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CS/ECE Advanced Network Security Dr. Attila Altay Yavuz. Topic 1.1 Course and Project Overview (1). Fall 2014. High-Level Objectives. Broad understanding of technology trends, security and privacy problems

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cs ece advanced network security dr attila altay yavuz

CS/ECE Advanced Network SecurityDr. Attila Altay Yavuz

Topic 1.1 Course and Project Overview (1)

Dr. Attila Altay Yavuz

Fall 2014

high level objectives
High-Level Objectives
  • Broad understanding of technology trends, security and privacy problems
  • Recognize key security and privacy challenges, list common threats and vulnerabilities on modern systems
  • Advanced Network Security Primitives
  • One-way hash chain, use of multiple root chains,
      • Relate keys in a special manner
    • Merkle hash tree and its applications,
      • Classic algorithmic trick of all times  O(Log_2(n))
    • Bloom filters
      • Is it there?
    • Secret sharing
      • A beautiful crypto classic
    • Rabin’s information dispersal
      • Resistance against erasure and disruption
high level objectives cont
High-Level Objectives (Cont’)
  • Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks counter measures.
    • Hash-based puzzles against connection depletion attacks
    • Variant client-server puzzle methods
    • Client-server puzzle outsourcing with Discrete-Logarithm Problem (DLP)
    • Message specific puzzles for DoS resiliency in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
    • Using broadcast environment to revert client-server puzzles (patents!)
  • Authentication Methods
    • Authentication and integrity are the first requirement for all IoTS applications!
    • Broadcast Authentication Methods
    • Going beyond Message Authentication Codes and Standard Signatures
    • Levering time factor: TESLA
    • Hash Chains and Signatures: EMSS
high level objectives cont1
High-Level Objectives (Cont’)
  • One-time and Multiple-time Signatures
    • Fastest authentication methods around, but with enormous signature and keys
    • Bins and Balls (BiBa)
    • Hash-to-Obtain Subset (HORSs)
    • Again play with time factor, but in a different way!
      • Time-Valid HORS
      • Trade-off between security and performance
  • Applications to Smart-Grid/Power Grid, Inter-car Networks and Comparison
    • How to distribute multiple-time public keys?
    • Packet loss problems: Chained public keys?
    • Bandwidth and storage issues?
    • Comparison to ECDSA type approaches, hardware-acceleration methods
high level objectives cont2
High-Level Objectives (Cont’)
  • Code Dissemination in Wireless Sensors
    • Start with one, spread to the others
    • Hope-by-hope secure code sensor programming
    • Dos Resistance, a different game with many little 8-bit devices
  • Authentication and Integrity for Low-end Devices
    • Backbone of IoTS
    • Normal crypto will kill battery, literally, 1000 times faster!
    • Sensors can be compromised and physically attacked
    • Develop advanced schemes to resist:
      • Active adversaries stealing your keys
      • Very little battery, 16 KB memory, 8-bit processor, tiny antenna!
      • HaSAFSS
      • BAF
      • ETA
grading
Grading
  • Homeworks, %20 (potentially two)
  • In-class paper presentation, %15 (subject to change)
    • See potential topics at the webpage,
  • Survey/Scouting, %20
    • Select a topic from “In-class presentation” sub-section at webpage
  • Research Project, %40
    • A good progress can remove survey/scouting!
    • Either select one of given topics, or propose your own project
    • Your preference + your skill set, team effort versus individual work
    • Deliverables will depend on the type of the project
    • Please let me know if you will continue this course by 10.08.2014
  • Class attendance/participation %5
project topics overview
Project Topics: Overview
  • Cloud Computing (3 topics)
    • Privacy-preserving Searches for data outsourcing
      • Searchable Encryption
    • Privacy-preserving Access for data outsourcing
      • Oblivious RAM
    • Privacy-preserving Operations for computation outsourcing
      • Outsourcing linear optimization problems
  • Internet of Things and Systems (1 topic)
    • Scalable and practical key management and provisioning
      • Self-certified cryptography and its implementation
  • Digital Forensics (1 topic)
    • Compromise-resilient and compact signatures
      • Security improvement and implementation
project topics overview cont
Project Topics: Overview (Cont’)
  • Wireless Sensor Networks
    • Detection of Node Replication Attacks
      • Design, Comparison and Analysis of Algorithms
  • Encryption Methods for Medical Security
    • Analyze and compare suitable encryption methods for medical databases
  • Recent Progresses on Proof-of-Retrievability and Implementation
  • Side-Channel Attacks on Medical Devices and Cyber Physical Systems
    • Scouting Oriented
project topics requirement generic
Project Topics: Requirement (Generic)
  • Requirement and Background
  • Recommended: Knowledge on basic security and crypto concepts
    • Symmetric key crypto, public key crypto, differences & similarities
    • Cryptographic hash functions, Message Authentication Codes, block ciphers (AES, DES)
    • RSA, DSA, Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, DLP
  • Good programming skills
    • C/C++, Ability to use data structure packages from open source libraries, open-hash table stack
    • Java, C# and/or Python for some projects (no need to be Guru, use high-level)
    • Familiarity with basic Linux environment, compile/link etc.
  • Willingness to learn existing crypto libraries to build algorithms
    • MIRACL, Number Theoretical Library (NTL), individual packages of researchers
  • Self-motivated and independent research and development (it is your work, your success!)
project topics requirement generic1
Project Topics: Requirement (Generic)
  • Deadlines and Sync. Up
  • Bi-weekly mini-updates indicating progress is recommended for projects
    • 3 paragraphs indicating achievements, problems, next steps (only team representative)
  • Office hours: Monday 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm
  • Project Selection:10.08.2014
    • Self-proposals have one more week, see website for details
  • Interim Report:11.07.2014
  • Final Report and Software-Package:12.11.2014
    • Project presentation summarizing results
    • Research report
    • Transferable software under Linux, VM ready (hopefully for Winter 2014)
    • See website for further details
slide11

