Automated mechanism design - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Regret Minimizing Equilibria of Games with Strict Type Uncertainty

Regret Minimizing Equilibria of Games with Strict Type Uncertainty. Stony Brook Conference on Game Theory Nathana ë l Hyafil and Craig Boutilier Department of Computer Science University of Toronto. Overview. 1. Motivation / Background Automated Mechanism design Strict Uncertainty

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Pingzhong Tang and Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University

Approximating optimal combinatorial auctions for complements using restricted welfare maximization. Pingzhong Tang and Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University. High-level contributions. New approach to mechanism design: “Social welfare with holes”

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312 views • 17 slides

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