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Computer Forensics. Ryerson University February 16, 2005 S/Sgt. Paul Poloz, Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Current Posting. Integrated Cyber Intelligence Team Technological Crime Branch Technical Operations Directorate, HQ Royal Canadian Mounted Police Ottawa.
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Computer Forensics Ryerson University February 16, 2005 S/Sgt. Paul Poloz, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Current Posting Integrated Cyber Intelligence Team Technological Crime Branch Technical Operations Directorate, HQ Royal Canadian Mounted Police Ottawa
Staff Sergeant Paul Poloz • Graduated from Ryerson in 1989. • Uniform and plainclothes work for 6 years on the west coast • French language training • Peacekeeping mission in Haiti • Technological Crime Branch • Eight years experience • Computer forensics, tech crime investigations • Secondment to Ottawa Police Service • Secondment to National Child Exploitation Investigation Coordination Centre
Staff Sergeant Paul Poloz • Declared expert witness in criminal court and testified numerous times. • Lecture at the Canadian Police College and other venues on computer forensics and tech crime investigations. • Recently completed a part-time MBA at University of Ottawa
Topics Covered • Definition of computer forensics • Brief history of computer forensics • Computer forensic methodology • Incident response • Location of evidence • Continuity • Statements • Tech crime investigations • Case study
Definition of Computer Forensics • Computer Forensics deals with the preservation, identification, extraction and documentation of computer evidence. • New Technologies Inc. (NTI) Website. • Usually performed for judicial process. • Criminal • Civil • CF usually performed on data at rest
History of Computer Forensics • PC’s (introduction to late 1990’s) • Intel CPU based PC’s – non-standard hardware and software • FAT file system • Forensics done on DOS platform despite Windows OS • In- house RCMP utilities to facilitate file residue analysis, hard disk lock, file listing, drive duplication. • Limited searching capabilities • Multiple disk images made of original during forensic process • “Standalone” forensics
History of Computer Forensics • Mainframes and Mini’s • Not much demand for forensics • Limited usage • Limited access • Forensics done on ad-hoc basis, computer experts tasked by police
History of Computer Forensics • Late 1990’s saw the emergence of GUI based tools • Standardized hardware • Proliferation of file systems • Internet gaining in popularity • A variety of file systems processed under one platform • Many different vendors to choose from • The Internet, networking • Pieces of puzzle scattered
History of Computer Forensics • Image galleries • Sophisticated search capabilities • GREP subset, sound-alike, “fuzzy-searches” • Sorting, hashing (data – reduction) • Report generation • Data (file system and residue) stored and accessed as files • Data authentication (embedded hashes) • Sophisticated Scripting Languages
CF – Present State • New technology introduced at a rapid rate. Other technology gaining in popularity • LANs, wireless, RAID, SANs, • Remote storage technologies • OS’s with default encrypted filesystems. • Huge storage capacities • Data reduction techniques • Multiprocessor architecture • Linguistic issues • unicode
Objectives • Ensure that not one bit of data on a hard disk is altered. • Imaging techniques • Analyze all of the data. • Problems with large data sets • Encryption • Present the findings tailored to the intended audience. • Unbiased • Many people involved in the judicial system have limited knowledge of I.T.
File Residue • Many file systems contain file residue • Example FAT – deleted, hidden, bad clusters, file slack • Valuable evidence can be located • Wiping utilities prove to be problematic
Basic Forensic Process • Seize computer (may include on-site examination, write blocker?) • Remove hard disk from CPU chassis • Image acquisition • Analysis performed using image (unless for a quick triage) • Off-the-shelf products (SMART, Encase, FTK) • ILOOK • Linux • In-house utilities and solutions • Native O/S
Basic Forensic Process • Search for text (i.e. grep search) • Examine graphic images • Uncompress, undelete, decrypt, extract residue • Gather evidence • Create final report
Hazards of Using the Target O/S • A virus could destroy evidence. • Trojans/modified commands. • Dates associated to file may be altered. • File residue may be overwritten. • Altering evidence introduces doubt into the integrity of the data.
Tainting the process • Use of untrained personnel to perform the forensic examination. • Power-up the target computer. • Use the target computer’s operating system to open files and examine data. • Install software to the target hard disk. • Improper shut-down. • Continuity issues. • Data integrity issues
Case Study Number 1 • Hacker investigation • Investigation in 2002 of a crime committed in 1996. • Phf exploit committed by perpetrator. BSD Unix platforms, with ISP’s as victims. • Gained access to password file (but not shadow password file). • Attempts were made to get pawwrod hashes. • Investigation involved seizing old BSD backup tapes from 3 locations.
