Marine Corps Transformation in the Pacific Col Bill Febuary AC

1. Marine Corps Transformation in the Pacific Col Bill Febuary AC/S G6, MARFORPAC 8 August 2006

2. Fighting the War for Influence Strategic Importance of the Pacific USMC movement to Guam Communications Modernization Agenda These are the four broad areas that I will discuss, feel free to ask question at any time.These are the four broad areas that I will discuss, feel free to ask question at any time.

3. Future Operational Designto Fight the War for Influence The United States will need to have a presence capable of deterring aggression in the western pacific, but at the same time, we need to be able to win the ideological struggle against opportunists, violent extremists and ideological enemies. Our goal is to establish a global environment of hope and the exercise of basic human rights. We want to do this from the top and the bottom, by supporting our partner nations efforts, building their capacity, and while we are present, gain influence with the disenfranchised and undecided. We want to engage in enough places to make a difference, be in enough places at the same time to stabilize a region, back often enough to gain influence, stay long enough to be believed, and do things that will make a difference.The United States will need to have a presence capable of deterring aggression in the western pacific, but at the same time, we need to be able to win the ideological struggle against opportunists, violent extremists and ideological enemies. Our goal is to establish a global environment of hope and the exercise of basic human rights. We want to do this from the top and the bottom, by supporting our partner nations efforts, building their capacity, and while we are present, gain influence with the disenfranchised and undecided. We want to engage in enough places to make a difference, be in enough places at the same time to stabilize a region, back often enough to gain influence, stay long enough to be believed, and do things that will make a difference.

4. Pacific AOR Strategic Importance US Marine Forces are strategically forward positioned at the confluence of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. From here we are well situated to respond to our primary wartime contingency on the Korean Peninsula. NorthEast Asia is an important economic region Rapid economic expansion over the last 3 decades Accounted for 22% of world gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004 Combined GDP of $12.4 trillion on purchasing power parity basis Home to 4 of world�s 17 largest economies (China $7.3 trillion (#2); Japan $3.7 trillion (#3); ROK $925 billion (#14); Taiwan $576 billion (#17) NEA important to US economically Region accounted for 25% of all US trade in 2004 Second only to NAFTA � greater than European Union US direct investment position in Northeast Asia totaled $109 billion at end of 2003. More than half of the world�s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the Straits of Malacca, the Sunda Straits or the Lombok Straits, with the majority continuing on into the South China Sea. Over 1,100 fully laden supertankers pass eastbound through the Straits of Malacca each year, and an average of nearly 10 million barrels of oil transit the Straits every day. Freedom of navigation throughout the region is paramount. This slide illustrates not only Okinawa�s strategic location with regard to the Korean Peninsula and ocean shipping routes, but also the variety of historical issues that continue to threaten regional stability and economic potential. Our visible forward presence on Okinawa allows US forces the opportunity to positively contribute to the stability of the region by rapidly responding to crises in any one of a number of potential flashpoints. US Marine Forces are strategically forward positioned at the confluence of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. From here we are well situated to respond to our primary wartime contingency on the Korean Peninsula. NorthEast Asia is an important economic region Rapid economic expansion over the last 3 decades Accounted for 22% of world gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004 Combined GDP of $12.4 trillion on purchasing power parity basis Home to 4 of world�s 17 largest economies (China $7.3 trillion (#2); Japan $3.7 trillion (#3); ROK $925 billion (#14); Taiwan $576 billion (#17) NEA important to US economically Region accounted for 25% of all US trade in 2004 Second only to NAFTA � greater than European Union US direct investment position in Northeast Asia totaled $109 billion at end of 2003. More than half of the world�s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the Straits of Malacca, the Sunda Straits or the Lombok Straits, with the majority continuing on into the South China Sea. Over 1,100 fully laden supertankers pass eastbound through the Straits of Malacca each year, and an average of nearly 10 million barrels of oil transit the Straits every day. Freedom of navigation throughout the region is paramount. This slide illustrates not only Okinawa�s strategic location with regard to the Korean Peninsula and ocean shipping routes, but also the variety of historical issues that continue to threaten regional stability and economic potential. Our visible forward presence on Okinawa allows US forces the opportunity to positively contribute to the stability of the region by rapidly responding to crises in any one of a number of potential flashpoints.

5. Marine Corps Bases, Pacific MARFORPAC and MARCORBASESPAC provide support to PACOM . . . MARFORPAC and MARCORBASESPAC provide support to PACOM . . .

6. Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) Move ~8000 Marines, plus family members, and civilian support personnel from Okinawa to Guam We are already developing plans to support the required command and control structure, and support to training areas spread out among the many islands surrounding Guam. New areas of concern Arc of Instability Regional Allies & Interests Strategically valuable Closer than Hawaii & Tokyo Similar distance to Okinawa More Freedom of action Collocation with other Services � will Guam be a Joint Use base? Lightens burden on Okinawa as outlined in the DPRI and ATARA. Creates balanced capabilities in Hawaii, Guam, and Okinawa Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) Move ~8000 Marines, plus family members, and civilian support personnel from Okinawa to Guam We are already developing plans to support the required command and control structure, and support to training areas spread out among the many islands surrounding Guam. New areas of concern Arc of Instability Regional Allies & Interests Strategically valuable Closer than Hawaii & Tokyo Similar distance to Okinawa More Freedom of action Collocation with other Services � will Guam be a Joint Use base? Lightens burden on Okinawa as outlined in the DPRI and ATARA. Creates balanced capabilities in Hawaii, Guam, and Okinawa

7. Tactical Comm Modernization The Marine Corps must maintain a minimum threshold communications capability in order to prosecute missions. Marine Corps systems are currently dying at an alarming rate. This is due to: Aging systems reaching the end of their service life. Effects of OIF on normal equipment attrition. JTRS, the directed solution, is not available now. Delays in program schedule delays availability more. Net result of dying systems and delayed program is an increasing capability gap. The Marine Corps must maintain a minimum threshold communications capability in order to prosecute missions. Marine Corps systems are currently dying at an alarming rate. This is due to: Aging systems reaching the end of their service life. Effects of OIF on normal equipment attrition. JTRS, the directed solution, is not available now. Delays in program schedule delays availability more. Net result of dying systems and delayed program is an increasing capability gap.

