'Repeated game' presentation slideshows

Unit III: The Evolution of Cooperation

Unit III: The Evolution of Cooperation. Can Selfishness Save the Environment? Repeated Games: the Folk Theorem Evolutionary Games A Tournament How to Promote Cooperation/Unit Review. 4/9. 7/28. 4/14. Repeated Games. Some Questions: What happens when a game is repeated?

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Unit III: The Evolution of Cooperation

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CHAPTER 13 OUTLINE

CHAPTER 13 OUTLINE. 13.1 Gaming and Strategic Decisions 13.2 Dominant Strategies 13.3 The Nash Equilibrium Revisited 13.4 Repeated Games 13.5 Sequential Games 13.6 Threats, Commitments, and Credibility 13.7 Entry Deterrence 13.8 Auctions. 13.1. GAMING AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS.

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M9302 Mathematical Models in Economics

Lecture 4. 07.04.2011. M9302 Mathematical Models in Economics. 2.5.Repeated Games. Instructor: Georgi Burlakov. Repeated Games. The aim of the forth lecture is to describe a special subclass of dynamic games of complete and perfect information called repeated games

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CHAPTER 13 OUTLINE

CHAPTER 13 OUTLINE. 13.1 Gaming and Strategic Decisions 13.2 Dominant Strategies 13.3 The Nash Equilibrium Revisited 13.4 Repeated Games 13.5 Sequential Games 13.6 Threats, Commitments, and Credibility 13.7 Entry Deterrence 13.8 Auctions. 13.1. GAMING AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS.

623 views • 42 slides

CHAPTER 13 OUTLINE

CHAPTER 13 OUTLINE. 13.1 Gaming and Strategic Decisions 13.2 Dominant Strategies 13.3 The Nash Equilibrium Revisited 13.4 Repeated Games 13.5 Sequential Games 13.6 Threats, Commitments, and Credibility 13.7 Entry Deterrence 13.8 Auctions. 13.1. GAMING AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS.

490 views • 42 slides

CHAPTER 13 OUTLINE

CHAPTER 13 OUTLINE. 13.1 Gaming and Strategic Decisions 13.2 Dominant Strategies 13.3 The Nash Equilibrium Revisited 13.4 Repeated Games 13.5 Sequential Games 13.6 Threats, Commitments, and Credibility 13.7 Entry Deterrence 13.8 Auctions. 13.1. GAMING AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS.

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Lecture 6 Reputation

Lecture 6 Reputation.

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3.2.2. Dynamic Games of complete information: Backward Induction and Subgame perfection

3.2.2. Dynamic Games of complete information: Backward Induction and Subgame perfection - Repeated Games -. Outline. 3.1. What is a Game ? 3.1.1. The elements of a Game 3.1.2 The Rules of the Game: Example 3.1.3. Examples of Game Situations 3.1.4 Types of Games

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Evolution and Repeated Games

Evolution and Repeated Games. D. Fudenberg (Harvard) E. Maskin (IAS, Princeton). Theory of repeated games important central model for explaining how self-interested agents can cooperate used in economics, biology, political science and other fields. But theory has a serious flaw:

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Lecture Notes II- 2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information

Lecture Notes II- 2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information. Extensive Form Representation (Game tree) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Repeated Games Trigger Strategy. Dynamic Games of Complete Information. Dynamic game with complete information

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Game Theory Lecture 7

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Game Theory Sequential bargaining and Repeated Games

Game Theory Sequential bargaining and Repeated Games. Univ. Prof.dr. M.C.W. Janssen University of Vienna Winter semester 2010-11 Week 46 (November 14-15). Sequential Bargaining. Ultimatum game is a sequential bargaining game with one round. SPE we know

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Repeated Interaction and Reputation Effects

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M9302 Mathematical Models in Economics

Lecture 4. 07.04.2011. M9302 Mathematical Models in Economics. 2.5.Repeated Games. Instructor: Georgi Burlakov. Repeated Games. The aim of the forth lecture is to describe a special subclass of dynamic games of complete and perfect information called repeated games

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The Role of Commitments in Repeated Games

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Repeated games

Repeated games. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. Repeated games. In a (typical) repeated game, players play a normal-form game (aka. the stage game ), then they see what happened (and get the utilities), then they play again, etc.

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CPS 296.1 Repeated games

CPS 296.1 Repeated games. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. Repeated games. In a (typical) repeated game, players play a normal-form game (aka. the stage game ), then they see what happened (and get the utilities), then they play again, etc.

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1. Reputation

1. Reputation. In a repeated game, establish a reputation for taking a particular action (cooperate, keep prices high, start price wars with entrants)

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