'Combinatorial auctions' presentation slideshows

TAC - Trading Agent Competition

TAC - Trading Agent Competition. Trading Agent Competition. E-Commerce is expected to grow drastically in the future, presenting a multi-billion market. Auctions make a substantial part of this ever growing market. What can an agent do that I cannot?

827 views • 66 slides

Multi- item auctions & exchanges (multiple distinguishable items for sale)

Multi- item auctions & exchanges (multiple distinguishable items for sale). Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University. Read: Optimal Winner Determination Algorithms. Sandholm, T. 2006. Chapter 14 of the book Combinatorial Auctions,

596 views • 59 slides

Multi- item auctions & exchanges (multiple distinguishable items for sale)

Multi- item auctions & exchanges (multiple distinguishable items for sale). Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University. Example application: Winner determination in multi- item auctions.

565 views • 56 slides

Computation and Incentives in Combinatorial Public Projects

Computation and Incentives in Combinatorial Public Projects. Michael Schapira Yale University and UC Berkeley. Joint work with Dave Buchfuhrer and Yaron Singer. Take Home Messages. Combinatorial Public Projects are cool! More suitable arena for exploring truthful computation?

533 views • 41 slides

Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming

Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming. Ron Lavi California Institute of Technology Joint work with Chaitanya Swamy. Overview of the Talk. The model of Combinatorial Auctions Definition, motivation, challenges and goals, previous results. Our results

344 views • 34 slides

399 views • 28 slides

Truthfulness and Approximation

Truthfulness and Approximation. Kevin Lacker. Combinatorial Auctions. Goals Economically efficient Computationally efficient Problems Vickrey auction is hard Finding social optimum is hard Even just communicating your type is hard. Single Minded Bidders.

410 views • 25 slides

Super solutions for combinatorial auctions

342 views • 24 slides

Combinatorial auctions in theory and practice

365 views • 23 slides

COMP/MATH 553 Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture 8: Combinatorial Auctions & Spectrum Auctions

443 views • 23 slides

Multi- item auctions & exchanges (multiple distinguishable items for sale)

Multi- item auctions & exchanges (multiple distinguishable items for sale). Multi- item auctions. Auctioning multiple distinguishable items when bidders have preferences over combinations of items: complementarity & substitutability Example applications

370 views • 22 slides

An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions

An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA ; E-mail address: sandholm@cs.cmu.edu

321 views • 21 slides

Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations

Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations. Tuomas Sandholm Subhash Suri Andrew Gilpin David Levine Carnegie Mellon University University of California CombineNet Inc. Computer Science Department Santa Barbara Pittsburgh, PA

273 views • 18 slides

Game Theory

260 views • 17 slides

Optimization and Game Theory Models of E-Markets - A Survey

Optimization and Game Theory Models of E-Markets - A Survey. Harri Ehtamo. Systems Analysis Laboratory Helsinki University of Technology www.sal.tkk.fi. What is E-commerce ?. New commercial affairs arising: in the Internet through the use of various

107 views • 10 slides

Some overarching themes on electronic marketplaces

159 views • 8 slides