Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

tamika
slide1 n.
Skip this Video
Loading SlideShow in 5 Seconds..
Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002 PowerPoint Presentation
Download Presentation
Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002

play fullscreen
1 / 45
Download Presentation
Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002
195 Views
Download Presentation

Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript

  1. Mission Analysis Brief20 August 2002 BLUE SINGA

  2. Purpose The purpose is to brief the commander on the results of the staff’s mission analysis, propose a restated mission and commanders intent.

  3. Agenda • CTF Area of Operations (AO) • Threat Situation • Facts / Assumptions / Limitations • Strategic/Operational Centers of Gravity • Tasks (Specified, Implied, Essential) • Force Structure Analysis • Risk Assessment • End states (Operational/Strategic) • Proposed CCTF Restated Mission and Intent Statements • Proposed CCIR • CCTF Feedback / Guidance

  4. CTF OPERATIONAL AREA • Land mass of Tindoro, including its territorial waters • Area of interest will include the sea and air lines of communication to Samagaland SAMAGALAND AUSTRALIA TINDORO

  5. CTF AREA OF OPERATIONS

  6. THREAT SITUATION • Threats • Terrorism • Operating from Displaced persons (DP) camps in Queenstown and the Fingal enclave. • Poor law & order (Banditry) • Direct impact on relief operations • Aggression from opposing military forces • Still deployed along border • Poor humanitarian conditions • May be exploited by terrorists & bandits • Cause low morale • Economy affected by war

  7. C2 Estimate • Key considerations • Geography – mountainous & wet • Good terrain for bandits & terrorists • Low morale - difficult to gain support • Economy – unemployment & poverty • Well established terrorist cells • Existing terrorists’ infrastructures • Disposition & readiness of North & South Tindoro forces

  8. C2 Estimate • AO • Mountainous • Network of lakes & rivers • Coastline generally rugged • Heavy rainfall • Coastal areas exposed to strong winds • Jan-Feb: warmest mths (18-21C) • Jun-Jul: coldest mths (average: 10C)

  9. HIGHER’S MISSION Coalition Task Force GOODWILL will commence deployment of a multinational force no earlier than 28 August 02, to conduct peacekeeping operations in North and South Tindoro, in accordance with UNSCR 147, in order to create conditions necessary for a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro.

  10. HIGHER CDR’S INTENT I intend for CTF GOODWILL to conduct peacekeeping operations in support of UNSCR 147, by providing a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro, so that the inhabitants can rebuild their lives, economies, and social institutions in peace.

  11. HIGHER’S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Singapore, as lead nation, will form CTF GOODWILL, utilizing the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Ninth Division Headquarters as the core CTF HQ, augmented by military planners from the various troop contributing countries. The CTF HQ will exercise OPCON over CTF multinational forces. CTF GOODWILL will provide a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro by maintaining separation of hostile factions and facilitating humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons. Coordination of efforts with UN Special Representative of the Secretary General is imperative to mission Success

  12. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING SINGAPORE • Army • Division HQ • 1 x Bde HQ with 3 x Inf Bns • 1 x Medical Team • Air Force • 2 x C-130 • 2 x CH-47D • 2 x SPs • Navy • 1 x LSL • 1 x LST

  13. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING UNITED STATES • Army • 1 x Air Evacuation Platoon • 1 x Civil Affairs Bde HQ • Air Force • 4 X C-130J • 1 X KC 135R • 2 X C-5B • 2 X C-17 • 1 X Air Mobility Support Sqn • Joint • 1 X Psyop Ops Coy • 1 x JPOTF HQ • 1 X JPOTF PDC • 1 X TPD 980 HQ • 1 X Special Ops Det • 1 X Special Force Group • 1 x Joint Spec Ops HQ • 1 X MSQ 126 ( for 60 days)

  14. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING UNITED STATES • Navy • 1 x LHD-2 • 1 x LPD-10 • 2 x LSD • 1 x LST • US Marine Corp (for 60 days) • 1 x Marine Air Group • 1 x Marine Inf Bn • US Marine Corp (for 60 days) • 1 x Bn Landing Team • Inf Bn • LAV Plt • AAV Plt • Arty Bty • 1 x Medium Helicopter Sqn (Reinforced) • 12 x CH-46E • 4 x CH-53E • 3 x UH-1N • 4 x AH-1W • 6 x AV-8B • 1 x MEU Service Support Group • 1 x STINGER Sect

  15. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING AUSTRALIA • Army • 1 x Infantry Bn • 1 x Engr Coy • 1 x Field Log Spt Staff • 1 x Medical Team • 1 x ROWPU Unit • Navy • 1 x LSH • 1 x LPA

