Presentation Transcript

1. Political Science 345:The Legislative ProcessClass 20: Legislative Oversight and the Bureaucracy

   Professor Jon Rogowski
2. Slackers and Zealots Policymakers need bureaucrats to implement their new policies When will bureaucrats behave competently (“zealots”) and when will they not (“slackers”)?
3. Slackers and Zealots More likely to behave competently when: Competency is important Level of control by the policymaker is low Policy divergence between the policymaker and the bureaucrat is not too larger
4. Why is oversight necessary? Time constraints Constitutional constraints Expertise and implementation Representation within the administration
5. “The informing function of Congress…” “The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function… Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and dispositions of the administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn of how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important it should understand and direct.” - Woodrow Wilson, 1885
6. Oversight Congress shines the light on the activities of the administration Administrative decisions should be legally binding Delegate vs. Trustee? What is “faithful execution?” Faithful to whom? (Congress, voters, president?)
7. Techniques of oversight (1) Hearings and investigations Senate confirmations Authorizing process Annual vs. Standing authorizations Appropriations process Carrots and sticks Limitation riders
8. Techniques of oversight (2) Inspectors general Informal oversight (guidance sought by agency officials) Audits by the GAO Reporting requirements
9. Techniques of oversight (3) Ad hoc groups (fire alarms) Program evaluations OMB, GAO Casework for constituents As part of policy area studies by CRS and CBO
10. Techniques of oversight (4) Resolutions of inquiry Individual members’ activity Courts, special prosecutors, etc. Impeachment
11. History of oversight Government not especially big or expensive before 1900 Until WWII, the size of govt shifted dramatically as nation moved into/out of war Presidents began to reorganize bureaucracy starting after about 1900
12. History of oversight Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 Committees: exercise “continuous watchfulness” Governmental Affairs Committees look after inefficiency, waste, corruption Authorizing committees look at performance of the agencies under their jurisdiction Appropriations committees provide fiscal oversight
13. Police Patrol Oversight Analogous to the use of real police patrols, police-patrol oversight is comparatively centralized, active, and direct; at its own initiative, Congress examines a sample of executive-agency activities, with the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by its surveillance, discouraging such violations. An agency’s activities might be surveyed by any of a number of means, such as reading documents, commissioning scientific studies, conducting, field observations, and holding hearings to question officials and affected citizens.
14. Fire Alarm Oversight Analogous to the use of real fire alarms, fire-alarm oversight is less centralized and involves less active and direct intervention than police-patrol oversight. Instead of examining a sample of administrative decisions and looking for violations of legislative goals, Congress establishes a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative decisions, to charge executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and to see remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself.
15. Assumptions Congress can choose either or both options when it writes laws (ex ante) or monitors bureaucratic behavior (ex post) MCs are credit-claiming and blame-avoiding Agencies are agents of Congress
16. Congress’s choice of action MCs prefer fire alarms to police patrols Police patrols are costly and inefficient Prone to errors Costs and errors of fire-alarm oversight are born by citizens and interest groups Congress will not neglect its oversight responsibilities Costs born by others but benefits accrue to MCs Logic applies further still Allowing bureaucracy to make law is not an abdication of MCs’ lawmaking responsibilities
17. How well does this work? Fire alarms are more effective—relative to legislative goals—than police patrols Goals themselves are vague; the incidence of a violation crucially depends upon public perception Police patrols are likely to miss lots of violations Congress can create new organizations (e.g., Legal Services Corporation) that will sound fire alarms for the “voiceless”
18. Potential limitations Should we believe interest groups/citizens? How well do organized interests match the policy priorities of MCs? What do we do with conflicting reports? Views the president and the courts as further agents of Congress Delegates “problem definition” to others
19. How much do legislatures delegate? Rather than the procedural mechanisms of control, look at legislative specificity Main idea: the higher the level of specificity, the less discretion granted an administrative agent. Look beyond Congress Examine state legislatures Look at effects of institutional variation
20. When to provide explicit instructions? Incentives Policy disagreement between legislature and agency Capacity Legislature sufficiently professionalized Alternative options for influencing agency Non-statutory mechanisms for control
21. Measurement Policy disagreement between legislature and agency Divided government Legislature sufficiently professionalized Compensation Bargaining costs Divided government between chambers Non-statutory mechanisms for control Legislative veto
22. Outcome of interest Number of new words that a state enacted into law in 1995-96 on issues related to Medicaid recipients Strengths: Focuses on one piece of legislation States have lots of flexibility in this area Allows for comparability across states Rising costs and changing federal politics encouraged state action
23. Main findings Unified legislatures add more words than divided legislatures Influence of divided government only for high-capacity legislatures States with legislative vetoes do less to limit discretion