avança depois da estabilidade de preços * Bancos públicos lideram processo financeiro... 5) Resultados: a) “depois das tempestades” financeiras Brasil sai bem b) Brasil no topo da lista (do IIF, Institute for International Finance) de relacionamento com o mercado e transparência de informação 6) Dá para acelerar a inclusão bancária?

  3. Introdução Poder de bancos centrais vão contra a democracia… “You cannot in a democratic society have an institution which is either fully or partially disassociated from the electoral process, and which has the powers that central banks inherently have. “ (Alan Greenspan) Chapter 6, “On Monetary Authority” Laurence Whitehead, Democratization. Oxford University Press, 2002 Do pensamento ortodoxo para o pensamento crítico para o novo pensamento sobre autoridade monetária e inclusão social. Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25:2, 1993: 151-62. (1436 citações)

  4. Banco Central e Crise Metas de Inflação + Controle Fiscal + Independência do Banco Central = ------------------------------------------- Estabilidade... (até 2007-8) E, na crise : Regra de Bagehot (Lombard Street, 1873): Empresta muito aos bancos (mas com juros altos...) (Escândalo de LIBOR....) US Government Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf

  5. O Banco Central Novo: Dá tudo aos bancos!

  6. Mercado administra risco?

  7. Balanço de Bank of England% PIB

  8. Novas Regras? Dodd Frank http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodd%E2%80%93Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_and_Consumer_Protection_Act US Financial Stability Oversight Council http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/default.aspx UK Independent Commission on Banking http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/

  9. Pesquisas  Publicação Unidade Temática FAPESP: A Construção de Autoridade Monetária no Brasil numa Epóca de Globalização Chapter 10 : From the Economics of Politics to the Politics of Monetary Policy Kurt von Mettenheim

  10. The Political Dynamics of Financial Crises in‘Emerging Market’ DemocraciesLaurence Whitehead

  11. Eight Stage Tree: Political Opportunities to Avert Crisis Political Response Time Line (election=0) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Binding I Pre-commitment + 1 to 10 years ⁄ \ Yes No II Negotiated Pre-insurance + 3 to 12 months / \ Yes No III Campaign Pact + 1 to 4 months / \ Yes No IV Market-Friendly 0 Election / \ Yes No V Post Electoral Discipline - 1 to 4 weeks / \ Yes No VI Capitulate to Market - 1 to 12 weeks Demands / \ Yes No VII International Rescue - 1 to 4 months / \ Yes No VIII Financial Crisis Overshoot Anytime -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  12. Crafting Economic Stabilization: Political Discretion and Technical Innovation in the Implementation of the Real PlanLourdes Sola & Eduardo Kugelmas

  13. Wall Street and Emerging Democracies: Financial Markets and the Brazilian Presidential Elections, Javier Santiso

  14. > 2000 bps EMBI Risk and Default

  15. From an Economics of Politics tothe Politics of Monetary Policy in Brazil 2 anomalias no Brasil: 1 = a relação entre estabilidade de preços e independência do BACEN é invertido: Avanços no BACEN occorem depois de políticas hetorodoxos acabam com a inflação inercial (1994) 2 = 15 anos depois do Plano Real e abrir o mercado bancário, bancos federais mantêm 40% do mercado...

  16. Fuga de capital, 2001-2002

  17. Mas o Brasil evita dolarizar...

  18. Então têm espaço para:Políticas Financeiras PROER, Programa de Reestruturação e Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro (1996); FGC, Fundo Garantidor de Créditos (1996) A ampliação do poder de intervenção do Banco Central (Lei 9.447. de 14.3.1997); PROES, Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade Bancária (1996); PROEF, Programa de Fortalecimento das Instituições Financeiras Federais (1999);

  19. FGC acalmou clientes bancários

  20. PROER liquidou bancos quebrados BankInterventionsBuyer ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Banco Econômico Excel e Caixa EconômicaFederal* Banco Nacional Unibanco Banco Mercantil de Pernb. Rural Banco Banorte Bandeirantes Banco Bamerindus HSBC. Caixa** Banco do Brasil (BB) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Departamento de Operações Bancárias (1) Julho/1994 a maio/1997 (2) Apenas a carteira imobiliária.

