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Software Security and Security Engineering (Part 1). Software Engineering Sources: Introduction to Computer Security, Matt Bishop, Addison Wesley, 2003 Chapter 1 Ian Somerville, Software Engineering, Chapter 12, 14
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Software Security and Security Engineering (Part 1) Software Engineering Sources: Introduction to Computer Security, Matt Bishop, Addison Wesley, 2003 Chapter 1 Ian Somerville, Software Engineering, Chapter 12, 14 Fundamental of Information Systems Security, Kim and Solomon, Jones and Bartlett, 2012, Chapter 1 and 8
Security: A Persistent Problem • Why? • Financial motivation • Religious/political motivation • Personal grudge • Boredom .. • How? • Physical access • Exploit lack of awareness and training • Exploit weak security policies and procedures • Exploit vulnerabilities in applications and security mechanisms • Victim? • Financial institutions • Education institutions • Government agencies • E-commerce web sites • ANYONE
Cost of Security Incidents in USA • Average cost to company for security breach: $5.5 million • 2011 Cost of Data Breach Study, Ponemon Institute • Dollar loss reported for Internet crime • Latest Internet Crime (IC3) Annual Report (2012)
Source of Security Incidents Global State of Information Security Survey 2013 http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/consulting-services/information-security-survey/giss.jhtml
Impact of Security Incidents Global State of Information Security Survey 2013 http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/consulting-services/information-security-survey/giss.jhtml
We are @top of the game … Symantec Intelligence Report January 2013
….. Symantec Intelligence Report January 2013
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….. Symantec Intelligence Report January 2013
Malicious Activity by Source, Overall Ranking 2011-2012 Symantec 2013 Internet Security Threat Report
Who is Targeting Whom Symantec 2010 Annual Security Report
Problem with Security • Most do not understand/know about it • Those who do understand, underestimates it • Those who understands and don’t underestimate, address it insufficiently
Attention Factors • Increased attack frequency • More attacks and attackers, more motivations for attacks, more availability of attack tools • Increased awareness • More activities and coverage in media • Presidents’ Executive Order on CyberSecurity • Cyber Security Act of 2012 controversy • Cyber-warfare/cyber-espionage • More Laws • The Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2011 • The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011 • Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2012 • CyberSecurity and American Cyber Competitiveness Act (2013) • Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (2013)
What’s Trending in Security • Cyber-crime as a service • Cyber-warfare • Targeted attacks • Attacks/defenses in • Cross platform • Mobile platform • Web technologies/platforms • Cloud computing/Virtual environment • Big data • Critical Infrastructure http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-threat-predictions-2013.pdf http://www.websense.com/content/websense-2013-security-predictions.html http://www.crn.com/slide-shows/security/240145572/10-security-predictions-for-2013.htm
Security Prioritized http://www.comptia.org/Libraries/Members_Research/Report_-_CompTIA_Security_study_-_Section_1.sflb.ashx
Boost in Security Expenditures • Homeland Security • $756 Million in 2013 • $786 Million for 2014 • US Cyber Command • $3.2 Billion in 2012 • $3.4 Billion in 2013 • Private Sector • $35.1 Billion in 2011 • $49.1 Billion by 2015 http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=333903 http://www.comptia.org/Libraries/Members_Research/Report_-_CompTIA_Security_study_-_Section_1.sflb.ashx
NSF Spending in Security http://www.nsf.gov/about/budget/fy2014/pdf/EntireDocument_fy2014.pdf
Security Employment - Current • Demand for cyber security professionals grew • 73% during the five years from 2007 to 2012 • 3.5 times the pace of the overall IT job market • 12 times the overall job market • Bureau of Labor Statistics May 2012 Report • 72,670 Information Security Analysts • $89,290 Mean Annual Salary http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/03/04/demand-for-cyber-security-jobs-is-soaring/ http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm#15-0000 http://data.bls.gov/oep/noeted
Security Job Market http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Skill=IT_Security_%26_Infrastructure/Salary
Security Employment - Future • Defense Department’s Cyber Command to recruit 4900 in next few years (now at 900) • Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010 – 20 Projected Growth http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-27/world/36583575_1_cyber-protection-forces-cyber-command-cybersecurity
Security Fundamentals • Information assurance and security • Offensive and defensive goals • Threats and attacks • CIA model • Defense in Depth • Security policy/controls
Information Assurance (IA) & Security • IA is the perception that systems are operating as expected in a protected environment. • Security is measures and controls to achieve IA.
