YOUTH INCLUSIVE MECHANISMS FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE IGAD REGION

1. Sunday, Angoma OKELLO (PhD) Assistant Professor Addis Ababa University, Institute for Peace and Security Studies Tel: +251-923253543 E-M: sokelloangoma@gmail.com YOUTH INCLUSIVE MECHANISMS FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE IGAD REGION OSSREA/PeaceNet/IGAD-CEWARN Nairobi, Kenya 26 MARCH 2018

2. Background and Context of Violent Extremism in the IGAD region • IGAD is predominantly known to be in the “accident of geography” (UNDP (2017) for it being in the borderlands of Indian ocean and yet internally ethnically divided, economically marginalized, multi-composition of religions and religious groups; • Persistence of conflict in IGAD region – volatile region; • The absence of state structures, fragility and collapse of states; • The increasing youth bulge living in the region; • The changing worldview and vulnerability of youth living in despair from the loss of hope, vulnerability to radicalization, extremism and violent behaviors amidst growing extremism; • The IGAD region is host to the largest population of refugees in Africa, which is a key population that is very vulnerable to violent extremism and radicalization.

3. Background and Context of Violent Extremism in the IGAD region • Accusations and counter accusations by neighbouring states are providing proxy support to religious extremist groups causing security discomfort for other countries; • The region has unsecured border territories with insignificant capacity gaps to control the porosity of the borders, insufficiently patrolled coastlines, lack of a sound legislative framework to counter terrorism, and swaths of barely governed territory; • High presence of international community in the region making the IGAD region a target for VE attacks; • The introduction of extremist religious ideology into what essentially was a combustible mix of frustrations and contradictions has contributed further to the radicalization of susceptible groups and the ready acceptance of violence.

4. Background and Context of Violent Extremism in the IGAD region • Gaps in state institutions and technical capacity for P/CVE; • Critical need of training support to P/CVE for youth, CSO, police, judges, and prosecutors; Improving border control and monitoring of unpatrolled coastlines; Strengthening interdepartmental cooperation; Upgrading communications equipment and facilities; Combating terrorist financing; Detecting document forgery; and combating arms trafficking; Supporting CVE legislation; Strengthening democratic institutions, Judiciary systems; Improving governance; etc. • Lack of knowledge and public support for Counter Terrorism efforts in IGAD region, due to lack of appropriate response, respect for human rights and Rule of Law.

5. Background and Context of Violent Extremism in the IGAD region • The socio-economic, political, social and religious impact on wide population in the IGAD region, especially women, youth and children dispose them off as vulnerable groups to VEGs. Therefore the women and youth (male and female) have become a very important part of the CVE programming; • The engagement and inclusion of youth into national and regional formulation and implementation of legislative framework to assist in P/CVE become very important but lagging behind; • In addressing all the points stated above, making the women and youth (male and female) a very important part of the CVE programming very essential; • Very little in known about the youth engagement and inclusion into national and regional formulation and implementation legislative framework that an assist in CVE become very important;

6. Kenya and Violent Extremism in the IGAD region • Kenya has so many underlying political, social, and economic problems that has to date exposed the country to violence and violent extremism, and terrorism. • Kenya deployed troops in Somalia in October 2012 and sympathizers of al-Shabaab attacked (Eelco Kessels, Tracey Durner and Matthew Schwartz, 2016). • Kenya has historical legacy of ethnic and regional discrimination especially access to education, jobs, health care, clean water, electricity, and serviceable roads and treatment by local police and justice officials;

7. Kenya and Violent Extremism in the IGAD region • Kenya has intense structural inequality pitting the growing youth population with limited economic opportunity, combined with the effects of insecurity (UNDP, 2013); • Kenya’s political, economic, and social disparities and inter-communal conflicts that drive violence and violent extremism of concern; • The government is about to realize a national CVE strategy that has been developed in cooperation with nongovernmental actors (Eelco Kessels, Tracey Durner and Matthew Schwartz, 2016); • A number of civil society actors’ are trying to focus on addressing the factors that have created conducive conditions to violent extremism with possible CVE-specific interventions (Eelco Kessels, Tracey Durner and Matthew Schwartz, 2016); • Kenya’s counterterrorism efforts have come under criticism for their militaristic and hard approach, disproportionality and alleged human rights abuses (UNDP 2013).