  16. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING • Fiji • -- 1 x MP Coy • France • 1 x Army Surgical Unit • 3 x C-130H • India • 2 x IL-76MD • Indonesia • 1 x Infantry Bn • Bangladesh • 1 x MP Coy • 1 x Medical Team • 1 x ROWPU unit • Brunei • 1 x Provost Coy • Canada • 1 x Army Logistic Coy • 2 x C-130E

  17. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING • Japan • 1 x Surgical Team • 1 x Engineer Bn • 1 x ROWPU Unit • 2 x C-130H • Korea • 1 x Engineer Coy • Madagascar • 1 x Civil Police Unit • Malaysia • 1 x Infantry Bn • 4 x C-130H • 2 x LST • Mauritius • - 1 x Engr Plt • Nepal • 1 x Infantry Coy

  18. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING • New Zealand • 1 x MP Coy • Philippines • 1 x Infantry Bn • 1 x Medical Team • Russia • 1 x Infantry Coy • Thailand • 1 x Infantry Bn • 1 x Special Forces Detachment • 1 x Army Support Grp • Sri Lanka • - 1 x MP Coy • Tonga • - 1 x Infantry Coy

  19. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING UNITED KINGDOM 2 x C-130J 2 x C-17 4 x HC3 Helo 1 x FFG

  20. FACTS • CTF is working with two sovereign states who have agreed to UN mandate • North and South Tindoro have Offensive Capabilities • 40,000 DP’s in 10 camps • UN NGO/IO already working in AO • The CTF will require re-supply within 5 days. • Engineer support is sufficient for road repair and maintenance of the force. • Host nation support is limited in South Tindoro • Security problems are hindering HA efforts

  21. FACTS (con’t) • The CTF will require re-supply within 5 days. • Engineer support is sufficient for road repair and maintenance of the force. • No effective law enforcement in North/South Tindoro

  22. FACTS(Maritime) • Northern Tindoro Port • Launceston; harbor is 100% • Bicheno • Bridport • Davonport (road conditions 40% flooded) • Marrrawah • Smithton • Stanley (road conditions 75% flooded) • Ulverstone • Wynard • Southern Tindoro Port • Hobart; harbor is 100% • Dover • Dunalley • Macquarie Harbour • Port Arthur • St. Helens • Strahan

  23. FACTS(Medical) • South Tindoro health system is near collapse • Large and growing displaced population with urgent humanitarian needs: • - Cholera outbreaks in 4 camps • Presence of medical NGOs/IOs in the AO (main offices in Hobart)

  24. FACTS (Special Operations) (CSOTF) • Known Facts • Terrorist activities Fengal and Queenstown • Suspected operating base – displaced person camps • Denouncement of terror activities by both governments • Assumptions • Disruption of restoration efforts by terrorist • Commanders intent • Anti terror, force protection • Security plan • Limitations – “CTF will not Conduct Counter Terrorist Actions”

  25. ASSUMPTIONS • The government of both countries will continue to support the peace process and accept the UN Sanctioned MNF • All Sea Port Of Debarkation/Aerial Port Of Debarkation (SPOD/APOD) will be available throughout the operation • MNF will be able to move freely within AO Existing IO and NGO can continue to provide assistance

  26. LIMITATIONS • CONSTRAINTS • Execute handoff with UNMOG • Forces must be able to be self-sustained for 6 months • Forces must be able to self deploy/redeploy • Must deal with two sovereign governments • RESTRAINTS • TCC cannot deploy before 28 Aug • NZ cannot be used as Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) • USMC must re-deploy by sea after 60 days • Cannot conduct any direct counter-terrorism • Host Nation support in South Tindoro is limited

  27. STRATEGICCENTERS OF GRAVITY • CRISIS • Belligerents/host nation belief that MNF/CTF is impartial in the application of the mandate • Belligerents capability/willingness to use violence to achieve means • FRIENDLY • Credibility of the MNF/CTF • APOD/SPOD Access • Public Consent

  28. OPERATIONALCENTERS OF GRAVITY • Phase I (Pre-Crisis Response) • CRISIS • Consent of all parties to the mandate • Well-being of displaced persons • FRIENDLY • Legitimacy and credibility of the CTF • Sea and air lines of communications • Phase II (Lodgment) • CRISIS • Acceptance of the general population • FRIENDLY • Deployment flow/ Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD)/ Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD)

