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Airport Privatization in India: Lessons from Delhi and Mumbai PowerPoint Presentation
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Airport Privatization in India: Lessons from Delhi and Mumbai

Airport Privatization in India: Lessons from Delhi and Mumbai

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Airport Privatization in India: Lessons from Delhi and Mumbai

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  1. Airport Privatization in India:Lessons from Delhi and Mumbai Rekha Jain G Raghuram Rachna Gangwar

  2. Major Airports in India

  3. Indian Airports • 449 airports/airstrips in the country • 126 airports managed by AAI • 13 international • 85 domestic • 28 civil enclaves at defence airfields Source: Annual Report 2005-06, Ministry of Civil Aviation

  4. Airport Privatization: Earlier Non-AAI Airports • Cochin • Government of Kerala (35%) • Investor Directors and Relatives (37%) • Public and NRIs (14%) • Central PSU (AI, BPCL) (7%) • Commercial Banks (6%) • Facility Providers (AI, BPCL, SBT) (1%) Source: Secretary, MoCA

  5. Airport Privatization: Earlier Non-AAI Airports • Bangalore • Karnataka State Investment and Industrial Development Corporation (13%) • AAI (13%) • Siemens Projects (40%) • Larsen & Toubro (17%) • Unique Zurich Airport (17%) Source:

  6. Airport Privatization: Earlier Non-AAI Airports • Hyderabad • Government of Andhra Pradesh (13%) • AAI (13%) • GMR Group (63%) • Malaysia Airports Holdings Berhad (11%) Source:

  7. Privatization of Delhi and Mumbai • Early Steps and Scope • Transaction Agreement • Pre and Post Bid Events • Scoring and Rescoring Criteria/Factors • Criterion for GMR’s Choice • Bid Specific and Other Issues • Lessons Learned • Post Bid Issues

  8. Privatization of Delhi and Mumbai: Early Steps

  9. Airport Traffic in India [Source: India Infrastructure, 2006; MoCA, Various Years]

  10. Share of Delhi and Mumbai Airports (2003-04) Percent Source: Ministry of Civil Aviation

  11. Capital Expenditure (Mandatory) Rs bn

  12. Scope • Number of passengers (Mumbai): Around 50 million by 2025 • Number of passengers (Delhi): Around 46 million by 2025, 87 million by 2040 • Cargo (Delhi) : 1.5 mn tonnes 2025 • Cargo (Mumbai) : 1.4 mn tonnes cargo 2025 • Aircraft Movements (Delhi): 420,000 • Aircraft Movements (Mumbai): 525,000

  13. Transaction Agreement • Transaction governed by Operations Management and Development Agreement (OMDA) • 30-year concessions agreement with a further 30-year option • A mandatory Capital Expenditure program with key projects to be completed by March 2010 • Massive liquidated damages for non-compliance • A series of objective and subjective service standards to be adhered to

  14. Transaction Agreement • Aeronautical charges currently as per AAI rates. In future, an independent regulator (AERA) will decide • Limiting the use of land for non-Aero purposes to 5% in Delhi and 10% in Mumbai • Minimum non aeronautical revenue 40% • Retention of all staff initially and then of a significant number even after 3-years • ATC would still be under the control of AAI/DGCA • First right of refusal, if within 10% of best bid for a second airport within 150 km

  15. Aero Related Commercial (Other) Cargo handling Real estate development Aircraft refueling Hotel, business and industrial parks Aircraft maintenance Retail and entertainment, residential Catering services Airport Operator Revenue Streams Non-Aeronautical Aeronautical Commercial (Terminal) Landing charges Advertising fee Revenue from concessionaires Parking charges Rental from airlines, business, shops Passenger service fee Car parking, public admission fee [Source: Communication from GMR, 2006]

  16. Pre Bid Events(May 2004–September 2005)

  17. Pre Bid Events(May2004–September 2005) • Transaction documents consisted of • Operation Management and Development Agreement (OMDA) • Lease Deed (LD) • Shareholders Agreement (SHA) • State Support Agreement (SSA) • State Government Support Agreement (SGSA) • Substitution Agreement (SA)