8. Linkages between Conflict and Violent Extremism • Many potential cases of conflict have been attached to ideology, identity, defending resources like land, grievances; • On occasions where the social contract between the State and citizenship have failed to address and improve living conditions of citizens, provide equitable services across the spectrum of security and other basic services that must be provided by the state; • Today, there are many varying levels of conflicts starting from inter-personal, community, within states, regional and others. Some of these conflicts disrupt, family relationship, social networks and can consequently contribute to the sharp rise of VEGs and violent extremism. These are fundamentally symptoms of failures of governance; • Today, most religious extremist engage in conflicts which are attached to fight for territory, resources and defence for their understanding and interpretations of religious ideology, texts and doctrines.

9. Linkages between Conflict and Violent Extremism • Religious groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and the Islamist extremism of Salafi-jihadism have been fighting to establish the constitutional framework of governance based on reasons and ideologies of establishing religously steered governance (Jhiad) and/or by way of Biblical Ten Commandments of God. • Other examples of violent extremism in the world include Neo-Nazis, Ku Klux Klan, eco-terrorism, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Boko Haram and al-Shabaab; • The question that remains to be answered is whether conflict generates violent extremism or the other way round. The USIP believe that extremist movements — such as ISIS, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Shabab — fuel, and often stem from instability and violent conflict and present a complex challenge;

10. Linkages between Conflict, Youth, Violent Extremism and Development • Today, most youth actions are linked to conflict and VE, are mostly defined along religious terms with intentions of invoking distorted interpretations of Islam. This are the basis used to facilitate the expansion of actions, deepen the roots and drivers of violent extremism. • However, religious ideologies have remained varied despite similarities based on affinity with globalized discourse; • Some of these youth are highly educated and can be reached by social media. This makes some of these youth expose themselves within the overall framework for a “way of life” that absorbs the frustrations, grievances, hatred and struggle against unjust and morally corrupt state; • The implications of youth, conflict, development and VE are rooted in the discourses and derivatives of understanding economic factors mostly along poverty eradication programmes in developing countries;

11. Linkages between Conflict, Youth, Violent Extremism, Development, Gender • Youth are leaving rural areas to urban settlements (mostly informal). Spme of these youth are young men and women who end up being subdued and subjected (forced) into prostitution, drug trafficking and gang-fights. • Compared to the young men (usually) who make up the majority of combatants and perpetrators of violence in most contexts, majority of the women remain passive in violent scenarios but they remain conspicuously victims, while others play the supporting roles to the (male) combatants in many areas. • More systematic research on gender implications in terrorism and counter-terrorism studies are beginning to emerge (Jackson et al., 2011); • The role of gender as both a brake and driver of violent extremism (USAID, 2011, p. 4) remain under researched;

12. Linkages between Conflict, Youth, Violent Extremism, Development, Gender • However, a gender perspective of violent extremism has “gained ground in academic and media discourse” (Hearne, 2009, p.2); • There are growing bodies of literatures on female suicide terrorism that underpin female suicide bomber (Jackson et al., 2011, p 143-144) and 2) and the gendered nature of the war on terror (Pratt, 2012); • Women’s roles – as “policy shapers, educators, community members and activists” (OSCE, 2013, p. 2) – in countering violent extremism have started to be recognized (OSCE, 2013). • McKay and Mazurana (2004) argue that women entries in armed military confrontations vary, citing Uganda, Sudan and Somalia women are active in armed opposition groups, and in militia and paramilitary. While voluntary entry tend to suggest that women of such nature support “ideological” armed struggle like in the cases of Ethiopia and Eritrea, majority of women are forcefully conscripted and abducted.

