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Economic Sanctions: Factors of Success

Economic Sanctions: Factors of Success. Research Proposal by David Benedetto. What makes some Sanctions Work?. Allies? Measured by trade status Government Responsive to People Audience Costs Political Instability in Recipient Speed/Strength of Sanction. Guatemala VS. North Korea.

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Economic Sanctions: Factors of Success

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  1. Economic Sanctions: Factors of Success Research Proposal by David Benedetto

  2. What makes some Sanctions Work? • Allies? • Measured by trade status • Government Responsive to People • Audience Costs • Political Instability in Recipient • Speed/Strength of Sanction

  3. Guatemala VS. North Korea • Allied to sender • Political Instability • Strong, Fast Sanction • Not Allied to sender • Political Stability • Little Freedom • Speed/Strength of Sanction

  4. Recipients – Non-random Selection? • States not allied • “Friendlies” = Success • “Regime Change” as goal • Instability = Success

  5. WORKS CITED • Achin, Kurt. “US Pushes to Enforce N. Korea Sanctions”. 24 Aug. 2009. VOA News. Sept. 28th 2009 < http://www.voanews.com/english/index.cfm>. • Cortright, David, Julia Wagler, George A. Lopez. “Learning from the Sanctions Decade.” June 2000. The Fourth Freedom Forum. 5 Oct. 2009 <http://www.fourthfreedom.org/Applications/cms.php?page_id=41>. • Elliott, Kimberly Ann. “Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions.” 23 Oct. 1997. Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sept. 28th 2009 <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=294>. • Elliott, Kimberly Ann. “Honduras: Deja Coup and the Forgotten ‘Autogolpe.’” 13 July 2009. Peterson Institute for International Economics. 20 Sept. 2009 <http://www.liu.edu/cwis/cwp/library/workshop/citmla.htm>. • Fearon, James D. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88 (3):577-592. • Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009 - North Korea, 16 July 2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a64529427.html [accessed 28 September 2009] • “Freedom Rankings for LAC Countries by Population Size-Groups”. 1993. Latin American Network Information Center. 28 Sept. 2009 <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/region/aid/aid94/democracy/DIIND.html>. • Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, & Barbara Oegg (2007). Economic Sanctions RECONSIDERED (3rd Edition). • Korea, North. (2008). The World Factbook [Online]. Retrieved 21 Sept. 2009, from US Central Intelligence Agency: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geors/kn.html> • “Sanctions Against North Korea”. The Global Policy Forum. 2009 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-souncil-agenda/north-korea.html>.

  6. Sanctions

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