the middle east north africa n.
Skip this Video
Loading SlideShow in 5 Seconds..
The Middle East & North Africa PowerPoint Presentation
Download Presentation
The Middle East & North Africa

The Middle East & North Africa

326 Views Download Presentation
Download Presentation

The Middle East & North Africa

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript

  1. The Middle East & North Africa • Key Issues • Iran’s Nuclear Weapons • Energy Sources • Israel & Syrian • Way Ahead GGS 684, GMU, Assignment 2, 4 March 2011 Group C(orona): Antonia Shull, Amber Marriott, Hadis Dashtestani, Brandon Payne, and Chuck Barber

  2. Key IssuesMiddle East and North Africa • Nuclear Iran • Energy Switch Resource Availability Water and Land Scarcity Climate Change Economic Stability Youth Bulge Role of Women • Regional Stability

  3. Iran’s Nuclear Weapons • Iran has admitted to having nuclear technology for energy purposes • Iran is rich in natural gas and other resources • Tons of gas resources are burning (without being used) • Nuclear equipment is extremely expensive and is using current energy resources

  4. Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Satellite Images & Geospatial Analysis of Iran’s Nuclear Sites

  5. Isfahan Nuclear Energy Site 2000 The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) interpreted images (taken by Google Earth & DigitalGlobe) of Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. Both these images show Isfahan Nuclear Energy Site. Isfahan is where uranium is first processed and where a storage facility is being built underneath a mountain. Obviously, there are significant changes between the two images indicating Iran has never stopped its nuclear programs. 2006

  6. Changes in Natan’s Nuclear Site Institute for Science & International Security The facilities in Google Earth from a few years ago On September16, 2002 Then January 2, 2005 

  7. According to GeoEye, the image shows a military facility located about 20 miles North-Northeast of Qum and 100 miles Southwest of Tehran. An analysis of the image by a defence intelligence consulting firm said the facility has a primary and several auxiliary entrances, ventilation shafts, a surface-to-air missile site, and quarry and construction equipment. 2009

  8. Iran’s Deadly Weapons Continue • Iran’s aims for regional leadership, including its nuclear ambitions • Iran’s interactions in the region • Afghanistan • Supporting Northern alliance before 9/11 • Provides “lethal support” to Taliban • Iraq • Iran has been constantly funding and supporting Shia militia and parties in Iraq

  9. Potential Consequences • Nuclear competition in the region • Countries might decide to seek nuclear weapons capabilities in reaction to Iran’s capability of nuclear weapons • Insurgency in Iraq & Afghanistan will be boosted • The international system will be shocked as it experiences immediate humanitarian, economic & political-military repercussion • Attempt to test nuclear weapons

  10. Energy Sources in 2025 • Oil – Limited • Natural gas – Limited • Coal – Limited • Wind power • Solar power • Advanced biofuels • Hydrogen fuel-cells • Other alternative energy systems Israel Wind Power in Tel Aviv UAE Future Solar Power Plant

  11. Team A vs. Team B A: High demand for oil/natural gas leads to a prosperous but chaotic Middle East B: Decrease demand for oil/natural gas leads to new opportunities in the Middle East A Map of World Oil Reserves

  12. High demand for oil/natural gas leads to a prosperous but chaotic Middle East The World’s Second Largest Oil Deposit  July 2009 by NASA’s Earth Observatory • 2020 their will be a global increase in energy consumption • OPEC production is expected to grow by 43% • Non-OPEC production won’t be able to keep up with demand • Oil reserve in ME will account for 57% of the world’s oil • Political and economic power will increase in the ME • 2/3rd of ME oil exports will go to India & China making them very dependant on the ME (possible exchange for allegiance) But… • Poorer overall (with remaining wealth unevenly spread) • Pipelines, facilities, and export terminals will not be well protected from attacks • Al-Qa’da will be interested in attacking the oil facilities • Possibility of a China-Japan-India naval arms race over routes