Two Sides in Security • Offensive Side • Defensive Side
Risk Offensive Goal CAUSE USE Threats & Attacks Vulnerabilities Harm/Loss
Terms • Threat • Potential to inflict harm to an asset or cause security violations • Attack • Infliction of harm to an asset or causing security violations • Vulnerability • A weakness in security procedures or system design, implementation, or operation that can be used to cause security policy violation • Risk • Potential loss or harm or security violation • Likelihood that a particular threat can exploit a particular vulnerability or a set of vulnerabilities to violate security policy
General Classes of Threats • Disclosure • Deception • Disruption • Usurpation
Specific Types of Attacks • Snooping/Sniffing • Spoofing • Modification • Repudiation of Origin • Delay • Denial of Receipt • Denial of Service
Defensive Goal Security Perimeter Confidentiality Integrity Loss Security Controls Availability
CIA Model of IA • Confidentiality • Keeping data and resources hidden • Integrity (Data and Origin) • Keeping data (and data sources) and resources uncorrupted • Availability • Keeping data and resources usable • Accountability (a.k.a. Non-Repudiation) • Holding one accountable for action
Offensive & Defensive Goal • Confidentiality • Origin Integrity • Data Integrity • Origin Integrity, Accountability • Accountability • Availability • Availability • Confidentiality • Integrity (Data and origin) • Availability • Accountability • Snooping/Sniffing • Spoofing • Modification • Repudiation of Origin • Denial of Receipt • Delay • Denial of Service
Cyber Good, bad and ugly http://www.securitymanagement.com/archive/library/RBC_security0102.pdf
Ethics Ten Commandments of Computer Ethics • Thou shalt not use a computer to harm other people. • Thou shalt not interfere with other people's computer work. • Thou shalt not snoop around in other people's computer files. • Thou shalt not use a computer to steal. • Thou shalt not use a computer to false witness. • Thou shalt not copy or use proprietary software for which you have not paid. • Thou shalt not use other people's computer resources without authorization or proper compensation. • Thou shalt not appropriate other people's intellectual output. • Thou shalt think about the social consequences of the program you are writing or the system you are designing. • Thou shalt always use a computer in ways that ensure consideration and respect for your fellow humans. http://computerethicsinstitute.org/ http://www.secureworks.com/resources/articles/other_articles/ethics/ http://turing.cs.camosun.bc.ca/COMP112/notes/classnotes/TenCommandments.pdf
Goals of Security: Defense in Depth • Prevent • Securing an environment to avoid penetration • Deter • Applying protection mechanisms to hurdle intruder efforts and thus causing delays in achieving a malicious goal • Detect • Ensuring visibility of suspicious activities • Response • Reacting to security incidents by notification, eradication, interdiction, prosecution • Continuing to survive to some extent • Recover • Assessing and repairing damage • Improving
End to End Security • Hardware • Software • Data • In processing • In transit • In storage • People
Security Policy • An organizational security policy applies to all systems and its users and sets out what should and should not be allowed. • Types • Military • Readers may not access documents above his/her privilege level • Commercial • A customer may not change price of the product. • A security policy helps identify system security requirements with risk management processes in place.
Enforcing Policy • Explicit Policy • X cannot view Y’s notes • Y have to protect notes • If anything happens, both X and Y can be held accountable • Explicit Policy • X cannot view Y’s notes • Implicit Policy • Y have to protect notes • If anything happens, only X can be hold accountable
Policy, Model & Mechanism • Security Policy • Statement of what is allowed and how • The system is only available to use by employees. • Security Model • Representation of policy • Formal/mathematical models • Security Mechanism • Methods and tools to ensure policy by implementing model • Password based login system
Trust • Trust and assumption play crucial role in policy, especially, integrity policy • As trust is hard to quantify, policies are hard to evaluate completely • Attackers look for assumptions and trusted users to find possible weak points in implementation of policy
Role of Trust • Higher level assumption example • Administrator installs patch • Trusts patch came from vendor, not tampered with in transit • Trusts vendor tested patch thoroughly • Trusts vendor’s test environment corresponds to local environment • Trusts patch is installed correctly
Role of Trust cont. • Lower level assumption example • A security-related program S is formally verified to work with operating system O • Proof has no errors • Bugs in automated theorem provers • Preconditions hold in environment in which S is to be used • S transformed into executable S whose actions follow source code • Compiler bugs, linker/loader/library problems • Hardware executes S as intended • Hardware bugs
Trusted System A Characteristic Degrees of Trustworthiness Judged based on evidence/analysis “Secure” vs. “Trusted” • Secure System • A Goal • Either … or • Asserted based on features
Note • “Perfectly” secure system does not exist. • Security is difficult • Security is not inherent. • Security is not universal. • Security is not static. • Security is not an absolute. • Security is a compromise between usability, cost and peace of mind.
Security engineering • Tools, techniques and methods to support the development and maintenance of systems that can resist malicious attacks that are intended to damage a computer-based system or its data.
Qu es ti ons? The End ______________________ Devon M. Simmonds Computer Science Department University of North Carolina Wilmington ____________________________________________ _________________
Risk Management • Risk assessment • Risk mitigation/control • Risk evaluation/assurance
Phased Risk Assessment Types • Preliminary • Life cycle • Operational
Preliminary Risk Assessment • Identifies risks from analyzing environment prior to development • Independent of technology • Aim is to develop an initial set of security requirements • Steps: • Identify Risk • Inventory of assets • Determine value of asset • Estimate percentage of asset that will be lost per incident (exposure) • Identify threats and vulnerabilities • Evaluate Risk
Asset analysis in a preliminary risk assessment report for the MHC-PMS
Threat Identification with Misuse cases • Identify the most probable threats to the system assets • Misuse cases are instances of threats to a system • Models malicious user actions to figure out strategies to prevent the actions. • Relationship with use case • Misuse case threatens use case • Use case mitigates misuse case
Threat Identification with Misuse cases Sindre G, Opdahl AL (2001) Templates for misuse case description. In: Proceedings of the 7th international workshop on requirements engineering: foundation for software quality (REFSQ’01), Interlaken, Switzerland