Cultivation of SC at early stage of nuclear power development

1. Cultivation of SC at early stage of nuclear power development Regional Training Course on Transition to IMS Approach Supporting the Development of a Strong Safety CultureJiujiang City 8-12 November 2010 Albert Frischknecht Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI)

2. Objectives

3. Objectives

4. Objectives

5. What could happen?

6. Objectives Everybody working in design, construction, manufacturing, implementing and testing of components or systems for a nuclear power plant should know that • Nuclear is special; • His/her work and the quality of the work contribute to the safety of the nuclear power plant; • One failure in a component, system or service can have a negative effect on the functioning of the whole installation • A defect in the delivered product or service could have a tremendeous impact on the life of thousands and thousends of people, on the environment in several countries and the economy of a very large geographical area. Nuclear is different! nuclear is special! nuclear has no boundaries!

7. Objectives Everybody working in design, construction, manufacturing, implementing and testing of components or systems for a nuclear power plant should know that • There are points of no return in decisions made. Be conservative in decision making. Investigate all possible options. Don‘t rely blindly on experience. In the case of uncertainty: Stop-Think-Act-Review! irrespective of time, schedule, money! Nuclear is different! nuclear is special! nuclear has no boundaries!

8. Objectives The welder who is welding the parts of the containment has to know: This is not a ship, it is the containment of a NPP. If the body of the ship fails, maybe the life of several hunderd people is challenged. If the containment of an NPP fails in the case of a demand, the health and the life of thousands of people are threatended. The project team which is defining a safety injection system has to be aware: Our product is not a just a water delivery system, it is the safety injection system of an NPP. If a water delivery system fails, it may cause trouble for some people or may even injure some people. If the safety injection system of an NPP fails in the case of a demand, the health and the life of thousands of people are threatended. The financial manager of a new build project has to know: This is not a normal financial investment, it is an investment in an NNP and in it‘s safety. If the decision for an usual invsetment is wrong, some stockholders may be concerned or may loose theri money. If the financial decisions for an NPP project of for part of it are wrong, the health and the life of thousands of people are threatended. Nuclear is different! nuclear is special! nuclear has no boundaries!

9. Objectives Everybody working in design, construction, manufacturing, implementing and testing of components or systems for a nuclear power plant should know that • His/her work and the quality of the work contribute to the safety of the nuclear power plant • One failure in a component, system or service can have a negative effect on the functioning of the whole installation • A defect in the delivered product or service could have a tremendeous impact on the life of thousands and thousends of people, on the environment in many countries at the same time and on the economy or even economical survival of a very large geographical area. Nuclear is different! nuclear is special! nuclear has no boundaries!

10. Challenges: Lack of Knowledge • Knowledge on nuclear issues with the applicants may not exist, has to be build up. • Vendors and contractors have disappeared, have joined, have lost their knowledge. • Engineers with experience in the nuclear field are retiered or are working in an other disciplines. Nuclear is different! nuclear is special! nuclear has no boundaries!

11. Challenges: Long supply chains

12. Challenges: Globalisation • Vendor is in most cases in a different country than the site (different norms, different ways of collaboration) • Subcontractors are from all over the world • Multilingual situation on the construction site (communication). • Multicultural situation on the construction site (communication, safety culture). • Big amount of contractors to communicate with (coordination, safety culture).

13. Considerations Sound regulatory regime • Legal framework (nuclear law, nuclear ordinances, regulatory guidelines. In line with international requirements) • Independence (from public, media, policy, utilities, etc. Decisions based on technical considerations) • Competence (professionalism) • Authority (legal power) • Resources (human and financial) • Support (TSO, Universities...) • International network (regulatory bodies, international organizations) • Clear requirements (understandable) • Transparency (clear information paths and information criteria) • Credibility (accepted by public, nuclear installations, oponents) • Regulatory Body has a clear understanding and a clear Oversight Programme on Safety Culture. His expectations about dealing with Vendors and Contractors are clearly communicated.

14. Considerations Safety Culture Programmes for Owner (future Licensee), Vendor and Subcontractors • Owner takes full responsibility and acountability for the safety of it‘s future installation. • Owner is aware about the importance of a good Safety Culture. • Owner recruits for his top management a person with a deep understanding of Safety Culture to develop and maintain the Safety Culture Programme (advocatus diaboli???).. • Owner establishes his own view on Safety Culture. • Owner implements a sound Safety Culture fostering programme. • Owner contracts vendors / contractors that are willing to implement Safety Culture programme/training (Safety Culture is part of the contract). • Vendor agrees, to implement and to foster a Safety Culture Programme in it´s own Organization and in the Organization his soubcontractors. • Owner implements a surveillance programme in the area of Safety Culture for the vendors and his subcontractors.

15. IAEA-Documentation Safety Culture During Pre-Operational Phases The aim is to share experiences as well as develop a Safety Series Report which contains practical methods to improve safety culture during pre-operational phases. Schedule: Step 1: 2-6 of November 2009 CM Step 2: 1-4 of December 2009 CM Step 3: 15-19 of February 2010 CM Step 4: 31 of May – 4 of June 2010 TM Step 5: 13-17 September 2010 CS Step 6: 9-12 November 2010 Joint TM NS/NE Step 7: 5-9 September 2011 TM

16. IAEA-Documentation Target Groups: • Governments • Shareholders  • Main Contractors   • Sub-Contractors • Vendors /Manufacturers • Designers • Regulatory bodies • Operators (future licensee) • Owners • Technical support organizations • NEPIO’s

17. IAEA-Documentation The contributors of the Safety Report have represented a wide range of international experts as well as different types of expertise such as: • Nuclear engineering with experience of new builds • Nuclear engineering with experience of project management of larger scale • Regulatory oversight with experience of new builds • Project management with experience of nuclear turn key projects • Intercultural knowledge with experience of large international projects • Behaviour science with deep cultural knowledge • Behaviour science with deep knowledge of human and organisational factors

18. Nuclear is different! • nuclear is special! • nuclear has no boundaries!

19. ? ? ? Questions?