  13. The World’s Second Largest Oil Deposit  July 2009 by NASA’s Earth Observatory

  14. Decrease demand for oil/natural gas leads to new opportunities in the Middle East • Oil and gas production will decline with the new energy transition • 2010 the ME produced 60% of the world’s oil, in 2025 39% • Oil discoveries in the Santos Basin will make Brazil a major oil exporter after 2020 • Number and geographic distribution of oil producers will decrease during the energy transition But… • Motivate the ME to open up to the West in a bid for greater foreign investment => strengthen ties • ME will not be able to support the demand due to not modernizing their production infrastructure Arak Oil Refinery Company  Collected February 2005 by GeoEye

  15. Arak Oil Refinery Company  Collected February 2005 by GeoEye

  16. High Impact - Low Probability Analysis • Funds from national investments become the dominant economic factor in the Middle East in light of a global shift away from fossil fuels.

  17. High Impact Outcomes • A more economically stable Middle East • Greater regional stability due to greater economic stability • Investment in non-oil sector creates jobs and curbs civil unrest • Shift in regional power to include oil-poor countries Rumalia, Iraq by Ikonos in 2009

  18. Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) “Capital generated from government surpluses and invested in private markets abroad.”

  19. Energy Diversification by 2035 Yearly Growth in Consumption Source: Energy Demand: 1.4% Liquid Fuel: 0.9% Renewables: 2.6%

  20. Investment SectorsObservable and Quantifiable via GEOINT • Tourism • Transportation Hubs • Alternative Energy • Manufacturing Jordan

  21. Low Probability for 2025 • Oil and natural gas are high income products and are unlikely to be replaced • The global financial situation is not encouraging economic growth • The current political situations are unlikely to bolster regional economies

  22. Contrarian “What-If” Analysis:Israel Returns the Golan Heights to Syria Brief History • Golan Heights occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War (June 5-10, 1967) • Formal peace agreement has yet to be signed between Israel and Syria • Wide international recognition that Golan Heights is Syrian territory • Strategically important • Fresh water resource in the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) • Elevated position (460 sqr. miles) Source: Israeli Settlements in the Golan Heights, CIA, 1992

  23. Path to Agreement • Resumption of informal peace talks between Israel and Syria • Formal peace deal ultimately brokered through Turkey, EU, US and Russia • Increased Western pressure on Israel • Nationalist political sensitivities in Europe frustrated by increased Muslim immigration • Divisions and realignments in the Middle East • Less certainty from an Israeli security perspective • Syria expands military cooperation with foreign powers • Russian naval base at Tartus, Syria

  24. Port of Tartus, Syria • Russian foothold in Mediterranean • Now used for anti-piracy operations • Undergoing major renovations to support Russian missile cruisers and eventually aircraft carriers

  25. Indicators

  26. Scope of Consequences Israel National Water Carrier • Potential to Increase Stability in the Region • Israel & Syria peace agreement concludes Six Day War (1967) • Syria agrees to stop sponsoring Palestinian and Lebanese militant groups • Syria recognizes Israel’s right to exist • Need for external watch agency or UN-like monitors • Potential for Syrian military basing/buildup in the Golan Heights • Ensure agreement on water usage/rights to the Sea of Galilee • Potential Internal Israeli Strife • Displaced Israelis – what happens to settlements and displaced persons? • Political challenges to a potentially unpopular agreement • Impact on Future Arab-Israeli peace agreements • Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty: water to Jordan from SoG • Reaction from Iran, Egypt, Lebanon, and Arab world? • Precedent for Israel regarding the West Bank and Gaza Strip Sea of Galilee Source:

  27. Way Ahead • Three focus areas for requirements and analysis • Nuclear Iran • Energy Switch • Israel and its Neighbors • Continue to develop and assess indicators • Next step – Identify GEOINT resources to fill gaps GGS 684, GMU, Assignment 2, 4 March 2011 Group C: Antonia Shull, Amber Marriott, Hadis Dashtestani, Brandon Payne, and Chuck Barber

