'Vincent conitzer' presentation slideshows

Algorithms for solving two-player normal form games

Algorithms for solving two-player normal form games. Tuomas Sandholm Carnegie Mellon University Computer Science Department. Recall: Nash equilibrium. Let A and B be | M | x | N | matrices. Mixed strategies: Probability distributions over M and N

507 views • 31 slides

CPS 296.3 Auctions & Combinatorial Auctions

CPS 296.3 Auctions & Combinatorial Auctions. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. A few different 1-item auction mechanisms. English auction: Each bid must be higher than previous bid Last bidder wins, pays last bid Japanese auction:

383 views • 28 slides

Risk attitudes, normal-form games, dominance, iterated dominance

Risk attitudes, normal-form games, dominance, iterated dominance. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. Risk attitudes. Which would you prefer? A lottery ticket that pays out $10 with probability .5 and $0 otherwise, or A lottery ticket that pays out $3 with probability 1 How about:

398 views • 18 slides

CPS 196.2 Proper scoring rules

271 views • 15 slides