Case Study Number 1 • Forensics done on Linux platform • Use of special utilities to determine tape format • Search Internet for appropriate restore software • Evidence copied to CDROM then processed on Window platform.
Case Study Number 2 - Predator • IRC chat room. • Identify targets of local jurisdiction • Engage supect • Assess suspect’s culpability • Ascertain if offence is/ or will be commited. • Search warrant (dial-up account) • Set-up meeting and surveillance • Meet suspect and gather RPG to search residence.
Case Study Number 2 - Predator • Arrest suspect and hold in custody • Execute search warrant and seize exhibits • On-site examination for RPG and determine severity of offence (evidence for Show Cause). • Process suspect. • Forensic processing at lab
Cyber Crime Incident Response • What is an incident? • Computer as a target • Unauthorized access • Mischief to data • Port Scans? • Computer as a tool • Threats • Hate Crime • Child Pornography • Fraud, etc
Incident Response* • Educate users to raise security awareness • Build a centralized incident reporting centre • Establish escalation procedures • Ensure that service-level agreements include provisions for security compliance • Decide in advance under what circumstances you’d call the police • Establish communication procedures should this become a media event.
Incident Response* • Is threat external or internal to company • Will event be reported to the police? • Your initial actions can make or break the case • Call police as soon as possible. • Lots of gray areas • Management may not want police involvement • Incident may be trivial • Incident may be civil
Incident Response* • Detect incident • Analyze the incident • Contain or eradicate the problem • Provide workarounds or fixes • Prevent re-infection • Log events • Preserve evidence • Conduct post-mortem and apply lessons learned * CIO cyberthreat response & reporting Guidelines
Incident Response • If management is undecided whether to involve police or not • Contain incident (take affected resources offline) • Observe and document machine state • Symptoms of incident • Unexplained processes • Etc
Incident Response • Preserve evidence • Log files, password file, other suspicious data • Original source (i.e. hard disk) is best evidence but copies often used. • Photograph or screen captures • Consider hashing of preserved files. • Gather evidence from those involved • Make detailed notes of everything you do • Write report so that non-technical personnel grasp the concepts, but be complete.
Documentation • Notes – made at the time of the incident while it is occurring. Record your actions as you’re doing them. The notes are for yourself but may be disclosable. • Statement – transcribe notes. Describe your actions with respect to incident. Used to aid investigators, and to refresh your memory. Plain language in as much detail as possible. • Report – comprehensive report of incident. May include information derived from other sources.
Evidence Handling Continuity is paramount • Must be able to convince a judge that evidence is accurate and wasn’t tampered with. • Locks and special lockers
Tech Crime Investigation • Distributed Denial Of Service case study. • Fictitious but entirely plausible • A Toronto based company with a web presence experiences server performance problems. Service degraded to the point where there is a loss of business. • Sys-admin reviews logs and notices large amounts of traffic from multiple IP addresses. • Police notified. • Several log entries show traffic coming from the same IP address.
Tech Crime Investigation • Several IP addresses are identified by sys-admin and police as being suspect. • Traceroute, whois, DNS look-up etc traces IP to an ISP in Calgary. • Police contact ISP and are given Vancouver as the geographical location of the subscriber. • Investigation continues with assistance of local police force. A search warrant for subscriber information is executed on the ISP.
Tech Crime Investigation • In compliance with the search warrant the subscriber’s name, address, credit card number, and usage history are given to police. • Surveillance and computer checks on the residence indicates that a man and woman reside there (Male subject is ISP subscriber). • Search warrant executed on the residence, computer seized, occupants questioned. Occupants deny involvement. • Forensics reveals Back Orifice Trojan on computer
Tech Crime Investigation • IP address responsible for Trojan is located. • Evidence linking the originator of the Trojan with DDOS is found. • IP address is administered by an ISP in Dallas. • FBI contacted and assist with a preservation order. FBI determines that suspect lives in Dallas. • MLAT request initiated by local authorities. • Subscriber details obtained via MLAT and given to Canadian authorities.
Tech Crime Investigation • FBI or Dallas Police assist by searching residence subject to MLAT request. • Interview of suspect, further investigation • Extradition request.
Additional resources • http://www.asrdata.com/SMART/ • Linux based Forensic Software • http://www.forensics-intl.com/ev-info.html • NTI website – good articles • http://www.dmares.com/maresware/linksto_forensic_tools.htm • “Mares Ware” excellent links • http://www.accessdata.com/Product04_Overview.htm • Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) – Windows platform • http://www.guidancesoftware.com • Encase – Forensic Software – Windows platform
Additional resources • www.linux-forensics.com • Information and links regarding Linux forensics • http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/sciencetech/publications.htm#publicationcollections • First responders Guide • http://www.cio.com/research/security/incident_response.pdf • Incident response guidelines