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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, GAME THEORY AND POLITICS 2, POL SCI 130B, 67130

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, GAME THEORY AND POLITICS 2, POL SCI 130B, 67130 Lecture 2.3: DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK. Question for today : Since preferences are useless for representing choices under risk, what can we do in order to represent such choices meaningfully?.

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, GAME THEORY AND POLITICS 2, POL SCI 130B, 67130

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  1. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, GAME THEORY AND POLITICS 2, POL SCI 130B, 67130 Lecture 2.3: DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK Question for today: Since preferences are useless for representing choices under risk, what can we do in order to represent such choices meaningfully? Please list a few meaningful choices in your life: ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ Everything that matters in our lives is a lottery!

  2. CASE STUDY: ENFORCEMENT OF PRISON NORMS OF “DIRTY PHYSIOLOGY” • Farting • Defecation • Urination • Masturbation Main rule: Separation in time from eating Question: How to detect norm-breakers?

  3. THE FARTING DILEMMA WHAT WOULD YOU DO? Note: S - skunk; O - odorless; H - herald; U - go undercover. The “bad smell” factor is normalized at -1; “shame” factor is b≥0; “sanction” for detection of going undercover is s>0 and the probability of detection of going undercover p>0.

  4. THE FARTING DILEMMA (utility-maximizing decision) HERALD if and only if b ≤ qps ROOKIE OLD INMATE parameter big shame b small small sanction s big small detection prob p big small prob of skunk q big ROOKIE always goes undercover OLD INMATE always heralds

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