Chapter 10 fiscal policies in monetary unions
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Chapter 10: Fiscal Policies in Monetary Unions De Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union Fiscal policies and the theory of optimum currency areas Germany France P F P G S G S F D’ G D F D’ F D G Y G Y F Two cases France and Germany form monetary and budgetary union

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Chapter 10 fiscal policies in monetary unions l.jpg

Chapter 10:Fiscal Policies in Monetary Unions

De Grauwe:

Economics of Monetary Union


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Fiscal policies and the theory of optimum currency areas

Germany

France

PF

PG

SG

SF

D’G

DF

D’F

DG

YG

YF


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Two cases

  • France and Germany form monetary and budgetary union

    • If asymmetric shock occurs

    • The centralized European budget automatically redistributes income from Germany to France

    • There is risk sharing

  • France and Germany form a monetary union without budgetary union

    • If asymmetric shock occurs

    • France accumulates budget deficits and debt

    • Germany reduces deficits and debt


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  • Note that the insurance system (whether centralized or decentralized) should only be used to take care of temporary shocks


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    • The theory of optimum currency areas leads to the following implications:

      • It is desirable to centralize a significant part of the national budgets to the European level

      • Risk sharing reduces social costs of a monetary union

      • If such a centralization of the national government budgets in a monetary union is not possible then, national fiscal policies should be used in a flexible way and national budgetary authorities should enjoy autonomy


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    Sustainability of government implications:budget deficits

    • A budget deficit leads to an increase in government debt which will have to be serviced in the future

    • Government budget constraint:

      G - T + rB = dB/dt + dM/dt

      • G is the level of government spending (excluding interest payments on the government debt), T is the tax revenue, r is the interest rate on the government debt, B, and M is the level of high-powered money (monetary base)

      • (G - T) is the primary budget deficit, rB is the interest payment on the government debt

      • The budget deficit can be financed by issuing debt (dB/dt) or by issuing high-powered money dM/dt


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    The dynamic implications:s of debt accumulation

    • where g = G/Y, t = T/Y, x = Y/Y (the growth rate of GDP), and

    • When the interest rate on government debt exceeds the growth rate of GDP, the debt-to-GDP ratio will increase without bounds

    • The dynamics of debt accumulation can only be stopped if the primary budget deficit (as a percentage of GDP) turns into a surplus

    • Alternatively, it can be stopped by seigniorage


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    • The debt-to-GDP ratio stabilizes at a constant value if implications:

    • If nominal interest rate > the nominal growth rate of the economy:

      • Either the primary budget shows a sufficiently high surplus (t > g)

      • Or money creation is sufficiently high in order to stabilize the debt - GDP ratio

      • The latter option has been chosen by many Latin American countries during the 1980s, and more recently by some Eastern European countries. It has also led to hyperinflation in these countries


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    • Important conclusion is that, if a country has accumulated sizeable deficits in the past, it will now have to run large primary budget surpluses in order to prevent the debt - GDP ratio from increasing automatically

    • This means that the country will have to reduce spending and/or increase taxes


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    Government Budget Deficits in Belgium, sizeable deficits in the past, it will now have to run large primary budget surpluses in order to prevent the debt - GDP ratio from increasing automaticallyThe Netherlands, and Italy (1979 – 2005)


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    Gross Public Debt (% of GDP) sizeable deficits in the past, it will now have to run large primary budget surpluses in order to prevent the debt - GDP ratio from increasing automatically



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    • The experience of these countries shows that large government budget deficits quickly lead to an unsustainable debt dynamics

    • Fiscal policies are not the flexible instrument

    • There is a lot of inertia

    • The systematic use of this instrument quickly leads to problems of sustainability, which forces countries to run budget surpluses for a number of years


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    Stability and Growth Pact government budget deficits quickly lead to an unsustainable debt dynamics

    • Main principles

      • Countries have to achieve balanced budgets over the business cycle

      • Countries with a budget deficit > 3% of GDP will be subject to fines. These fines can reach up to 0.5% of GDP

      • These fines will not be applied if the countries in question experience exceptional circumstances, e.g. a natural disaster or a decline of their GDP of more than 2% during one year

      • In cases where the drop in GDP is between 0.75 and 2% the application of the fine will be subject to the approval of the EU finance ministers


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    The argument for rules on government budget deficits government budget deficits quickly lead to an unsustainable debt dynamics

    • A country with an unsustainable increasing government debt creates negative spillover effects for the rest of the monetary union

    • First, such country will have increasing recourse to the capital markets of the union

      • The union interest rate increases

      • This higher union interest rate increases the burden of the government debts of the other countries

      • These will be forced to follow more restrictive fiscal policies


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    • A second spillover: government budget deficits quickly lead to an unsustainable debt dynamics

      • The upward movement of the union interest rate is likely to put pressure on the ECB to relax its monetary policy stance


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    Criticism is based on government budget deficits quickly lead to an unsustainable debt dynamics efficient markets

    • If the capital markets work efficiently, there will be no spillover:

      • There will be different interest rates in the union, reflecting different risk premia on the government debt of the union members

      • It does not make sense to talk about the union interest rate


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    Is this criticism valid? government budget deficits quickly lead to an unsustainable debt dynamics

    • There is interdependence in the risk of bonds issued by different governments because within EMU, governments are likely to bail out a defaulting member state

