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A New Role of Europe in the New World Order

A New Role of Europe in the New World Order. Student: Popova Victoria, TSU, 101. Describing the world order today we can infer that:. It is no longer bipolar and is not organized vertically like it used to be during the Cold War;

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A New Role of Europe in the New World Order

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  1. A New Role of Europe in the New World Order Student: Popova Victoria, TSU, 101

  2. Describing the world order today we can infer that: • It is no longer bipolar and is not organized vertically like it used to be during the Cold War; • The strict resistance between two opponent ‘camps’ supported by the deterrence policy does not exist any more; • A number of new actors, able to play a part, were introduced into the international system; • A new set of structures (‘poles’) was established; • So, the world order has been transformed and the the role of actors in it has also changed completely.

  3. The idea of my report is: • to define, what the role of Europe in making such structures distinctive for the world today is and find out how strong Europe is to overcome the difficulties that exist to achieve the aim to act independently on the world stage and be active in such a ‘new’ world.

  4. The challenges that Europe faces today are: • The Members of the European Union are sovereign states and the big amount of them exist now within the enlarged Union-25; • The presence of special relations with NATO, which is a separate security structure and where some European sates have membership, and with the USA as a dominant actor in particular; • The internal institutional weakness, where mechanisms of decision-making do not work sufficiently, especially in such strategic issues like Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

  5. Concerning the first obstacle there are two controversial points: • from one side the states aspire to have a strong Europe with its clear weighty role and a voice heard on the world stage, but from the other side the states, showing themselves here as national states, have their individual interests and do not want to loose their sovereignty; • Because the states, which have joined the EU are not big and do not dispose a significant influence they are to choose whom to stick to, if they want to declare their importance. To obtain this they can share European values to get protection from the Union. But from the other side, these new Members do not want to be absorbed by the EU and begin to seek some support in another directions.

  6. The practical examples are: • The rejection of the European Political Community project known as Pleven plan (1950) by the French National Assembly in 1954. This project was aimed at establishing a federal structure; • The floundered negotiations on two Fouchet plans in 1962. These plans envisaged closer political cooperation, a union of states and common foreign and defense policies; • The everlasting British support of the US policy in terms of Great Britain own preferences, what still causes the discrepancy between states like it recently towards Iraq in 2003.

  7. The complication with the second difficulty for Europe exists in some specific points like: • Many of the EU Members are at the same time the Members of the Alliance, what banns Europe to act independently in developing its separate security goals; • The supremacy of NATO law: everything should be coordinated with NATO; • Not the whole EU as a coherent actor is involved in the NATO today, some states inside the EU this way can be strictly pro-US, some of them are not and stay in the Union framework;

  8. The EU before the Petersberg tasks being introduced had no joint military capabilities under a centralized command: to launch a military operation at the continent Europe were to act inside the NATO order; • The position of the USA, which is uncertain: does the USA need a strong independent partner capable to react at what happens in the world, but sometimes unpredictable and uncontrolled or does it expect to see Europe constrained, but obedient?

  9. The view of the US on forming the European common political values after the Cold War: • The USA in the framework of NATO maintained the initiatives of European states to strengthen their security and develop their mutual political solidarity under the working out of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). But it was developed to balance transatlantic relations and strengthen Alliance as a whole; • Europe was allowed to develop the CFSP initiatives under the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. But it was an intergovernmental pillar of the EU and was not so efficient; • Since the Cologne Summit in 1999 Europe became ready to work for international conflict prevention and crisis management, even deploying the rapid reaction force (RRF) of its owns, if necessary; • Europe was allowed to drawn up the Security Strategy of its own (‘A secure Europe in a better world’, 2003).

  10. Concerning the internal institutional weakness it is quite simple, but still very problematic: • It is still very early for Europe to agree upon these questions unanimously. To reach the consent of 25 states is unlikely to be simple or seems even impossible. To overcome this some new mechanisms are to be developed.

  11. The possible solutions of how to overcome the challenges: • The flexibility of the EU: the series of the overlapping clubs inside the Union, where the membership is optional; • The concept of ‘multi-layered’ Europe, which means almost the same: the different level of cooperation among the states depending on how deep they agree to integrate.

  12. To my mind, to prevent disagreements among the members, caused by national peculiarities, the EU should: • Develop efficient mechanisms to establish common decision-making institutions (in CFSP and ESDP) at the supranational level of cooperation, and thus getting rid at the end of these ineffective unanimity procedures – not realizable in a Union of 25 member states; • Guarantee the obligatory involvement of each member into the decision-making process within the frame of the EU structure. It should be done especially for beginners to give them a belief in the strength of the Union. For them it is essential, because since joining the EU, they desire to increase their significance on the world stage and be supported by a powerful unity; • Share European identity based on the principle of law, priority of human rights and peace.

  13. Consequently, a successful EU is a strong EU. If its Members are inside a strong Union, they will not maintain to seek protection or support somewhere else. This way, to my concern, Europe can get much closer to its aim to act independently on the world stage. It will become more capable to overcome the difficulties within the transatlantic relations transforming them into a constructive dialogue of two separate partners, different from each other.

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