NYAYA-VAISHESHIKA. Vaisheshika “The Particularist School” vishesha : difference, particularity, specialness, the quality of individuality. Vaisheshika Sutra Kanada , “atom eater” Circa 1 st century BCE systematized by Prashashtapada , 6 th century CE
vishesha: difference, particularity, specialness, the quality of individuality.
“The School of Reasoning”
Vaisheshika and Nyaya merge into one system in the later Medieval period.
Vaisheshika is the ontology for Nyaya epistemology and logic.
Pure Natural Philosophy
Defense of Vedic orthodoxy
Nyaya as correct methods of proof originates in the ancient Indian tradition
of debate and argument: Vada
As manuals of debate defining the rules for fair argument.
It is from dharma that the highest and supreme good is achieved.
The Veda has its authority because of its concern with dharma.
Vaisheshika Sutra 1-3
Metaphysics explains the fundamental nature of being and the world and answer two questions:
"What is there?” and "What is it?”
The word is from the Greek words μετά ("beyond" or "after") and φυσικά ( "physical"), "physical.”
A central part is ontology, the investigation into the types of things there are in the world, their relations, existence, property, space, time, and causality.
Before the development of modern science, scientific questions were known as “Natural Philosophy."
or valid means of knowing:
Creation and destruction is a natural process.
The world of particular things arises by the combination of elemental atoms.
Atoms (paramanu) are eternal,
their combinations as not.
Atoms are invisible and so inferred.
Atoms combine into binaries dyads and triads.
Three binaries form a three-dimensional triad or molecule—the size of a particle of dust in a sunbeam.
The character of things result different proportions of the elemental atoms.
Adrishta is the law-like impersonal causative power inherent in atoms in their combinations of qualities.
In addition to atomism, it accepts the existence of immaterial eternal substances including souls.
The elements have a dual psycho-physical nature. Sensory qualities inhere in things,
more precisely, in their atoms.
Earth or solidity possesses smell, taste, color, touch.
Water or liquidity taste, color, touch.
Fire or light possesses color, touch.
Air or gas possesses touch.
Akasa or ether possesses no perceivable qualities.
Vaisheshika Sutra II.1.1-5
1. Problem of inferring the existence of atoms, which cannot be perceived.
2. The contradiction of atoms: atoms are partless, spaceless points, yet have sides that contact other atoms, which would seem to require magnitude and extension.
Referent of words, the kinds of objects knowable.
Commonsense view of how and what we know.
Realist view of the relation between word and thing.
Gau = = Cowness
Adrishta: the “unseen” invisible power of karmic causality.
Explains all motion and change as due to the physical, atomic nature and organization of entities from the movement of atoms to human bodies and behavior.
“The movement of the jewel toward a thief and the turn of a needle toward a lodestone have adrishta as their cause.”
Vaisheshika Sutra V.1.15
Only later does the more moralistic notion of adrishta as the potency connecting good and bad human actions to their future results come to predominate.
Vaisheshika is commonsense realism about the physical world to which a theistic cosmology and the later notion of karma seem awkwardly added on as some think.
Prashashtapada 6th century CE
Compendium of the Nature of Fundamental Categories.
The view that the effect does not pre-exist in its cause;
effects are new entities and differ from their causes;
Things are separate.
New combination of atoms are new things separate from their cause in line with a pluralist realist world view of many permanent things non-reducible to other things or categories.
Things emerge by the transformation of more fundamental substances.
1. Results pre-exist in their cause. The prakritiof Sankhya.
2. Or only the cause exists. The Brahman of Vedanta. Effects aremaya(illusory appearance).
Atman is never really separate from Brahman.
Vaisheshika’s thing-like conception of the self much criticized later.
The atman ends up as an unconscious rock-like thing devoid of all qualities of thought, feeling, life, and activity.
What is the point of existence if it ends in a state so null and void?
Logic and Epistemology
1. Means of Valid Knowing pramana
2. Objects of knowledge prameya
4. Purpose. Attaining desirable or avoid
5. Familiar Example
6. View accepted as valid
7. Logical argument the five part syllogism
8. Confutation tarka
9. Certain knowledge attained by removing doubt.
10. Discussion. Valid argument aiming at the
11. Arguing to win, not to get at the truth. Jalpa
12. Disproving your opponent’s view without
proving your own. Vitandareductio ad absurdum
14. Tricks and misrepresentation of the opponent’s
15. False analogies.
16. Clinching the argument, grounds of defeat in
Prama: Sure Knowledge always of some real external objects as by means of the 4 pramanas.
Theory Of Knowledge
1. Ordinary (laukika)
a. External: visual auditory, tactile, taste, smell,
b. Internal: internal awareness(manas)
2. Extraordinary (alaukika)
a. Intuitionof universals
b. Yogic perception
Sense objects artha
Acts of body, speech, and mind pravritti
Mental defects dosha
(desire, hatred, delusion)
Fruits of action phala
Indeterminate-pure awareness of things
Determinate-perception with concepts and language.
Verbal testimony of a “reliable person”
Inference is knowledge of an object, not by direct observation, but by means of a sign and its universal connection with the inferred object.
Nyayalogic has a tendency to the inductive, empirically verifiable, pragmatic, and non-formal.
Retains the form of a debate.
necessarily follows from the premises.
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.
All men are from Mars.
Deven is a man.
Deven is from Mars.
Induction allows for the possibility that the conclusion is false even where all of the premises are true, but aims at theconstant and invariable.
All of the ice we have examined so far is cold.
Therefore, all ice is cold.
From a perceived cause to an unperceived effect
From perceived effect to an unperceived cause
From the empirical to the non-empirical
or general correlation established by experience
It will rain.
Because theclouds are dark and heavy.
The clouds are now dark and heavy, which invariably in experience precedesa rain.
Therefore, itwill rain.
From perceived effect to unperceived cause.
What is to inferred: There is fire on the hill.
Reason (hetu): Because there is smoke (linga).
Example:As in a kitchen, where there is smoke, there is fire (vyapti).
Application: There is smoke, which is associated with fire, on the hill.
Conclusion: There is fire on the hill.
something else that can therefore be inferred from.
Smoke is the linga of fire.
Vyapti “pervasion” is the universal concomitance
the major term (fire)
and the minor term (hill)
by means of --
the middle term (smoke)
A Cosmological/Teleological Argument for God (Ishvara)
The world was created by Ishvara.
Because the world has been made out of atoms.
3. Whatever has been created has an intelligent maker,
like a pot made from clay and a potter.
4. The world has a formal order, which is always
associated with an intelligent creator.
5. Therefore, Ishvara created the world
The Self is a real unique substance, to which thoughts feelings, and actions (karma) belong as attributes.
Desire, hate, will, pleasure, pain, cognition are all temporary,karmically determined qualities (gunas) ofthe self when the self comes into contact with the internal sense (manas) and the manaswith the senses.
The self is itself indestructible and eternal.
Apavarga is total freedom from all qualities,
in particular, pain (duhkha).
Classical Nyaya accepted the idea of liberation (moksha) as the purpose for acquiring correct knowledge.
It did not concerned with the Vedas.
Nyaya was always mainly interested in correct argument and logic, but became the great champion of the existence of Godagainst the Buddhists.
For Nyaya, God is the efficient cause or regulator of the action of souls and atoms.
He is not the material cause, as in Vedanta