Which Charging Policies for Encouraging PSI Re-Use?

1. Which Charging Policies for Encouraging PSI Re-Use? Turin, July 9th, 2012

2. A price of PSI reuse: A thick skein of issues to be disentangled Legal issues Cultural Values Economic theory Institutional design issue Industrial policy aims Empirical analysis “Encouraging PSI Re-Use” via regulative rules Legislative design issue

3. The available options Current Article 6 Proposed Article 6 1. Where charges are made for the re-use of documents, the total amount charged by public sector bodies shall be limited to the marginal costs incurred for their reproduction and dissemination. Where charges are made, the total income from supplying and allowing re-use of documents shall not exceed the cost of collection, production, reproduction and dissemination, together with a reasonable return on investment. Charges should be cost-oriented over the appropriate accounting period and calculated in line with the accounting principles applicable to the public sector bodies involved. Reuse facilitation recovery cost rule Long run recovery cost rule ? 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to a) Public sector bodies that are required to generate revenue to cover a substantial part of their costs relating to the performance of their public tasks b) Libraries (including university libraries), museums and archives 3. [Current article 6]

4. From the current Article 6 to the proposed Article 6 The marginal cost ruleis consistent with the industrial goal of promoting the emergence of a EU-wide market for information services,because it allows private firms to take the “free chance” to play with PSI so to create new information goods It may either discourage some PSBs to maintain/ improve the quality of the PSI available for re-use, or induce them to modify the rules about the access so to prevent PSI to be available for re-use Yet It may work as a “predatory price” in the upstream market for the generation of PSI and, hence, it may discourage private sector firms to enter (or to remain) in the market for the generation of PSI-substitutes It prevents PSB to find by themselves sources of revenue other from taxpayers’ money • Actually, and in support of the marginal cost rule, it has been observed that: • PSBs should not make profit out of the generation of a good required by the pursuit of their public task • PSBs are inefficient in managing money This could be true, but Directives may establish a hierarchy of policy aims Indeed

5. The legislative design of the proposed Article 6 The first exception is consistent with the option of leaving PSBs free to find other sources of revenue. Yet, some questions still deserve to be answered: • Isn’t it too broad? Which are the PBSs that it addresses? • The text says public sector bodies that “are required” … are required by whom/what? • A specific piece of law? • Their management? • Objective exceptional circumstances? • Other? • The text says “substantial part of their costs relating to the performance of their public task” … what does it mean? • What is substantial? • How related? Perhaps, we will be able to answer these questions after years of litigation Likewise, the second exception for libraries (including university libraries), museums and archives is consistent with the need of giving to PSBs the funds for maintaining/improving the quality of their raw data. Yet, a concern still arises: Are there any other PSBs that could need the possibility to use the same exceptions?

6. In sum The current Article 6 as well as the proposed Article 6 are regulatory tools: they are supposed to intervene directly in real markets so to shape their competitive dynamics. Given the monopolized market scenarios, both of them serve to exclude a price next to monopoly price Proposed Article 6 tries to combine with a default rule and its exceptions the different needs and wants that the discussion of charging policies urges Probably, the exception should be better defined.