  18. Pre Bid Events Overview of Transaction Structure [Source: AAI, 2005a]

  19. Pre Bid Events(May 2004–September 2005) Original Bidders • Bharti-Changi • pulled out citing stiff performance conditions in the transaction documents • L&T-Piramal-Hochtief • pulled out citing stiff performance conditions in the transaction documents • Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP • GMR-Fraport • GVK-ACSA

  20. Pre Bid Events(May 2004–September 2005) Original Bidders • Reliance-ASA • DS Construction-Munich • DLF-MANSB • dissolved itself, MANSB was invited to join the GMR-Fraport consortium • Essel-TAV • Videocon-Methven Corporation • Was rejected because the group had involved an airport consultant rather than an airport operator

  21. Pre Bid Events Bid Submission (September 14, 2005)

  22. Post Bid Events (September 2005 – January 2006)

  23. EC’s Report (November 21, 2005) Per cent [Source: Thakurta and Majumdar, 2005]

  24. Post Bid Events (September 2005 – January 2006)

  25. EC’sRevised Scoring Per cent [Source: GMR, 2006]

  26. Post Bid Events (September 2005 – January 2006)

  27. Post Bid Events (September 2005 – January 2006)

  28. Scoring Criteria/Factor

  29. Issues by GETE for Rescoring • Weightages were assigned to sub-factors equally. (The EC had assigned the weightages on a ‘subjective’ basis). • Since the non-OECD experience of ASA was only in airport development and not in operations, giving high marks to this was not in conformity with the RFP. (The EC had given 75% marks). • The marks for the current non-aeronautical revenue share of the bidders were rescaled to begin at 50% (from 75%) for the ‘required’ 40% share. • The marks for the proposed three year staff absorption share were rescaled to begin at 0% (from 50%) for the minimum 40% share.

  30. Staff Absorption Share 100 EC % Marks 50 GETE 0 40 100 Staff Absorption Share

  31. Non-aero Revenue Clause in RFP Sub-Criteria: Management Capability Criteria 1: Experience of the nominated airport operator (weightage: 25) 1.1.6 The performance of commercial operations at major airports managed by the airport operators, covering retail, property and other commercial operations, focusing on airports where non aeronautical revenues is 40% or more of total revenue. GETE Rescoring In sub-factor 1.1.6, the assessment of performance of commercial operations of major airports covering retail property and other commercial operations was to be done focusing on airports having non-aeronautical revenue of 40% or more of total revenue. Though non-aeronautical earnings of bidder ‘Reliance’ are only 37%, but they have been given 75% marks. This is considered to be in non-conformity of the RFP. The explanation of EC that wording of the Clause did not make the 40% mandatory is not convincing. In any case, since the non-aeronautical earnings of bidder A was less than the threshold limit of 40%, assigning a high score of 75% was not justified. This should have been of the order of 40% to 50%.

  32. GETE Rescoring (Delhi Airport)

  33. GETE’s Second Report (January 17, 2006) Per cent [Source: SC, 2006]

  34. EGoM’s Framework (January 24th, 2006) • GMR-Fraport is the only technically qualified bidder for both the airports • Financial bids of the top four technical bidders will be opened • GMR-Fraport is given the choice of selecting the airport subject to matching the highest financial bid since they are the only technically qualified bidder • The other airport (not chosen by GMR-Fraport) will be awarded to the highest financial bidder amongst three bidders. Government has declared technical cut-off marks of 50% for this airport

  35. Criteria for EGoM’s Framework • Speed of decision: Commonwealth Games • Timeliness of decision: Praful Patel’s commitment • Validity/robustness of current process (weaknesses in RFP, repeated three evaluations) • Unbiased approach • Potential for new bid content, other players • Political implications • Implications for future airports, other infrastructure

  36. Financial Bids (January 31, 2006) [Source: SC, 2006]

  37. Criteria for GMR’s Choice • Highest financial bid (Delhi: 45.99%, Mumbai: 38.70%) Revenue share increase for GMR (Delhi: 2.35%, Mumbai: 5.67%) • Impact on Reliance • GMR choosing Delhi: GVK gets Mumbai • By Choosing Mumbai: Reliance gets Delhi • Changes in the environment after September 14, 2005