8. COMMAND AND CONTROL ON-THE-MOVE NETWORK, DIGITAL OVER-THE-HORIZON RELAY - (CONDOR) Allows line of sight single channel radios to talk over an expanded area using a SATCOM interface.COMMAND AND CONTROL ON-THE-MOVE NETWORK, DIGITAL OVER-THE-HORIZON RELAY - (CONDOR) Allows line of sight single channel radios to talk over an expanded area using a SATCOM interface.

9. Initiative Description: The CONDOR Capability Set provides a near-term architectural solution with long-term relevance � leveraging existing technologies and equipment to implement an on-the-move/over-the-horizon (OTM/OTH) communications architecture which will prepare the Marine Corps for the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA). Capability Provided: The CONDOR Capability Set is a three-part architectural solution. CONDOR Gateway (GW) provides OTM, OTH relay connectivity between local, OTM EPLRS data networks. CONDOR Point-of-Presence Vehicle (PoP-V) extends OTH/OTM data network connectivity to all tactical data radios (SINCGARS, Have Quick II, HF). The PoP-V is a sub-system of the CONDOR Capability Set that will be produced and maintained as the Marine Corps interim solution to JTRS Cluster 1 radios. CONDOR Common Army Marine C2 Vehicle (CAMC2V) provides OTH/OTM data network connectivity to a commander and his staff during displacements � simultaneously maintaining current state/data on all routers and databases. The CAMC2V is a sub-system of the CONDOR Capability Set that will be produced and maintained as the common Army Marine solution for C2 On-the-Move Initiative Description: The CONDOR Capability Set provides a near-term architectural solution with long-term relevance � leveraging existing technologies and equipment to implement an on-the-move/over-the-horizon (OTM/OTH) communications architecture which will prepare the Marine Corps for the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA). Capability Provided: The CONDOR Capability Set is a three-part architectural solution. CONDOR Gateway (GW) provides OTM, OTH relay connectivity between local, OTM EPLRS data networks. CONDOR Point-of-Presence Vehicle (PoP-V) extends OTH/OTM data network connectivity to all tactical data radios (SINCGARS, Have Quick II, HF). The PoP-V is a sub-system of the CONDOR Capability Set that will be produced and maintained as the Marine Corps interim solution to JTRS Cluster 1 radios. CONDOR Common Army Marine C2 Vehicle (CAMC2V) provides OTH/OTM data network connectivity to a commander and his staff during displacements � simultaneously maintaining current state/data on all routers and databases. The CAMC2V is a sub-system of the CONDOR Capability Set that will be produced and maintained as the common Army Marine solution for C2 On-the-Move

10. A MFP M2C2 Interoperability Prototype C3 integrating Marine �First In� Expeditionary forces with afloat Forces providing OTH/OTM tactical C3 Integrated, lightweight, interoperable, modular, reconfigurable, rapidly deployable minimal setup/footprint C3 package for early entry expeditionary forces at the Brigade, MEB/MEU, Battalion and small unit/team levels CONOPS/TTP - supporting Joint Task Force operations and MARFORPAC concept of implementation This program was initiated to support CONDOR, but has proven to be a significant capability in its own right. MFP is supporting two follow on initiatives to expand on progress already achieved. A MFP M2C2 Interoperability Prototype C3 integrating Marine �First In� Expeditionary forces with afloat Forces providing OTH/OTM tactical C3 Integrated, lightweight, interoperable, modular, reconfigurable, rapidly deployable minimal setup/footprint C3 package for early entry expeditionary forces at the Brigade, MEB/MEU, Battalion and small unit/team levels CONOPS/TTP - supporting Joint Task Force operations and MARFORPAC concept of implementation This program was initiated to support CONDOR, but has proven to be a significant capability in its own right. MFP is supporting two follow on initiatives to expand on progress already achieved.

11. Command Operations Center COC/UOC is the USMC program responsible for providing Marine Operational Forces with C2 Capabilities whenever and wherever they operate or fight The Command Operations Center, also called the Unit Operations Center was designed to standardize capabilities across the operating forces, and provide support it as a program of record (POR). The UOC is a modular capability that includes shelters, vehicles, generators, and the C4 equipment (computers, headsets, projectors, screens, etc) to display the common operational picture and support command and control.The Command Operations Center, also called the Unit Operations Center was designed to standardize capabilities across the operating forces, and provide support it as a program of record (POR). The UOC is a modular capability that includes shelters, vehicles, generators, and the C4 equipment (computers, headsets, projectors, screens, etc) to display the common operational picture and support command and control.

12. Information ManagementWhere We Are Going

13. Information ManagementBases/Post/Stations Where We Are Going

14. Questions?

15. Backup Slides

16. CCIR�S and the Decision Making Cycle

19. Friendly COP

20. Operational Level Fires

21. Sustainment - Logistics

24. PHASE II � SEIZE THE INITIATIVE H � H + 46