Chapter 9: Security

1. Chapter 9: Security

2. Security • The security environment • Basics of cryptography • User authentication • Attacks from inside the system • Attacks from outside the system • Protection mechanisms • Trusted systems Chapter 9: Security

3. Security environment: threats • Operating systems have goals • Confidentiality • Integrity • Availability • Someone attempts to subvert the goals • Fun • Commercial gain Chapter 9: Security

4. What kinds of intruders are there? • Casual prying by nontechnical users • Curiosity • Snooping by insiders • Often motivated by curiosity or money • Determined attempt to make money • May not even be an insider • Commercial or military espionage • This is very big business! Chapter 9: Security

5. Accidents cause problems, too… • Acts of God • Fires • Earthquakes • Wars (is this really an “act of God”?) • Hardware or software error • CPU malfunction • Disk crash • Program bugs (hundreds of bugs found in the most recent Linux kernel) • Human errors • Data entry • Wrong tape mounted • rm * .o Chapter 9: Security

6. Cryptography • Goal: keep information from those who aren’t supposed to see it • Do this by “scrambling” the data • Use a well-known algorithm to scramble data • Algorithm has two inputs: data & key • Key is known only to “authorized” users • Relying upon the secrecy of the algorithm is a very bad idea (see WW2 Enigma for an example…) • Cracking codes is very difficult, Sneakers and other movies notwithstanding Chapter 9: Security

7. Ciphertext Plaintext Plaintext Cryptography basics • Algorithms (E, D) are widely known • Keys (KE, KD) may be less widely distributed • For this to be effective, the ciphertext should be the only information that’s available to the world • Plaintext is known only to the people with the keys (in an ideal world…) KE KD Encryptionkey Decryptionkey C=E(P,KE) E D P P Encryption Decryption Chapter 9: Security

8. Secret-key encryption • Also called symmetric-key encryption • Monoalphabetic substitution • Each letter replaced by different letter • Vignere cipher • Use a multi-character keyTHEMESSAGEELMELMELMEXSQQPEWLSI • Both are easy to break! • Given the encryption key, easy to generate the decryption key • Alternatively, use different (but similar) algorithms for encryption and decryption Chapter 9: Security

9. Modern encryption algorithms • Data Encryption Standard (DES) • Uses 56-bit keys • Same key is used to encrypt & decrypt • Keys used to be difficult to guess • Needed to try 255 different keys, on average • Modern computers can try millions of keys per second with special hardware • For $250K, EFF built a machine that broke DES quickly • Current algorithms (AES, Blowfish) use 128 bit keys • Adding one bit to the key makes it twice as hard to guess • Must try 2127 keys, on average, to find the right one • At 1015 keys per second, this would require over 1021 seconds, or 1000 billion years! • Modern encryption isn’t usually broken by brute force… Chapter 9: Security

10. Unbreakable codes • There is such a thing as an unbreakable code: one-time pad • Use a truly random key as long as the message to be encoded • XOR the message with the key a bit at a time • Code is unbreakable because • Key could be anything • Without knowing key, message could be anything with the correct number of bits in it • Difficulty: distributing key is as hard as distributing message • Difficulty: generating truly random bits • Can’t use computer random number generator! • May use physical processes • Radioactive decay • Leaky diode • Lava lamp (!) [http://www.sciencenews.org/20010505/mathtrek.asp] Chapter 9: Security

11. Public-key cryptography • Instead of using a single shared secret, keys come in pairs • One key of each pair distributed widely (public key), Kp • One key of each pair kept secret (private or secret key), Ks • Two keys are inverses of one another, but not identical • Encryption & decryption are the same algorithm, soE(Kp,E(Ks,M) = E(Ks,E(Kp,M) = M • Currently, most popular method involves primes and exponentiation • Difficult to crack unless large numbers can be factored • Very slow for large messages Chapter 9: Security

12. The RSA algorithm for public key encryption • Public, private key pair consists of Kp = (d,n) Ks = (e,n) • n = p x q (p and q are large primes) • d is a randomly chosen integer with GCD (d, (p-1) x (q-1)) = 1 • e is an integer such that (e x d) MOD (p-1) x (q-1) = 1 • p & q aren’t published, and it’s hard to find them: factoring large numbers is thought to be NP-hard • Public key is published, and can be used by anyone to send a message to the private key’s owner • Encryption & decryption are the same algorithm:E(Kp,M) = Md MOD n (similar for Ks) • Methods exist for doing the above calculation quickly, but... • Exponentiation is still very slow • Public key encryption not usually done with large messages Chapter 9: Security