Challenge: Privacy versus Data Utilization Dilemma

Sensitive data!

Storage on the cloud

Client

(encrypted)

Outsource the data

SEARCH?

ANALYZE?

Standard Encryption

  • CAN’T SEARCH!
  • CAN’T ANALYZE!

IMPACT

slide12

Searchable Encryption (Generic Framework)

Client

Cloud

  • Efficient Privacy Enhancing Technologies for Big Data Analytics
      • Role: Co-PI / Budget: $1,000,000 (2014-2017)
    • Searchable Encryption: Search on encrypted data without decrypting it

c1

cn

fn

f1

. . .

. . .

Extract keywords

Data

Structure

. . .

w1

wn

. . .

t1

tn

Trapdoors

Searchable Representation

. . .

t1

tn

c1

Search keyword: w1 t1

t1

f1

Update file: fi (zi,V)

(zi,V)

project topics searchable encryption
Project Topics: Searchable Encryption
  • Understand, implement, validate important SSE schemes on real-data

Dynamic Symmetric Searchable Encryption by Microsoft Research

Seny Kamara and CharalamposPapamanthou.Parallel and Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption, Financial Cryptography 2013 (FC 2013)

Dynamic Symmetric Searchable Encryption by IBM Research and Academia

David Cash, Joseph Jaeger, Stanislaw Jarecki, CharanjitJutla, Hugo Krawczyk, Marcel Rosu, Michael Steiner. 

Dynamic Searchable Encryption in Very-Large Databases: Data Structures and Implementation, NDSS 2014.

Work of Dr. Elaine Shi by UMD (code will be potentially provided , in C#)

Dynamic Symmetric Searchable Encryption by Robert Bosch (optional)

My work on high-security DSSE

Static Symmetric Searchable Encryption (optional)

Reza Curtmola, Juan Garay, Seny Kamara, and RafailOstrovsky. Searchable symmetric encryption: improved definitions and efficient constructions. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and comm. security (CCS '06).

project topics searchable encryption1
Project Topics: Searchable Encryption
  • Group Size: 3 student (+1 if other project may be merged)
    • Students considering security research, or Winter 2014:Applied crypto class
  • Required Background:
    • C/C++ programming, ability to use data structure packages from open source libraries
    • C# or Java for certain algorithms (use existing libraries, no need to be Guru)
    • Knowledge on cryptographic hash functions, MAC, block ciphers (AES), Pseudo Random Functions: Leverage existing crypto libraries to use those primitives with data structures
    • Knowledge on basic data structures: Red-black trees, hash tables, linked list, ability to

implement them with open source C/C++ libraries

  • Each member will be responsible for an algorithm, skill sets and selected algorithm will be decided
  • Implementation results will be tested on ENRON public data set
oblivious random access memory oram
Oblivious Random Access Memory (ORAM)
  • SSE, homomorphic encryption, differential privacyasa
    • Operations under encryption
  • ACCESS to the encrypted data also leaks info!
  • Example: Any SSE algorithm leaks “access pattern”
    • Same tag for keyword returns same file
    • Adversary knows we access certain files in certain pattern!
  • Problem: The sequence of storage locations accessed by the client can leak a significant amount of sensitive information. Demonstrated that by observing accesses to an encrypted email repository, an adversary can infer as much as 80% of the search queries .