13. Linkages between Conflict, Youth, Violent Extremism, Development, Gender • However, ideology alone cannot primarily explain the driving factor of women who join armed struggle. • The complexities of VE ideology, conflicts and gender have raised scepticism at the bureaucratic level of government and international agencies where short term-political agendas have insulated P/CVE efforts from addressing women, peace, and security issues; • Most cited conceptual and operational challenges of following integrated gender perspectives into P/CVE aimed at transforming gendered stereotypes require structural preferential needs for male and female benefits for both girls and boys equally;

14. Motivations, Drivers for Joining Violent Extremism • The drivers and enablers of violent extremism are multiple, complex, context-specific and have religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions (UNDP, 2012); • Many researchers have found that the drivers of violent extremism shows lack of authoritative statistical data on the pathways to individual radicalization. They also found that underpinning factors from the structural context from which violent extremism emerges include structural issues include like lack of socio-economic opportunities; marginalization and discrimination; poor governance, violations of human rights and the lack of Rule of Law (RoL); prolonged and unresolved conflicts; and radicalization in prisons; • There are processes, drivers, motivations and enablers that can be identified operate at the individual, group, and community, national, regional and global levels. However, it should quickly be noted that the production of violent extremism are context-specific and requires deeper analysis;

15. Motivations, Drivers for Joining Violent Extremism • GuilainDenoeux and Lynn Carter articulated one of the more widely referenced frameworks that helps explain violent extremism through a typology of complex interactions of “push” and “pull” factors that indirectly combine with more proximate political drivers, individual motivations, and interpersonal relationships and group dynamics. • Push factors are structural conditions—underdevelopment, unemployment, political repression, or social marginalization, for example—that can fuel grievances, which, in combination with other factors, may help push individuals toward adopting violent extremist ideas and engaging in violent extremist actions (GuilainDenoeux and Lynn Carter, 2013); • Push factors could be real or perceived and could be felt on behalf of communities with whom individuals share a cultural, ideological, religious, or ethnic bond, even if they are at a physical distance.

16. Motivations, Drivers for Joining Violent Extremism • Push factors that have individual backgrounds and motivations can gather collective grievances and victimization stemming from domination, oppression, subjugation or foreign intervention; distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies and ethnic and cultural differences; and leadership and social networks; • State’s counter-terrorism measures that may have failed to prevent, investigate, prosecute or punish the terrorist acts and that in turn may have perpetration of new human rights violations with impunity (CHRJG, 2011, p. 60). • Human rights deficiencies and violations are often cited as one of the conditioning factors (push factors) in the radicalisation process and in terrorist rhetoric (USAID, 2009). • Minority and targeted groups ranging from gender inequality, abuse of minority rights and marginalization, and denial of basic human needs to targeted groups.

17. Motivations, Drivers for Joining Violent Extremism • Pull factors nurture the appeal of violent extremism, for example,: the existence of well-organized violent extremist groups with compelling discourses and effective programs that are providing services, revenue and/or employment in exchange for membership. • Groups can also lure new members by providing outlets for grievances and promise of adventure and freedom; • Attraction of charismatic individuals, powerful strategic communications and compelling messaging, financial or other material benefits, or the social status that some group members feel they achieve when being part of a terrorist or militant group. • Alan B. Krueger and JitkaMalečková (2003) have long argued that poverty and violent extremism have no causal link, but people living in poor countries are the most affected: only approximately 5 percent of all deaths from terrorism since 2000 have occurred in countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