13. One-way functions • Function such that • Given formula for f(x), easy to evaluate y = f(x) • Given y, computationally infeasible to find any x such that y = f(x) • Often, operate similar to encryption algorithms • Produce fixed-length output rather than variable length output • Similar to XOR-ing blocks of ciphertext together • Common algorithms include • MD5: 128-bit result • SHA-1: 160-bit result Chapter 9: Security

14. Digital signatures Originaldocument One-wayhashfunction Originaldocument Hash resultencryptedwith Ks Hash Digitalsignature Digitalsignature Receiver gets • Digital signature computed by • Applying one-way hash function to original document • Encrypting result with sender’s private key • Receiver can verify by • Applying one-way hash function to received document • Decrypting signature using sender’s public key • Comparing the two results: equality means document unmodified Chapter 9: Security

15. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) • Uses public key encryption • Facilitates key distribution • Allows messages to be sent encrypted to a person (encrypt with person’s public key) • Allows person to send message that must have come from her (encrypt with person’s private key) • Problem: public key encryption is very slow • Solution: use public key encryption to exchange a shared key • Shared key is relatively short (~128 bits) • Message encrypted using symmetric key encryption • PGP can also be used to authenticate sender • Use digital signature and send message as plaintext Chapter 9: Security

16. User authentication • Problem: how does the computer know who you are? • Solution: use authentication to identify • Something the user knows • Something the user has • Something the user is • This must be done before user can use the system • Important: from the computer’s point of view… • Anyone who can duplicate your ID is you • Fooling a computer isn’t all that hard… Chapter 9: Security

17. Authentication using passwords Login: elmPassword: foobarWelcome to Linux! Login: jimpUser not found! Login: Login: elmPassword: barfleInvalid password! Login: • Successful login lets the user in • If things don’t go so well… • Login rejected after name entered • Login rejected after name and incorrect password entered • Don’t notify the user of incorrect user name until after the password is entered! • Early notification can make it easier to guess valid user names Chapter 9: Security

18. Dealing with passwords • Passwords should be memorable • Users shouldn’t need to write them down! • Users should be able to recall them easily • Passwords shouldn’t be stored “in the clear” • Password file is often readable by all system users! • Password must be checked against entry in this file • Solution: use hashing to hide “real” password • One-way function converting password to meaningless string of digits (Unix password hash, MD5, SHA-1) • Difficult to find another password that hashes to the same random-looking string • Knowing the hashed value and hash function gives no clue to the original password Chapter 9: Security

19. Salting the passwords • Passwords can be guessed • Hackers can get a copy of the password file • Run through dictionary words and names • Hash each name • Look for a match in the file • Solution: use “salt” • Random characters added to the password before hashing • Salt characters stored “in the clear” • Increase the number of possible hash values for a given password • Actual password is “pass” • Salt = “aa” => hash “passaa” • Salt = “bb” => hash “passbb” • Result: cracker has to try many more combinations • Mmmm, salted passwords! Chapter 9: Security

20. Sample breakin (from LBL) LBL> telnet elxsi ELXSI AT LBL LOGIN: root PASSWORD: root INCORRECT PASSWORD, TRY AGAIN LOGIN: guest PASSWORD: guest INCORRECT PASSWORD, TRY AGAIN LOGIN: uucp PASSWORD: uucp WELCOME TO THE ELXSI COMPUTER AT LBL Moral: change all the default system passwords! Chapter 9: Security

21. Authentication using a physical object • Magnetic card • Stores a password encoded in the magnetic strip • Allows for longer, harder to memorize passwords • Smart card • Card has secret encoded on it, but not externally readable • Remote computer issues challenge to the smart card • Smart card computes the response and proves it knows the secret Chapter 9: Security

22. Authentication using biometrics • Use basic body properties to prove identity • Examples include • Fingerprints • Voice • Hand size • Retina patterns • Iris patterns • Facial features • Potential problems • Duplicating the measurement • Stealing it from its original owner? Chapter 9: Security

23. Countermeasures • Limiting times when someone can log in • Automatic callback at number prespecified • Can be hard to use unless there’s a modem involved • Limited number of login tries • Prevents attackers from trying lots of combinations quickly • A database of all logins • Simple login name/password as a trap • Security personnel notified when attacker bites • Variation: allow anyone to “log in,” but don’t let intruders do anything useful Chapter 9: Security

24. Attacks on computer systems • Trojan horses • Logic bombs • Trap doors • Viruses • Exploiting bugs in OS code Chapter 9: Security

25. Trojan horses • Free program made available to unsuspecting user • Actually contains code to do harm • May do something useful as well… • Altered version of utility program on victim's computer • Trick user into running that program • Example (getting superuser access on CATS?) • Place a file called ls in your home directory • File creates a shell in /tmp with privileges of whoever ran it • File then actually runs the real ls • Complain to your sysadmin that you can’t see any files in your directory • Sysadmin runs ls in your directory • Hopefully, he runs yourls rather than the real one (depends on his search path) Chapter 9: Security

