MBF-705 LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS OF BANKING SUPERVISION

1. Session: EIGHTEEN MBF-705LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS OF BANKING SUPERVISION OSMAN BIN SAIF

2. Summary of last session • Supervisory Methodologies • Off site Surveillance • Organization Issues • Staffing and Compensation • Career Path • Training • Inaction in Restructuring Banks

3. Agenda of this session • Examples of Bank Supervision Approaches • Bank Supervision in Britain • Bank Supervision in Continental Europe • Bank Supervision in United States • Bank Supervision in Pakistan

4. Bank Supervision in Britain • The informal approach to bank supervision is best exemplified by the approach taken by the Bank of England. • In Britain, supervision was traditionally carried out by the Bank of England in consultation with banks.

5. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • Moral suasion, discretion, and personal contact were the principal tools of bank supervisors. Each bank had an individual relationship with the Bank of England.

6. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • Banks made prudential returns but, unlike other systems of supervision where examiners conduct onsite examinations to verify and extract information, the responsibility for passing on information to the Bank of England rested solely with the banks.

7. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • For many years this system worked relatively well in a highly concentrated banking industry. • However, the system came under stress when the number of banks increased as a result of the creation of so-called secondary banks and the influx of foreign banks in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

8. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • The flaws of the informal system, which relied on information provided by management but without an independent assessment of the quality of bank portfolios and of the adequacy of provisions for possible loan losses, became apparent.

9. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • Gradually, the British authorities adopted a more legalistic approach to bank regulation and supervision that brought British practice closer to continental European practice.

10. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • The British authorities effectively delegated on-site inspections to external auditors by strengthening the reporting requirements of banks' auditors to the Bank of England.

11. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • Steps were also taken to improve the off-site surveillance capability of the Bank of England.

12. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • For the informal approach to be effective, the U.K. experience would seem to suggest that several key conditions must exist: • a small number of banks, • a strong central authority, • a tradition of close cooperation between government and industry as well as close personal relationships between bankers and supervisors,

13. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • a highly skilled work force, • effective management systems within the banks themselves, • strong auditing and accounting practices, and full disclosure to ensure market discipline.

14. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • Even then, dishonest or fraudulent management could deceive bank supervisors and cause irreparable damage to an institution.

15. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • This system of informal supervision left a legacy of "hands-off" bank supervision in many former British colonies, which made them ill-prepared for the problems of banking in a developing environment.

16. Bank Supervision in Britain (Contd.) • While this does not appear to have created difficulties in some countries, problems have emerged in many other Commonwealth countries in Africa and Asia where indigenous banks were promoted to compete against the hitherto dominant role of foreign banks.

17. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe • The model of bank supervision found in continental European countries is based on a legalistic approach that stipulates various ratios that the banks must observe but delegates the on-site examination of banks and the verification of their records to external auditors.

18. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe (Contd.) • In Belgium, special auditors are appointed and paid by the authorities. • In Switzerland, the auditors are licensed by the Federal Banking Commission and are subject to special statutory duties.

19. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe (Contd.) • In Germany, general auditors perform the examinations of banks and must inform the authorities if they discover facts that justify the qualification of an audit.

20. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe (Contd.) • However, supervisors retain the right to examine a bank's books and carry out examinations at any time. • In each of these countries, the supervisors have established detailed rules concerning the form and content of the auditors' reports.

21. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe (Contd.) • Delegating on-site bank examinations to external auditors effectively represents the privatization of the inspection process, although under strict government rules and guidelines.

22. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe (Contd.) • There are several advantages to this approach. • Auditing firms may escape the resource and salary constraints that often prevent supervisory authorities, and governments generally, from employing and retaining highly skilled staff.

23. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe (Contd.) • Moreover, auditors may achieve operating economies by combining a prudential inspection with ordinary accounting audits.

24. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe (Contd.) • However, this approach also raises some concerns. • There are risks that if not properly structured and controlled, auditors may be placed in potentially conflicting roles with dual loyalties to both the banks and the government, particularly in cases where the auditors are permitted to undertake other work.

25. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe (Contd.) • In addition, there is a concern that, in their efforts to control costs and maximize profits, auditors may not devote sufficient resources to ensure proper performance of the audit.

26. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe (Contd.) • The appropriate modality for on-site inspection, that is, supervisors or auditors, for any particular country ultimately depends on an evaluation of which group is best able to perform the on-site verification function.

27. Bank Supervision in Continental Europe (Contd.) • Factors to be evaluated include skills, competence, experience, and independence from political and other influence. This evaluation is best performed on a case-by-case basis.

28. Bank Supervision in the United States • Bank supervision in the United States exemplifies the formal approach to supervision that requires an active, on-site presence to verify conditions existing within banks. • In the U.S. model, periodic onsite examinations have been the cornerstone of the supervisory process.

29. Bank Supervision in the United States (Contd.) • The American approach is justified by the large number of small banks and on unit banking within particular states, both of which result from restrictions on geographic expansion.

30. Bank Supervision in the United States (Contd.) • Whereas the concentrated banking systems of the European countries internalize most of the costs of policing branches and losses are dispersed at the branch level, in the American banking structure, policing costs are incurred to a much greater extent by the regulatory agencies, while bank losses are covered to a greater extent through formal deposit insurance schemes.

31. Bank Supervision in the United States (Contd.) • U.S Unlike countries where the authorities rely on outside experts, bank supervisors in the United States must themselves possess the skills to evaluate asset quality and other areas of a bank's activities.

32. Bank Supervision in the United States (Contd.) • The more than 14,000 banks supervised by U.S. regulators is a major reason that a formal approach to supervision has been required.

33. Bank Supervision in the United States (Contd.) • It also explains the adoption of the CAMEL rating system and the use of the Uniform Bank Performance Report. • The CAMEL rating quantifies a supervised institution's condition in five critical areas and assigns an overall composite rating, while the Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) is a statistical analysis of bank performance that is based on data from quarterly prudential reports.

34. Bank Supervision in the United States (Contd.) • This report compares and ranks each bank against its peers. • There are twenty-five peer groups, bringing together institutions with similar characteristics. • In the latest stage of technological advance, expert systems are being used to analyze prudential reports and generate written comments.

35. Bank Supervision in Pakistan • State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) which is the Central Bank of the country has been interalia entrusted with the responsibility for an ongoing effective supervision of the banking sector.

36. Bank Supervision in Pakistan (Contd.) • Health of an economy depends on the degree of safety and stability of its banking and financial system. A sound, stable and robust banking and financial system is a pre-requisite for economic well being of a country and its populace.

37. Bank Supervision in Pakistan (Contd.) • The banking supervision departments viz. Banking Policy and Regulations Department (BP&RD), • Banking Surveillance Department (BSD), • Off-Site Supervision and Enforcement Department (OSSED) and • Banking Inspection Department (BID) have been assigned this important function to work jointly and severally to ensure the soundness of individual banks and of overall banking industry.

38. Bank Supervision in Pakistan (Contd.) • The Banking Surveillance Department is responsible to supervise financial institutions in the country. The department ensures effective adherence to regulatory and supervisory policies, monitors risk profiles, evaluate operating performance of individual banks/DFIs and the industry as a whole while issuing guidelines for managing various types of risks

39. Bank Supervision in Pakistan (Contd.) • It also ensures that banks are adequately capitalized and have policies and systems in place to assess various risks. The department is also responsible for the implementation of the Basel II Accord in Pakistan.

40. Summary of this session • Examples of Bank Supervision Approaches • Bank Supervision in Britain • Bank Supervision in Continental Europe • Bank Supervision in United States • Bank Supervision in Pakistan

41. THANK YOU