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JLAB Password Security

JLAB Password Security. Ian Bird Jefferson Lab HEPiX-SLAC 6 Oct 1999. History. Aug ’97 – break-in & compromise Off the net for 5 days Enforced password changes & tightened rules Installed network and system monitors Tightened/created access policies

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JLAB Password Security

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  1. JLAB Password Security Ian Bird Jefferson Lab HEPiX-SLAC 6 Oct 1999

  2. History • Aug ’97 – break-in & compromise • Off the net for 5 days • Enforced password changes & tightened rules • Installed network and system monitors • Tightened/created access policies • Denied off-site access for non-verified & monitored systems

  3. Since then… • Install firewall + traffic monitors • Continual tightening of access • Very few systems directly open to outside now • Push to ssh on all platforms • Teratem/ssh on PCs, DataFellows on Mac • Shutdown telnet, rsh etc. • Mail : IMAP + SSL • Netscape + Outlook as remote clients • Creation of “DMZ” • Continue to move to switched network (> 70%) • Protect with routers: • Business Services/HR • Accelerator controls

  4. External access • Need still to provide clear-text password access from off-site • Implementing “DMZ” outside firewall with: • Split horizon DNS • External mail server (forwarder) • ftp server (not through firewall) • Web server • (eventually) telnet/ssh forwarder • Only 3 central hosts open to outside • Ssh or web access to selected internal hosts • These have to be monitored.

  5. Mail • Currently allow POP, IMAP and S-IMAP (SSL) • Switch off POP, clear-text IMAP soon • UW IMAP server • SSLeay provides password encryption • Server provides certificate to client • Clients : • Netscape (everywhere), Outlook (PC’s) • S-IMAP has been working well for > 1 year

  6. External mail server • Server in DMZ forwards S-IMAP, IMAP, POP to internal mail server (ports only) • Perl script • Avoids copying files or mounting filesystems outside firewall • No authentication outside • No password file accessible on external server • Working on telnet/ssh forwarder (gateway) • Deny direct telnet access to inside, but • Provide telnet access where needed

  7. Developments • Would be nice to have a consistent framework for all authenticated applications and processes • Something that: • Works with SSL, that can: • Handle normal logins • Do process-process authentication • Minimize the number of credentials a user has to keep track of • Setup a general CA • Currently use (different) certificates for • Mail • MIS applications

  8. Developments .. Cont. • Possible candidates: • Globus/GSI • Ssh that uses certificates • Authenticates processes • Can span sites with different encryption schemes (Kerberos, etc, etc.) • Kerberos?

  9. Summary • Close to removing clear text passwords internally • Provide clear-text external access in a controlled way • Need a consistent framework for authentication • Problems: • NIS – ypcat • X-terminals (although most are now on switched ports) • Win95/98 LANManager hash cripples NT security • Suppress W95/98 in domain by mid-2000 • Modems – back door

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