18. Motivations, Drivers for Joining Violent Extremism • Religious ideologies have for so many times been cited as one of the primary reason youth to join VE, without possibly looking at other accompanying factors. Youth tend to engage a lot with religious ideologies for both constructive and destructive and can be used to C/PVE. • The recruitment of youth in the name of religion by violent extremist groups makes sure religion becomes a touchstone for other context-based grievances. However, there are also those who express voluntary willingness to die for religion over other causes; • Economic factors have pitted youth unemployment in Kenya’s coastal and northeastern counties is between 40 and 50 percent higher than the national average (UNDP, 2013).Many literatures are specifically talking about youth unemployment and lack of opportunities, low or non-remunerations status, and other economic privileges that could be missing, thus leading to contribute to the recruitment of youth into VE groups;

19. Motivations, Drivers for Joining Violent Extremism Gender-based motivations and drivers have been met with some mixed findings and conclusions from the large body of literatures. Female who are involved are either portrayed as “pawns, victims or agents’ (Jackson et al., 2011)”, or are represented in the media as deviant women, monsters or victims to be rescued” (Sjoberg and Gantry, 2007, quoted in Jackson et al 2011, 144-145 and Gentry, 2010); The overall conclusion is that overall, women make decision to join armed organizations for much the same reasons as men; Bloom (2007, 101) finds that female converts married to Muslim men (increasingly among female bombers) are a particularly dangerous group, not only because they can evade most profiles, but also because they carry credible documents and passports and garner a lot of media attention (see: Carter, Becky 2013);

20. Motivations, Drivers for Joining Violent Extremism • Abusing the rights of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals can be used as a bartering tool to appease terrorist or extremist groups in ways that further unequal gender relations, minority rights to subject such persons to increased violence’ (CHRJG, 2011, 24);

21. Strategies for deepening interventions in P/CVE • Global Strategies: The UN Global Counter-Terrorism strategy of 2006 that has many aspects of violent extremisms; • General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/254 on the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism; • Member States also decided to give further consideration to the Plan at the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy review in June 2016 as well as in other relevant forum; • Continental: The AU 2002 protocol on anti terrorism, the UK’s Counter Terrorism Strategy-2011 and The EU’s Counter Terrorism Strategy, 2005; all identify the major motivation for terrorist violence to be the struggle for power and justice.

22. Strategies for deepening interventions in P/CVE • UNDP Specific approach: There is a liberal approach that stresses on issues of development and good governance with thoughtful dialogue to be an essential, although not sufficient, condition for building social capital and trust (UNDP, 2009) • According to Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake (2016), responses and strategies used to P/CVE in Kenya and Uganda suggest that: Public approval of the government’s response to extremism was considerably lower among Kenyans (44%) than among Ugandans (83%). Although two-thirds (66%) of Kenyans said that the country’s intervention in Somalia had been worth the extremist reprisals, only 43% would oppose a military withdrawal (Forst, 2009)

23. Strategies for deepening interventions in P/CVE Punitive - hard response strategy: Reactionary and punitive responses by law enforcement, military, and intelligence services have frequently characterized counterterrorism policies and actions
in the Greater Horn region. Heavy-handed, discriminatory, and arbitrary responses can further isolate impacted communities and reduce trust in governments, proving tactically and strategically counterproductive. Re-thinking new strategy: New shift within the global discourse from a predominate focus on counterterrorism to recognizing the importance of developing proactive, inclusive, and durable approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism as part of a comprehensive strategy to address terrorist threats include:

24. Strategies for deepening interventions in P/CVE • September 2014, the UN Security Council who for the first time adopted the language of CVE in Resolution 2178 on the threat of foreign terrorist fighters. • February 2015, the United States convened the three-day White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism; subsequent regional iterations, including one held in Nairobi in June 2015, have advanced opportunities for dialogue among governments and civil society. • The United States also hosted the Leaders’ Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism during the UN General Assembly in September 2015, and the UN Secretary-General presented his action plan on preventing violent extremism to the General Assembly in early 2016UN Security Council, S/RES/2178, 24 September 2014, paras. 15, 16, 18, and 19.

