'Player 1 plays' presentation slideshows

Virtual bargaining as a micro-foundation for social behaviour

Virtual bargaining as a micro-foundation for social behaviour. Nick Chater (with Tigran Melkonyan Jennifer Misyak & Hossam Zeitoun ) Behavioural Science Group. TOPIC OVERVIEW. Nash equilibria: Too many or too few? Weakly feasible equilibrium: Expanding the set of equilibria

680 views • 54 slides

Course administration

Course administration. Tirgul : will be held every only after exercise submission. Teaching Assistant : Liri Finkelstein, lirifink@gmail.com Exercises : four exercises. Each one is 8% of the final grade.

488 views • 42 slides

Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria

282 views • 18 slides

CPS 296.1 Extensive-form games

CPS 296.1 Extensive-form games. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. Extensive-form games with perfect information. Players do not move simultaneously When moving, each player is aware of all the previous moves ( perfect information )

418 views • 17 slides

CPS 296.1 Extensive-form games

CPS 296.1 Extensive-form games. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. Extensive-form games with perfect information. Players do not move simultaneously When moving, each player is aware of all the previous moves ( perfect information )

173 views • 17 slides

CPS 296.1 Extensive-form games

CPS 296.1 Extensive-form games. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. Extensive-form games with perfect information. Players do not move simultaneously When moving, each player is aware of all the previous moves ( perfect information )

173 views • 17 slides

Algorithms for solving two-player normal form games

Algorithms for solving two-player normal form games. Recall: Nash equilibrium. Let A and B be | M | x | N | matrices. Mixed strategies: Probability distributions over M and N If player 1 plays x , and player 2 plays y , the payoffs are x T Ay and x T By

144 views • 14 slides

Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs

Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs. Eilon Solan Tel Aviv University. Joint with: Dario Bauso, University of Palermo Ehud Lehrer, Tel Aviv University. Two players play a repeated game with vector payoffs which are d -dimensional.

98 views • 9 slides