'Stable match' presentation slideshows

The Boston Mechanism Reconsidered. Papers. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Che Yeon-Ko and Yasuda Yosuke “Resolving Conflicting Interests in School Choice: Reconsidering The Boston Mechanism”,. Miralles 2008. "School choice: the case for the Boston Mechanism“

Matching Markets. Jonathan Levin Economics 136 Winter 2010. National Residency Match. Doctors in U.S. and other countries work as hospital “residents” after graduating from medical school. In the US, about 15,000 US med students and many foreign-trained doctors seek residencies each year.

Matching Markets. Jonathan Levin Economics 136 Winter 2010. National Residency Match. Doctors in U.S. and other countries work as hospital “residents” after graduating from medical school. In the US, about 15,000 US med students and many foreign-trained doctors seek residencies each year.

Matching and Market Design. Algorithmic Economics Summer School, CMU. Itai Ashlagi. Topics. Stable matching and the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) Kidney Exchange. The US Medical Resident Market. Each year over 16,000 graduates form US medical schools.

September 25, 2007. Reorganization in Matching Markets The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiment - John H Kagel and Alvin E Roth. Presentation for: MGT 703: Experimental Economics. What’s so special about March 15, 2007?.

Matching Markets. Jonathan Levin Economics 136 Winter 2010. National Residency Match. Doctors in U.S. and other countries work as hospital “residents” after graduating from medical school. In the US, about 15,000 US med students and many foreign-trained doctors seek residencies each year.

Matching Markets. Jonathan Levin Economics 136 Winter 2010. National Residency Match. Doctors in U.S. and other countries work as hospital “residents” after graduating from medical school. In the US, about 15,000 US med students and many foreign-trained doctors seek residencies each year.