Mohammad Saiful Islam, Mehmet Kuzu, Murat Kantarcioglu: Access Pattern disclosure on

Searchable Encryption: Ramification, Attack and Mitigation. NDSS 2012

oblivious random access memory oram1
Oblivious Random Access Memory (ORAM)
  • Guessing actions in critical situations
  • Q1, Q2, Q3 sequence followed by a buy/sell in market, no need for decryption!
  • Reverse Engineering and Software Privacy
  • Accessing certain memory location leaks information about software!
    • Reverse engineering in cloud computing
  • A valid method is using hardware key to protect the validity of the software; hardware key cannot be duplicated
  • The memory access between the HW and SW components can leak information
  • Attacker can deceive or skip the checking with the HW component
project topics oram
Project Topics: ORAM
  • Understand, implement, validate important ORAM schemes on real-data

Emil Stefanov, Marten van Dijk, Elaine Shi, Christopher Fletcher, Ling Ren, Xiangyao Yu, and SrinivasDevadas.

Path ORAM: An extremely simple oblivious RAM protocol.In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security (CCS '13).

https://github.com/nathanwolfe/dropbox-oram

  • Emil Stefanov, Elaine Shi, ObliviStore: High Performance Oblivious Distributed Cloud Data Store In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '13) .
    • Code in C#
  • Emil Stefanov, Elaine Shi, Dawn Song, Towards Practical Oblivious RAM, NDSS 2012, San Diego,

CA, USA.

    • Code in C#
project topics oram1
Project Topics: ORAM
  • Group Size: 1 student
    • Students considering security research, or Winter 2014:Applied crypto class
  • Required Background:
    • C# or Python programming, or ability to use software packages from existing libraries
    • Network programming experience (e.g., with Java or C#), preferable!
    • Knowledge on cryptographic hash functions, MAC, block ciphers (AES), Pseudo Random
    • Knowledge on basic data structures: Red-black trees, hash tables, linked list
  • Prepare a survey ORAM methods, advantages/disadvantages, theory comp.
  • Performance measurements and comparison with different libraries,
  • Presentation describing evolution an best results of ORAM, with measurements
  • Possible integration with SSE team, especially if Bosch scheme works
secure inter car communication
Secure Inter-car Communication

Observation/trend:

  • Command and control mechanisms are crucial for distributed systems such as vehicular networks
  • These mechanisms are time, safety and security critical.
  • Requirements:
  • Extremely fast processing of messages (a few ms).
  • Authentication and integrity of messages must be
  • guaranteed.
  • Security must be scalable (e.g., key management).
    • Accidents
    • Pedestrians in danger
  • Current Technology Limitations:
  • Asymmetric crypto is as of not yet feasible due to high computation, memory and communication costs.
    • ECDSA has been shown be to slow
  • Symmetric crypto is unscalable due to key management issues.
  • Resource-constrained platforms involved
    • Sensors on lights, mobile devices of pedestrian
secure inter car communication1
Secure Inter-car Communication
  • Further Methods and Limitations:
  • Signature Amortization: Traditional signatures are slow, but what about signing a group of packages?
  • Buffer packages and sign together, faster and signing each
    • Real-time authentication, no time to buffer packages!
  • One-time Signatures (hash-based): Just relying crypto hash, they are the fastest methods known to date.
    • One-time signature  One-time public key
    • Re-distribute a new public key each time, bandwidth killer!
    • Enormous signatures and public keys
      • Packet size = 128 bits, signature size = 5 KB
secure inter car communication2
Secure Inter-car Communication
  • Playing with Time (TESLA&EMSS): Introduce asymmetry with time.
    • Details will come later, but caveat is: It requires package buffering!
  • Observation: To prevent collision in real-time, we need a couple of ms
  • Remain secure a couple of minutes is enough!
  • Existing methods offer significantly longer security, by being very expensive
  • Time-Valid Security: A security/performance trade-off for fast authentication
    • (sk,PK) = 2^k bit security, |PK,sk| = n bits
    • Use m <n bits for (sk,PK)
    • Smaller signature size, less transmission, much faster processing (less bit to work on)
    • Less security, but a couple of minutes is enough!
secure inter car communication3
Secure Inter-car Communication
  • Playing with Time (TESLA&EMSS): Introduce asymmetry with time.
    • Details will come later, but caveat is: It requires package buffering!
  • Observation: To prevent collision in real-time, we need only a couple of ms
  • Remain secure a couple of minutes is enough!
  • Existing methods offer significantly longer security, by being very expensive
  • Time-Valid Security: A security/performance trade-off for fast authentication
    • (sk,PK) = 2^k bit security, |PK,sk| = n bits
    • Use m <n bits for (sk,PK)
    • Smaller signature size, less transmission, much faster processing (less bit to work on)
    • Less security, but a couple of minutes is enough!
secure inter car communication4
Secure Inter-car Communication
  • Limitations of Time-Valid Approach
  • Each signature scheme has its own security/key length balance
    • Factorization, DLP, Lattices, …
    • Requires a good theoretical estimation for acceptable security = cryptanalysis
  • Shorter signature = Shorter public keys
    • Remember one-time signatures?
    • Re-distribute public keys from time to time
      • First gained but then lost bandwidth (still ok)
    • Chaining public keys
    • Packet loss issues
  • A public key distribution and synchronization framework is needed
project topics new tv signatures
Project Topics: New TV-Signatures
  • 1) I identified very fast signatures for you:
    • Ed25519

a) Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, Peter Schwabe, and Bo-Yin Yang.. High-speed high-security

Signatures, In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems , CHES 2011 - 13th International Workshop,

Nara, Japan, September 28 - October 1, 2011. Proceedings, pages 124–142, 2011.

b) Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, Peter Schwabe, and Bo-Yin Yang.

High-speed high-security signatures. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 2(2):77–89, 2012.

    • Efficient and Tiny Authentication (ETA)

Attila Altay Yavuz. ETA: efficient and tiny and authentication for heterogeneous wireless systems. In Proc.

of the sixth ACM conference on Security and privacy in wireless and mobile networks, WiSec ’13, pages 67–72,

New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM

    • Rapid Authentication (RA)

Attila Altay Yavuz. An efficient real-time broadcast authentication scheme for command and control messages.

Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, 9(10):1733–1742, Oct 2014.

project topics new tv signatures1
Project Topics: New TV-Signatures
  • NTRU Signature

Jeff Hoffstein, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Jill Pipher, and William Whyte. Practical lattice-based cryptography:

Ntruencrypt and ntrusign. Information Security and Cryptography, pages 349–390. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,

2010.

  • Signcryption

Y. Zheng. Digital signcryption or how to achieve cost(signature & encryption) << cost(signature) +

cost(encryption). In Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO ’97), pages 165–179, 1997.

  • Schnorr Signature

Gregory Neven, Nigel P. Smart, and Bogdan Warinschi. Hash function requirements for schnorr signatures. J.

Mathematical Cryptology, 3(1):69–87, 2009.

project topics new tv signatures2
Project Topics: New TV-Signatures
  • 2) Realize Signatures with Efficient Crypto Libraries under TV-framework
    • MIRACL, NTL
    • Varying (SK,PK) sizes with different security parameters
    • Guideline about key sizes?

A. K. Lenstra and E. R. Verheul. Selecting cryptographic key sizes. Journal of Cryptology, 14(4):255–293, 2001. Lenstra stuff

    • Detailed timing measurements
  • 3) Time-Valid Framework with PK Distribution
    • Minimize PK distribution, hash chains are used:

Q. Wang, H. Khurana, Y. Huang, and K. Nahrstedt. Time valid one-time signature for time-critical multicast data authentication. In INFOCOM 2009, IEEE, April 2009..

    • Consider packet loss, chaining properties, do measurements
project topics new tv signatures3
Project Topics: New TV-Signatures
  • Group Size: 2-3 student
    • Students considering security research, or Winter 2014:Applied crypto class
  • Required Background:
    • C/C++ or Java programming, or ability to use software packages from existing libraries
    • Knowledge on cryptographic hash functions, MAC, block ciphers (AES), Pseudo Random
    • Knowledge on PKC-cryptography (e.g., RSA, DSA)
  • 2 students work on implementation for given algorithms
  • 1 student work on updating Lenstra’s results as much as possible
  • All re-iterate experiments with public key chaining
  • Final report and presentation