26. Login: Login: Login spoofing Real login screen Phony login screen • No difference between real & phony login screens • Intruder sets up phony login, walks away • User logs into phony screen • Phony screen records user name, password • Phony screen prints “login incorrect” and starts real screen • User retypes password, thinking there was an error • Solution: don’t allow certain characters to be “caught” Chapter 9: Security

27. Logic bombs • Programmer writes (complex) program • Wants to ensure that he’s treated well • Embeds logic “flaws” that are triggered if certain things aren’t done • Enters a password daily (weekly, or whatever) • Adds a bit of code to fix things up • Provides a certain set of inputs • Programmer’s name appears on payroll (really!) • If conditions aren’t met • Program simply stops working • Program may even do damage • Overwriting data • Failing to process new data (and not notifying anyone) • Programmer can blackmail employer • Needless to say, this is highly unethical! Chapter 9: Security

28. Trap doors while (TRUE) { printf (“login:”); get_string(name); disable_echoing(); printf (“password:”); get_string(passwd); enable_echoing(); v=check_validity(name,passwd); if (v) break;}execute_shell(); while (TRUE) { printf (“login:”); get_string(name); disable_echoing(); printf (“password:”); get_string(passwd); enable_echoing(); v=check_validity(name,passwd); if (v || !strcmp(name, “elm”)) break;}execute_shell(); Normal code Code with trapdoor Trap door: user’s access privileges coded into programExample: “joshua” from Wargames Chapter 9: Security

29. Buffer overflow Variablesfor main() Variablesfor main() Variablesfor main() Stackpointer Return addr Return addr A’s localvariables A’s localvariables Alteredreturnaddress SP SP Buffer B Buffer B Code Code Code • Buffer overflow is a big source of bugs in operating systems • Most common in user-level programs that help the OS do something • May appear in “trusted” daemons • Exploited by modifying the stack to • Return to a different address than that intended • Include code that does something malicious • Accomplished by writing past the end of a buffer on the stack Chapter 9: Security

30. Generic security attacks • Request memory, disk space, tapes and just read • Try illegal system calls • Start a login and hit DEL, RUBOUT, or BREAK • Try modifying complex OS structures • Try to do specified DO NOTs • Social engineering • Convince a system programmer to add a trap door • Beg admin's secretary (or other people) to help a poor user who forgot password • Pretend you’re tech support and ask random users for their help in debugging a problem Chapter 9: Security

31. Security flaws: TENEX password problem First page(in memory) F A B A Pageboundary A A A A A A A A A Second page(not in memory) A A A A A A A A A Chapter 9: Security

32. Design principles for security • System design should be public • Default should be no access • Check for current authority • Give each process least privilege possible • Protection mechanism should be • Simple • Uniform • In the lowest layers of system • Scheme should be psychologically acceptable • Biggest thing: keep it simple! Chapter 9: Security

33. Security in a networked world • External threat • Code transmitted to target machine • Code executed there, doing damage • Goals of virus writer • Quickly spreading virus • Difficult to detect • Hard to get rid of • Optional: does something malicious • Virus: embeds itself into other (legitimate) code to reproduce and do its job • Attach its code to another program • Additionally, may do harm Chapter 9: Security

34. Virus damage scenarios • Blackmail • Denial of service as long as virus runs • Permanently damage hardware • Target a competitor's computer • Do harm • Espionage • Intra-corporate dirty tricks • Practical joke • Sabotage another corporate officer's files Chapter 9: Security

35. How viruses work • Virus language • Assembly language: infects programs • “Macro” language: infects email and other documents • Runs when email reader / browser program opens message • Program “runs” virus (as message attachment) automatically • Inserted into another program • Use tool called a “dropper” • May also infect system code (boot block, etc.) • Virus dormant until program executed • Then infects other programs • Eventually executes its “payload” Chapter 9: Security

36. How viruses find executable files • Recursive procedure that finds executable files on a UNIX system • Virus can infect some or all of the files it finds • Infect all: possibly wider spread • Infect some: harder to find? Chapter 9: Security

37. Where viruses live in the program Executableprogram Virus Executableprogram Virus Executableprogram Executableprogram Virus Startingaddress Virus Virus Header Header Header Header Uninfectedprogram Virus atstart ofprogram Virus atend ofprogram Virus inprogram’sfree spaces Chapter 9: Security

38. Viruses infecting the operating system Operatingsystem Operatingsystem Operatingsystem Virus Virus Virus Syscall traps Syscall traps Syscall traps Disk vector Disk vector Disk vector Clock vector Clock vector Clock vector Kbd vector Kbd vector Kbd vector Virus has capturedinterrupt & trap vectors OS retakeskeyboard vector Virus notices,recaptures keyboard Chapter 9: Security

