'Truthful mechanism' presentation slideshows

Market Design and Analysis Lecture 4

Market Design and Analysis Lecture 4. Lecturer: Ning Chen ( ?? ) Email: ningc@ntu.edu.sg. Last Lecture. 2. Revenue Consideration. Question: For first price and second price auction, which generates more revenue?

618 views • 50 slides

On Scheduling Mechanisms : Theory, Practice and Pricing

490 views • 39 slides

Truthful Mechanism Design for Multi-Dimensional Scheduling via Cycle Monotonicity

507 views • 39 slides

Algorithms for Incentive-Based Computing

475 views • 36 slides

Truthful Mechanism Design for Multi-Dimensional Scheduling via Cycle Monotonicity

436 views • 35 slides

Mechanisms with Verification

431 views • 32 slides

SECOND PART on AGT: Algorithmic Mechanism Design

SECOND PART on AGT: Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Game Theory vs Mechanism Design (in poor words).

325 views • 32 slides

SECOND PART on Non-cooperative Networks: Algorithmic Mechanism Design

SECOND PART on Non-cooperative Networks: Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Game Theory vs Implementation Theory (in poor words).

321 views • 32 slides

Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions

Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions. Lei Wang Georgia Institute of Technology Joint work with Gagan Goel Chinmay Karande Google Georgia Tech.

322 views • 24 slides

Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions

Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions. Lei Wang Georgia Institute of Technology Joint work with Gagan Goel Chinmay Karande Google Georgia Tech.

247 views • 24 slides

Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks

Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks. Carmine Ventre Joint work with Paolo Penna University of Salerno, WP2. Wireless transmission. Power(i)= d(i,j) ? = range(i) ? , ?>1 (empty space ? = 2 )

327 views • 21 slides

Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers

Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers. Saeed Alaei University of Maryland e-mail: saeed@cs.umd.edu. Introduction. We want to allocate items (heterogeneous) to buyers.

245 views • 16 slides

Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University

Mechanism design for computationally limited agents (previous slide deck discussed the case where valuation determination was complex). Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University. Part I Mechanisms that are computationally (worst-case) hard to manipulate.

257 views • 15 slides

Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University

Mechanism design for computationally limited agents (previous slide deck discussed the case where valuation determination was complex). Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University. Part I Mechanisms that are computationally (worst-case) hard to manipulate.

158 views • 15 slides

Computational Criticisms of the Revelation Principle

Computational Criticisms of the Revelation Principle. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm AMEC V. The revelation principle. The revelation principle states that for any mechanism, there is another truthful, direct revelation mechanism that:

105 views • 10 slides