  21. E evitou custo maior de crise bancária

  22. “Recentralização”= PROES: O Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade Bancária (Proes). Medida Provisória 1.514. de 7.8.1996. Banacre, Banco do Estado do Acre S.A. Banap, Banco do Estado do Amapá S.A. Bandern, Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte S.A. BDRN, Banco de Desenvolvimento do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte S.A. Bemat, Banco do Estado do Mato Grosso S.A Beron, Banco do Estado de Rondônia S.A. Minascaixa, Caixa Econômica do Estado de Minas Gerais Produban, Banco do Estado de Alagoas S.A. Baner Banco do Estado de Roraima S.A. (liquidated) Bandepe, Banco do Estado de Pernambuco S.A. Baneb, Bancoc do Estado de Bahia S.A. Banerj, Banco do Estado de Rio de Janeiro S.A. Banestado, Banco do Estado de Paraná S.A. Bemge, Banco do Estado de Minas Gerais, S.A. Credireal Banco de Crédito Real de Minas Gerais S.A. Paraiban Banco do Estado da Paraíba S.A Banespa, Banco do Estado de São Paulo S.A. BEA, Banco do Estado de Amazonas S.A. BEC, Banco do Estado de Ceará S.A. BEG, Banco do Estado de Goiás S.A. BEM, Banco do Estado de Maranhão S.A. BEP, Banco do Estado de Piaui S.A. BESC, Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina S.A.

  23. Anomalia: BACEN avança depois da estabilidade de preços, 1994+ BCB antes de 1994 =atender a demandas para acompanhar o cumprimento das medidas estabelecidas pelos diversos planos econômicos (Plano Cruzado. Plano Bresser. Plano Verão. Plano Collor Ie Plano Collor II). • deficiências na estrutura operacional. • decorrentes da falta de equipamentos de informática. • de equipes devidamente treinadas

  24. BACEN medidas Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision, setembro de 1997. • Regras de prudência bancária • Limites mínimos de capital para a constituição de instituições financeiras. • Limites adicionais de acordo com o grau de risco da estrutura dos ativos • Índice de Basileia, 8, BCB 1999 = 11

  25. BACEN medidas cont. • Inspeção Global Consolidada (IGC). • A Central de Risco de Crédito. 22.5.1997. = banco de dados com base em informações prestadas pelas instituições financeiras sobre obrigações • E de seus clientes de valores atualmente superiores a R$ 5.000.00. • Rating Resolução 2.12.1999. cada instituição financeira passou a informar a classificação de cada operação de crédito. numa lista de 9 níveis de risco. que vai de AA (melhor classificação) até H (pior classificação). • SBP = 2002 online realtime balance supervision

  26. Multas aplicadas a bancos pelo Banco Central do Brasil Consultas de bancos ao Centro de Risco do Banco Central do Brasil

  27. Estrutura do Banco Central

  28. Nomes... • Decad, Departamento de Cadastro e Informações • Decif, Departamento de Combate Ilícitos Cambiais e Financeiros • Defin Departamento de Gestão de Informações do Sistema Financeiro • Defis Departamento de Fiscalização • Depad Departamento de Controle de Processos • Desin Departamento de Supervisão Indireta • Desup Departamento de Supervisão Direta • Difis Diretoria de Fiscalização

  29. Longo caminho...Crédito para o setor privado, % PIB) 1 Simple average of country data. 2 Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Moving average of current and previous year private credit levels to current year GDP.