25. Strategies for deepening interventions in P/CVE Plans are also underway to establish a new Horn and Eastern Africa Countering Violent Extremism Center of Excellence and Counter- Messaging Hub that will serve as a regional coordinating body for CVE initiatives and capacity building; A number of national and regional CVE efforts from bilateral and multilateral donors have been in operation since 2009 including the the U.S. Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, known as PREACT, has focused on CVE, enhancing the capacity to respond to immediate threats, and addressing longer-term vulnerabilities in each of the IGAD region. The “EU Counter-Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen is in operation and supports CVE initiatives in Kenya and Somaliland through its Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa program;

26. Strategies for deepening interventions in P/CVE • National counterbalance strategy; have adopted programs that reflect the growing importance placed on CVE by the international community. The nationalframeworks for monitoring and evaluating CVE programs are inadequate, resulting in limited evidence that has subsequently hindered the field’s effective development; • Locally based grassroots strategy: The role of locally based organisations and civil society has been emphasized in many studies as key factor when implementing effective policies and strategies (van Ginkel, B., 2012). • Civil societies are sometimes perceived as a risk or a threat to governments. • TinkaVeldhuis and JørgenStaun, 2009) have suggested that grassroots knowledge of societal character (social identification, social interaction and group processes, relative deprivation) or a political, economical, cultural or religious character (macro level).

27. Strategies for deepening interventions in P/CVE • Pratt (2011) argues that grassroots strategy can help in generating the social basis for democracy; Promoting political accountability; Producing trust, reciprocity and networks; Creating and promoting alternatives; and supporting the rights of citizens and the concept of citizenship; • Locally based organizations can detect early signs of radicalization that leads to extremism

28. Policy frameworks and practices of P/CVE • Global framework for preventing violent extremism contained in the UNDP report (2017), talks about the 2015 United Nations Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism mainly urges the global community of states to pay closer attention to the root causes and drivers of violent extremism, after decades of overconcentration on militarized approaches; • Many practices to P/CVE give reference to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments, General Assembly resolutions, such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and Security Council resolutions, such as resolution 2178 (2014); • The UN, through the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Office, its Country Teams and an “All-of-UN” approach;

29. Policy frameworks and practices of P/CVE • 2009 a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering violent extremism noted the need to integrate a gender perspective into policy design; • Regional P/CVE plans of action relies on questions of mobilising resources in order to accomplish the seven priority areas of planned actions in P/CVE in the region. • Dialogue and Conflict Prevention: • Strengthening Good Governance, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: • Engaging Communities: • Empowering Youth: • Gender Equality and Empowering Women: • Education, Skill Development and Employment Facilitation: • Strategic Communications, the Internet and Social Media:

30. Policy frameworks and practices of P/CVE • National P/CVE plans of action: is being carried out in Uganda and Kenya (near complete) that sets national priorities to address the local drivers of violent extremism and in complementarity to the national counter-terrorism strategies where they already exist. • Such plans are being developed in a multidisciplinary manner with input from governmental and non-governmental actors to fortify the social compact against violent extremism; address the Foreign Terrorist Fighters threat; prevent the financing of violent extremist and terrorist groups; align national development policies with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG); promote public-private partnerships; and include effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure impact.

31. Policy frameworks and practices of P/CVE • Grassroots actionsare usually termed, bottom up-approach that focuses more on initiatives that grassroots community contributes to P/CVE; • Civil society organizations play a crucial role in P/CVE in numerous ways – by working on development programs, through their work in conflict transformation, in providing a platform to raise political grievances and to facilitate dialogue, or through their work in empowering victims and survivors of terrorism; • A holistic approach to countering violent extremism is advocating provision of alternative opportunities, empowering positive role models, and engaging with the marginalized groups / people. And it is believed by many youth included more effective in preventing recruitment and de-radicalizing extremists than the adversarial (punitive and top-down) approaches. This model includes government officials, CSO leaders, religious leaders, elders, etc. (see: van Ginkel, 2012);