Gödel and Formalism freeness

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# Gödel and Formalism freeness - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Gödel and Formalism freeness. Juliette Kennedy. Bill Tait. A. Heyting. Carnap diary entry Dec 1929. Gödel “On Russell’s Mathematical Logic” 1944. Kreisel 1972. Gödel Princeton Bicentennial lecture 1946. Gödel Princeton Bicentennial lecture 1946. Joint work with M. Magidor and J. Väänänen.

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### Gödel and Formalism freeness

Juliette Kennedy

Gödel’s two notions of definability
• Two canonical inner models:
• Constructible sets
• Model of ZFC
• Model of GCH
• Hereditarily ordinal definable sets
• Model of ZFC
• CH? – independent of ZFC
Constructibility
• Constructible sets (L):
Ordinal definability
• Hereditarily ordinal definable sets (HOD):
• A set is ordinal definable if it is of the form

{a : φ(a,α1,…, αn)}

where φ(x,y1,…, yn) is a first order formula of set theory.

• A set is hereditarily ordinal definable if it and all elements of its transitive closure are ordinal definable.
Myhill-Scott result: Hereditarily ordinal definable sets (HOD) can be seen as the constructible hierarchy with second order logic (in place of first order logic):
• Chang considered a similar construction with the infinitary logic Lω1ω1 in place of first order logic.
If V=L, then V=HOD=Chang’s model=L.
• If there are uncountably many measurable cardinals then AC fails in the Chang model. (Kunen.)
C(L*)
• L* any logic. We define C(L*):
• C(L*) = the union of all L´α
• For a variety of logics C(L*)=L
• Gödel’s L is robust, not limited to first order logic
• For a variety of logics C(L*)=HOD
• Gödel’s HOD is robust, not limited to second order logic
• For some logics C(L*) is a potentially interesting new inner model.
Robustness of L
• Q1xφ(x) {a : φ(a)} is uncountable
• C(L(Q1)) = L.
• In fact: C(L(Qα)) = L, where
• Qαxφ(x)  |{a : φ(a)}| ≥ אα
• Other logics, e.g. weak second order logic, ``absolute” logics, etc.
Observations: avoiding L
• C(Lω1ω) = L(R)
• C(L∞ω) = V
Quantifiers
• Q1MMxyφ(x,y) there is an uncountable X such that φ(a,b) for all a,b in X
• Can express Suslinity.
• Q0cfxyφ(x,y) {(a,b) : φ(a,b)} is a linear order of cofinality ω
• Fully compact extension of first order logic.
Theorems
• C(L(Q1MM)) = L, assuming 0#
• C(L(Q0cf)) ≠ L, assuming 0#
• Lµ⊆C(L(Q0cf)), if Lµ exists
What Myhill-Scott really prove
• In second order logic L2 one can quantify over arbitrary subsets of the domain.
• A more general logic L2,F: in domain M can quantifier only over subsets of cardinality κ with F(κ) ≤ |M|.
• F any function, e.g. F(κ)=κ, κ+, 2κ, בκ, etc
• L2 = L2,F with F(κ)≡0
• Note that if one wants to quantify over subsets of cardinality κ one just has to work in a domain of cardinality at least F(κ).
Theorem
• For all F: C(L2,F)=HOD
• Third, fourth order, etc logics give HOD.
Bernays

“It seems in no way appropriate that Cantor’s Absolute be identified with set theory formalized in standardized logic, which is considered from a more comprehensive model theory.”

-Letter to Gödel, 1961. (Collected Works, vol. 4, Oxford)

Robustness of L (contd.)
• A logic L* is absolute if ``φ∈L*” is Σ1 in φ and ``M⊨φ” is Δ1 inM and φ in ZFC.
• First order logic
• Weak second order logic
• L(Q0): ``there exists infinitely many”
• Lω1ω, L∞ω: infinitary logic
• Lω1G,L∞G: game quantifier logic
• Fragments of the above