  30. Depois das tempestades financeiras: BOVESPA , Mercado Futuro de Swap de Taxa de Juros, 360 dias, 1996-2007 Russia  Asia  Brazil  Lula 9-11

  31. Progresso 2004-2007 Expectativa de Inflação e 1) Crédito como % PIB 2) Prazo médio de emprestimos, dias

  32. Spread Bancário campeão do mundo, mas caindo Consumer Corporate

  33. “Cohabitação” Crédito de bancos e Mercado: IPOs 2000-2006

  34. Resultados, II

  35. IIF Investor Relations Ranking

  36. Data Dissemination Practices 1) Central Government Operations (CGO). Timeliness: 1 month after the end of the reference period, Periodicity: Monthly MGFS 1986: Identifies countries that use classification of fiscal statistics according to the IMF's A Manual of Government Finance Statistic 1986 (MGFS 1986) MGFS 2001: Identifies if government accounting follows the definicion and classification of the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Manual, 2001 (MGFS 2001). 2) Central Government Debt (CGD). Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly 3) Amortization Schedule for CGD. Preferably, dissemination of government debt service presented at least annually for a period of at least five years from the effective date of the debt data. It is desirable that the annual data should be supplemented with quarterly data at least for the year immediately ahead. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference periodPeriodicity: Quarterly 4) External Debt. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly 5) Amortization Schedule for External Debt. It is important that data cover both public and private sector debt. Preferably, amortization payments presented at least annually for a period of at least five years from the effective date of the debt data. It is desirable that the annual data should be supplemented with quarterly data at least for the year immediately ahead. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly

  37. March 8, 2007 IIF Report on Central Bank of Brazil The investor relations office, Gerin, at the Central Bank of Brazil has enhanced the content of its website to make information important to investors more easily accessible. With these improvements, Gerin has become the first individual office to score 38 out of 38 in prioritized terms. Brazil has been a market leader in investor relations practices for many years. In 2006, Brazil became the first sovereign to score 38 out of 38 in prioritized terms. Brazil operates two investor relations programs. Gerin is operated by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) and a second National Treasury Investor Relations Unit (IRU) is operated by the Debt Management Office at the National Treasury. The existence of the two offices has evolved out of organizational changes. BEST = Brazil: Excellence in Securities Transactions (BEST Brazil) activities. The BEST Brazil initiative is aimed at promoting the Brazilian capital markets to the international investor community involving various official agencies including, in addition to the Treasury and the BCB, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil. With the inclusion of links to regulatory information, archives, and information regarding roadshows, Gerin now satisfies three additional criteria for a total of 20. The prioritized score moved from a total of 34 to a score of 38. Gerin has surpassed global leaders Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines.

  38. Financial Roads to Social EconomiesPublic Banking, Monetary Authority and Social Inclusion Kurt Mettenheim Maria Fernanda Freire de Lima Paper to be presented to the Society for the Advancement of Social Economics 23rd Meeting, Transformations of Contemporary Capitalism: Actors, Institutions, Processes. Research Network N, “Finance and Society” Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 24 June 2011

  39. Arguments Recent developments in central banking and public banking  possible to radically increase the pace of financial and social inclusion. Financial liberalization and bank modernization have led to the realization of competitive advantages by large public banks. Citizenship (ATM) cards = innovation to alleviate poverty, promote social inclusion and increase access to banking. Basic income policies / conceptions of citizenship & social justice = alternative model to microfinance via “entrepreneurship, financial markets and private banks.” New policies for inclusion of bankless vast majorities in large emerging countries suggest that views of fiscal dominance, structural constraints to change and zero-sum relations between central banking, politics and social inclusion need revision.

  40. From the Macroeconomics of Populismto the Microeconomics of Social Inclusion “Most economists would agree that, at least in the short run, monetary policy can significantly influence the course of the real economy” Bernanke & Gertler “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission.” p. 27 We ask: Can it accelerate social inclusion? (yes) Past Keynesian and Development New Microeconomic Banking Policies Increase Aggregate Demand. Policies Increase Aggregate Supply

  41. LifetimeAsset Curve IF >IR + Inequality

  42. 4 scenarios for banking the bankless

  43. Core Principles for Alternative Banking and Social Inclusion

  44. Core Principles for Alternative Banking and Social Inclusion, cont.

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