  28. Questions


  30. Key Certainties and Consequences • Continued economic growth—coupled with 1.2 billion more people by 2025—will put pressure on energy, food, and water resources. • Unless employment conditions change dramatically in parlous youth-bulge states such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen, these countries will remain ripe for continued instability and state failure. • The potential for conflict will increase owing to rapid changes in parts of the greater Middle East and the spread of lethal capabilities. • Terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could lessen if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorists that are active the diffusion of technologies will put dangerous capabilities within their reach. • The need for the US to act as regional balancer in the Middle East will increase, although other outside powers—Russia, China and India—will play greater roles than today.

  31. Key Uncertainties and Consequences • Whether an energy transition away from oil and gas—supported by improved energy storage, biofuels, and clean coal—is completed during the 2025 time frame. • With high oil and gas prices, major exporters such as Russia and Iran will substantially augment their levels of national power, with Russia’s GDP potentially approaching that of the UK and France. • A sustained plunge in prices, perhaps underpinned by a fundamental switch to new energy sources, could trigger a long-term decline for producers as global and regional players. • Whether regional fears about a nuclear-armed Iran trigger an arms race and greater militarization. • Turbulence is likely to increase under most scenarios. Revival of economic growth, a more prosperous Iraq, and resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute could engender some stability as the region deals with a strengthening Iran and global transition away from oil and gas.

  32. Emerging Multi-Polar Powers • Middle East and Northern African countries are not expected to be in the big five economic powers (USA, Brazil, Russia, India, and China) • We expect, however, to see the political and economic power of other countries—such as Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey—increase.

  33. Population Growth The number of countries with youthful age structures in the current “arc of instability” is projected to decline by as much as 40 percent. Three of every four youth-bulge countries that remain will be located in Sub-Saharan Africa; nearly all of the remainder will be located in the core of the Middle East, scattered through southern and central Asia, and in the Pacific Islands.

  34. Global Economic Growth • Unprecedented global economic growth—positive in so many other regards—will continue to put pressure on a number of highly strategic resources, including energy, food, and water, and demand is projected to outstrip easily available supplies over the next decade or so. • the world will be in the midst of a fundamental energy transition away from oil toward natural gas, coal and other alternatives • a transition—particularly an abrupt one—out of fossil fuels would have major repercussions for energy producers in the Middle East and Eurasia, potentially causing permanent decline of some states as global and regional powers.

  35. Prospects for Terrorism, Conflict and Proliferation • Terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East. • Economic opportunities for youth and greater political pluralism probably would dissuade some from joining terrorists’ ranks, but others—motivated by a variety of factors, such as a desire for revenge or to become “martyrs”—will continue to turn to violence to pursue their objectives. • Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, other countries’ worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear-weapons capable Iran. Episodes of low-intensity conflict taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. • We believe ideological conflicts akin to the Cold War are unlikely to take root in a world in which most states will be preoccupied with the pragmatic challenges of globalization and shifting global power alignments. The force of ideology is likely to be strongest in the Muslim world—particularly the Arab core. In those countries that are likely to struggle with youth bulges and weak economic underpinnings—such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen—the radical Salafi trend of Islam is likely to gain traction. • The risk of nuclear weapon use over the next 20 years, although remaining very low, is likely to be greater than it is today as a result of several converging trends. The spread of nuclear technologies and expertise is generating concerns about the potential emergence of new nuclear weapon states and the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist groups. Ongoing low-intensity clashes between India and Pakistan continue to raise the specter that such events could escalate to a broader conflict between those nuclear powers. The possibility of a future disruptive regime change or collapse occurring in a weak state with nuclear weapons also continues to raise questions regarding the ability of such a state to control and secure its nuclear arsenals.