  29. OPERATIONALCENTERS OF GRAVITY, con’t • Phase III (Mandate Enforcement) • CRISIS • Host nation forces • FRIENDLY • Integration and liaison with all parties • CTF credibility • Phase IV (Stabilization) • CRISIS • Local population acceptance of the settlement • FRIENDLY • Sustainment of mandate • Capability of NGO/IO to provide humanitarian assistance

  30. OPERATIONALCENTERS OF GRAVITY, con’t • Phase V (Post Crisis) • CRISIS • Host nation ability to provide secure environment • FRIENDLY • Complete transition to host nation

  31. SPECIFIED TASKS • Facilitate reintegration of DPs to respective communities • Facilitate transition of HA to host nations • Execute mission handoff from UNMOG to MNF • Separate hostile factions • Facilitate humanitarian assistance • Conduct Information Operations • Execute handoff to host nations • Develop media campaign plan • Create conditions for a secure and stable environment on Tindoro • Coordinate with UN SRSG • Establish border regime • Conduct peacekeeping operations

  32. IMPLIED TASKS • Provide security/presence at Displaced Persons (DP) camps associated with militia and terrorist activity • Establish buffer vicinity disputed border areas • Establish/monitor cantonment areas • Provide support to Host Nation Police forces • Establish/monitor border regime and checkpoint control • Integrate with Host Nation Police/Mil coordination mechanisms • Integrate with NGO/IO/PVOs coordination mechanisms

  33. IMPLIED TASKS • Emergency infrastructure development • Secure and establish storage facilities for distribution of HA supplies • Establish SPODs and APODs • Facilitate external news media coverage • Conduct air-mobility operations • Develop Main Supply Routes (MSR) and their security • Assist in the development of DP routes and their security • Assist in the transport DPs as necessary • Establish Command and control (C2) arrangement within the CTF • Provide communications to supporting forces as required

  34. ESSENTIAL TASKS • Create conditions for a secure and stable environment • Conduct Information Operations • Facilitate reintegration of DPs to respective communities • Execute handoff to host nations • Execute mission handoff from UNMOG to MNF • Separate hostile factions • Facilitate humanitarian assistance • Conduct peacekeeping operations • Coordination and liaison with NGOs/IOs/UN SRSG

  35. INITIAL FORCE STRUCTUREANALYSIS Sealift – sufficient Airlift – sufficient Communications – shortfall of communications equipment and inter-operability

  36. RISK ASSESSMENT Risk is minimal

  37. OPERATIONAL END STATE CTF successfully hands over security and HA support responsibilities to Host Nations’ Armed Forces and Civil Authorities, when; hostile forces are separated, border regime is in place, displaced persons are reintegrated, HA missions are transitioned to civil authorities.

  38. STRATEGIC END STATE A secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro.

  39. PROPOSED CTF RESTATED MISSION Coalition Task Force GOODWILL will deploy a multinational force no earlier than 28 August 02 (C-Day), to conduct peacekeeping operations in North and South Tindoro, in accordance with UNSCR 147, to create the conditions necessary for the governments of North and South Tindoro to maintain a secure and stable environment.

  40. PROPOSED COMMANDER’S INTENT Intent is to form a multinational force to help create conditions necessary to establish a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro. All of our actions in keeping hostile forces apart, assisting with HA and return of DPs, must be focused towards this end.

  41. PROPOSED INITIAL CCIR • Do the Militia and terrorists receive tacit support from host governments • The CCTF requires notification of impending terrorist/militia activity • Does the host nation have the ability/intent to perform Counter Terrorism in support of CTF operations and defense.

  42. COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE

  43. CPG-1 Guidance Minimum Military Footprint • Heavy SOF, CMO, and involvement of smaller regional nations • Heavy HA, IO, PA, media campaign • Establish functional composite subordinate Task Forces (TF) - (TF med, TF LOG, TF Security, etc.) • Strong border regime or Military Exclusion Zone (MEZ) - CPG make recommendation • Critical infrastructure repair & CA projects on Tindoro • Full integration of Multinational Forces

  44. CPG-2 Guidance Heavy Military Footprint • Establish MEZ along TEMASEK Agreement border • Demilitarization • Heavy mil-police security • Full integration of MNF • Establish CCMOTF to conduct HA & NGO support, Civil Military Operations (CMO) and support to SRSG

  45. CPG-3 Guidance Sector Establishment • Sector assignment of participating forces • Plan for smooth coordination of NGO / HA support • Security patrols / demilitarization • Coordinate reintegration of DPs across sectors and borders • Strong border regime or MEZ - CPG make recommendation • Minimize inefficiencies created by force structure • Determine optimum logistic support