  38. Criteria for GMR’s Choice (?) • Vacant land available (Delhi: 2723 acres, Mumbai: 56 acres) • Encroached/disputed land (Delhi: 91 acres, Mumbai: 200 acres) • Total Revenue 2003-04 (Delhi: Rs 4,089m Mumbai: Rs 4,376m) • Use of land for Non-Aero purposes (Delhi: 5% (253 acres), Mumbai: 10% (187.5 acres)) • Threat of traffic diversion from Mumbai airport due to upcoming Bangalore and Hyderabad Airports as well as due to proposal of second airport in Navi Mumbai • Runway layout (Delhi: nearly parallel, greater scope for simultaneous use, Mumbai: intersecting) • By 2025, Mumbai airport will be saturated as per the SH&E analysis • CAGR 1999-00 to 2003-04 (Delhi: 9.39%, Mumbai: 6.54%) • Ability to leverage commonwealth games in Delhi

  39. EGoM’s Decision (January 31, 2007) • After GMR-Fraport chose Delhi airport and matched the • highest bid of Reliance ASA, EGoM awarded • Delhi airport to GMR-Fraport • Mumbai airport to GVK-ACSA

  40. Subsequent Events

  41. Bid Specific Issues • Should the GETE report have been accepted, especially since it revises the Reliance score to below cut off? • Should GMR have been given a choice? Or should they have been given the airport where there would have been the best value for GoI on opening the financial bids? (GMR’s choice of Delhi airport effectively got Reliance out of the bid). • Should GMR, while being given the choice, be asked to match the highest financial bid? • What if the financial bid among the top four had been significantly higher than GMR’s?

  42. Bid Specific Issues • Should the “other” airport have been re-tendered? • Implications of rebidding? • For the “other” airport, should the opportunity to match the highest financial bid have been given in order of the technical rank rather than treating all above 50%/top 4 equally? • If a key criteria for the EGoM was to come up with a framework by which no winning bid for a specific airport should be known apriori, to avoid possible accusations of bias, then what choices did the EGoM have?

  43. Larger Issues • Was the RFP well thought out? • Was it OK for bidders to make contact with various committees/those involved? • Was lowering the cut off justified? • Were two re-evaluations justified?

  44. Larger Issues • Danger of over determination in the contractual parameters • Pool of bidders being restricted by requirements such as FDI caps, a foreign player having to be a constituent of the bid consortia, and limits on airline participation • Role of regulators, especially for tariff setting of aeronautical charges? • Implications for next round of bids, other sectors • Sustainability of the high revenue share (winning bids are in the 38-46% range, while the minimum was set at 5%)

  45. Lessons Learned • A lot of thought should be given to the RFP including • Bid structure • Parameters (eg integration between different terminals, other modes) • Weightages and Scoring • Obligations of bidders during the bid process • Transparency • Implications for those who had not bid • Constitution of EC and other Committees • Contingency plan: if none or one had qualified

  46. Lessons Learned • Norms during the bidding process need to be specified and complied with • Adherence to deadlines • responsibility of the bidders in identifying and bringing to notice deficiencies in the bid document during pre bid meetings • discretion on the part of bidders in independently communicating with sensitive stakeholders (decision makers, media etc) • deciding modifications in the evaluation by the EC, if essential, prior to opening of the bids

  47. Other Issues • Positive Mood of Privatization of Infrastructure – Central Government ; Commercial Capital and National Capital • Tired/Worn out: Further Modernisation not by Privatization • Centre vs State

  48. Other Two Metro Airports Decision on Chennai and Kolkata • Modernization will be undertaken by AAI • Funding through internal resources • Estimated modernization cost for • Chennai airport: Rs 20 bn • Kolkata airport: Rs 15 bn

  49. Post Bid Issues • DIAL vs MoCA on Architecture • Subsidiaries and then JVs for Commercial Development – Implications for Revenue Share • Cargo Free Time • MIAL – Encroachments, Responsibility? • Duty Free Retail Deal • New Airports – NOIDA, New Mumbai • Leveraging Business at Other Airports • Government Nominees on Board • Airport Development Fee Vs User Development Fee • Earnings for AAI • AERA Constituted

  50. DIAL vs MoCA on Architecture • GMR wanted to give the airport facade a red sandstone structure, much like the majestic Red Fort