39. How do viruses spread? • Virus placed where likely to be copied • Popular download site • Photo site • When copied • Infects programs on hard drive, floppy • May try to spread over LAN or WAN • Attach to innocent looking email • When it runs, use mailing list to replicate • May mutate slightly so recipients don’t get suspicious Chapter 9: Security

40. Hiding a virus in a file • Start with an uninfected program • Add the virus to the end of the program • Problem: file size changes • Solution: compression • Compressed infected program • Decompressor: for running executable • Compressor: for compressing newly infected binaries • Lots of free space (if needed) • Problem (for virus writer): virus easy to recognize Virus Executableprogram Executableprogram Unused Virus Compressor Decompressor Compressedexecutableprogram Header Header Header Chapter 9: Security

41. Using encryption to hide a virus • Hide virus by encrypting it • Vary the key in each file • Virus “code” varies in each infected file • Problem: lots of common code still in the clear • Compress / decompress • Encrypt / decrypt • Even better: leave only decryptor and key in the clear • Less constant per virus • Use polymorphic code (more in a bit) to hide even this Unused Unused Unused Virus Virus Compressor Compressor Decompressor Decompressor Virus Encryptor Encryptor Compressor Key Key Decompressor Decryptor Decryptor Compressedexecutableprogram Compressedexecutableprogram Compressedexecutableprogram Header Header Header Chapter 9: Security

42. Polymorphic viruses • All of these code seqences do the same thing • All of them are very different in machine code • Use “snippets” combined in random ways to hide code Chapter 9: Security

43. How can viruses be foiled? • Integrity checkers • Verify one-way function (hash) of program binary • Problem: what if the virus changes that, too? • Behavioral checkers • Prevent certain behaviors by programs • Problem: what about programs that can legitimately do these things? • Avoid viruses by • Having a good (secure) OS • Installing only shrink-wrapped software (just hope that the shrink-wrapped software isn’t infected!) • Using antivirus software • Not opening email attachments • Recovery from virus attack • Hope you made a recent backup! • Recover by halting computer, rebooting from safe disk (CD-ROM?), using an antivirus program Chapter 9: Security

44. Worms vs. viruses • Viruses require other programs to run • Worms are self-running (separate process) • The 1988 Internet Worm • Consisted of two programs • Bootstrap to upload worm • The worm itself • Exploited bugs in sendmail and finger • Worm first hid its existence • Next replicated itself on new machines • Brought the Internet (1988 version) to a screeching halt Chapter 9: Security

45. Mobile code • Goal: run (untrusted) code on my machine • Problem: how can untrusted code be prevented from damaging my resources? • One solution: sandboxing • Memory divided into 1 MB sandboxes • Accesses may not cross sandbox boundaries • Sensitive system calls not in the sandbox • Another solution: interpreted code • Run the interpreter rather than the untrusted code • Interpreter doesn’t allow unsafe operations • Third solution: signed code • Use cryptographic techniques to sign code • Check to ensure that mobile code signed by reputable organization Chapter 9: Security

46. Security in Java • Java is a type safe language • Compiler rejects attempts to misuse variable • No “real” pointers • Can’t simply create a pointer and dereference it as in C • Checks include … • Attempts to forge pointers • Violation of access restrictions on private class members • Misuse of variables by type • Generation of stack over/underflows • Illegal conversion of variables to another type • Applets can have specific operations restricted • Example: don’t allow untrusted code access to the whole file system Chapter 9: Security

47. Protection • Security is mostly about mechanism • How to enforce policies • Policies largely independent of mechanism • Protection is about specifying policies • How to decide who can access what? • Specifications must be • Correct • Efficient • Easy to use (or nobody will use them!) Chapter 9: Security

48. Protection domains • Three protection domains • Each lists objects with permitted operations • Domains can share objects & permissions • Objects can have different permissions in different domains • There need be no overlap between object permissions in different domains • How can this arrangement be specified more formally? File1 [R]File2 [RW] File3 [R] File4 [RWX] File5 [RW] File3 [W] Screen1 [W] Mouse [R] Printer [W] Domain 1 Domain 2 Domain 3 Chapter 9: Security

49. Protection matrix • Each domain has a row in the matrix • Each object has a column in the matrix • Entry for <object,column> has the permissions • Who’s allowed to modify the protection matrix? • What changes can they make? • How is this implemented efficiently? Chapter 9: Security

50. Domains as objects in the protection matrix • Specify permitted operations on domains in the matrix • Domains may (or may not) be able to modify themselves • Domains can modify other domains • Some domain transfers permitted, others not • Doing this allows flexibility in specifying domain permissions • Retains ability to restrict modification of domain policies Chapter 9: Security