    • Thus, financial markets may find it difficult to price these risks correctly

    • The ‘no-bailout’ clause introduced in the Maastricht Treaty may not be credible

    • Mutual control to avoid costly bailouts is necessary


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    Government budget deficits in Eurozone, US, UK, Japan government budget deficits quickly lead to an unsustainable debt dynamics


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    The Stability and Growth Pact: government budget deficits quickly lead to an unsustainable debt dynamics an evaluation

    • Two conflicting concerns:

      • The first one has to do with flexibility and is stressed in the theory of optimum currency areas: in the absence of the exchange rate instrument and a centralized European budget, national government budgets are the only available instruments for nation-states to confront asymmetric shocks

      • A second concern relates to the spillover effects of unsustainable national debts and deficits


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    • The Pact has been guided more by the fear of unsustainable debts and deficits than by the need for flexibility

    • As a result, the Pact is quite unbalanced in stressing the need for strict rules at the expense of flexibility

    • This creates a risk that the capacity of national budgets to function as automatic stabilizers during recessions will be hampered, thereby intensifying recessions


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    • Lack of budgetary flexibility to face recessions creates a potential for tensions between national governments and European institutions

    • This tension exists at two levels:

      • As countries are hindered in their desire to use the automatic stabilizers in their budgets during recessions, they increase their pressure on the ECB to relax monetary policies

      • When countries are hit by economic hardship, EU institutions are perceived as preventing the alleviation of the hardship of those hit by the recession intensifying Euro-scepticism


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    • The flaws of the Stability and Growth Pact we just described led to serious problems in 2002– 4

    • Major Eurozone countries were hit by an economic downturn. This led to an increase of the budget deficits of France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal

    • In the name of the Pact, the European Commission insisted that these countries should return to budget balance even in the midst of a declining business cycle


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    • The Commission had to yield to the unwillingness of these countries to subject their policies and their commitments towards the increasing number of unemployed to the rule of the mythical number 3

    • In November 2003 the Council of Ministers abrogated the procedure that the European Commission had started. For all practical purposes the Pact had become a dead letter


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    How to reform the Stability and Growth Pact? countries to subject their policies and their commitments towards the increasing number of unemployed to the rule of the mythical number 3

    • More flexibility is required. This flexibility should be achieved at two levels:

      • The judgment of whether budget deficits are excessive should be based on the debt levels of individual countries

      • The analysis of the budgetary situation should be based on the structural budget deficits


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    • Finally, the requirement that countries should have balanced budgets on average implies that the debt to GDP ratio is pushed to zero

    • There is no valid economic argument to force countries to bring their debt ratio to zero

    • Requirement to bring the debt ratio to zero gives strong political incentives to reduce government investment:

      • Governments are required to finance all new investments by current taxation


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    • A large part of the benefits of these investments will be reaped by future governments

    • This gives an incentive to governments today to reduce these investments and only spend on items that benefit the present voters

    • Thus the GSP is likely to lead to lower government investments and thus lower growth


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    Hypothetical evolution of the debt ratios within Euroland assuming that the member countries abide by the pact, and assuming that nominal GDP increases by 5% a year.


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    The Reform Proposals assuming that the member countries abide by the pact, and assuming that nominal GDP increases by 5% a year.

    • On March 22-23, 2005, the European Council agreed to a reform of the Stability Pact

    • The main elements in this reform are the following:

      • First, countries with a low debt ratio (and a high growth potential) are allowed to maintain a deficit of 1% over the business cycle. The other countries have to maintain a balanced budget over the business cycle. The 3% budget deficit ceiling, however, is maintained for all countries.


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    • Second, while in the old Stability Pact countries could exceed the 3% deficit ceiling when GDP declined by 2% or more, this condition will be relaxed in the new Stability Pact. It will be enough to have a negative growth rate or a “protracted period of very low growth relative to potential growth” to be allowed to (temporarily) exceed the 3% limit.


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    • Third, countries will be able to invoke more special circumstances for exceeding the 3% ceiling. For example, investment programs, pension reforms that increase the debt today while improving the future sustainability of government finances will be accepted as special circumstances allowing for a temporary breach of the 3% rule.

    • Finally, countries which exceed the 3% ceiling but have low debt levels will be allowed to stretch the adjustment over a longer period than countries with a high debt level.


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    Evaluation circumstances for exceeding the 3% ceiling. For example, investment programs, pension reforms that increase the debt today while improving the future sustainability of government finances will be accepted as special circumstances allowing for a temporary breach of the 3% rule.

    • The proposals go in the right direction of targeting the debt levels and allowing more flexibility

    • However, by keeping the 3% rule but allowing for many exceptions, the proposals have laid a minefield for future discussions and conflicts


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    Conclusion circumstances for exceeding the 3% ceiling. For example, investment programs, pension reforms that increase the debt today while improving the future sustainability of government finances will be accepted as special circumstances allowing for a temporary breach of the 3% rule.

    • Two views about how national fiscal policies should be conducted in a monetary union:

      • National fiscal authorities should maintain a sufficient amount of flexibility and autonomy (theory of optimum currency areas)

      • The conduct of fiscal policies in the monetary union has to be disciplined by explicit rules on the size of the national budget deficits (Stability and Growth Pact)

    • Strong criticism against the Stability and Growth Pact for its excessive rigidity

    • This has led to a reform of the SGP which provides for more flexibility


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