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Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks

Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks. Weijie Liu Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Contents. Part One: Simple introduction of Cognitive Radio Networks Part two: My work on a problem of Partial Spectrum Sharing in CRN. Introduction of Cognitive Radio Networks.

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Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks

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  1. Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks Weijie Liu Shanghai Jiao Tong University

  2. Contents • Part One: • Simple introduction of Cognitive Radio Networks • Part two: • My work on a problem of Partial Spectrum Sharing in CRN

  3. Introduction of Cognitive Radio Networks • Motivation: • to solve the problems of scarcity in spectrum resource and inefficiency in spectrum usage • DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS (DSA) • Definition： • a context-aware intelligent radio • capable of autonomous reconfiguration • learn from and adapt to the communication environment

  4. Standards of CR • IEEE 802.22 • ECMA 392 • IEEE 802.11AF

  5. 3 Models for DSA in CRN • DYNAMIC EXCLUSIVE USE MODEL • OPEN SHARING MODEL • HIERARCHICAL ACCESS MODEL:

  6. HIERARCHICAL ACCESS MODEL • primary users (PU) and secondary users (SU) (some networks with BS, SPS, agent ) • SU can make use of the spectrum licensed to PU opportunely

  7. Problems for CR Figure 2

  8. Spectrum Trading • The processes of selling and purchasing spectrum resource between PUs and SUs (sometimes agents, SPSs, operators involved) Spectrum Trading in CRN Figure 3

  9. Considerations in Spectrum Trading • Revenue of PUs • Utility of SUs • Welfares of all the entities

  10. Considerations in Spectrum Trading Not just economic problems ! • We also have to consider : • limited ability of equipments in PUs and SUs: less complex algorithms • are preferred • Capacity or throughput of the whole network: less overhead and • control message are required • In some multi-hop CR networks, some problems about geolocation, • such as the spatial reuse of spectrum, should be considered as well

  11. Considerations in Spectrum Trading • In short, Spectrum Trading • Business • Regulatory Policy • Technology Figure 4

  12. Approaches for studying Spectrum Trading • Economic approaches: Pricing, Auction, Contract…. • Game theories: Potential Game, Stochastic Game, Supermodel Game…. • Learning Algorithm

  13. Part Two My work on a problem on Partial Spectrum Sharing in Centralized CRN www.1kejian.com

  14. Motivation • Partial Spectrum Sharing • make full use of spectrum hole • Centralized CRN • More compatible with current systems • such as IEEE 802.22 • Limited equipment on PUs and SUs www.1kejian.com

  15. Centralized Hierarchical CRN • PUs, SUs, Primary Base Stations(PSs), Spectrum Policy Server(SPS) • Partial Spectrum Sharing of PBSs System Model

  16. Two PSs manage OWN spectrum (C1, C2) • A SPS manages a COMMON SHARED spectrum white space (C) with certain schemes like Auction • PSs can lease this part of spectrum by Biding Model of Partial Spectrum Sharing SPS C1 C C2

  17. Sealed First-price Auction • Step 1: The two PSs bid with respectively • Step 2: SPS acts as auctioneer to choose the PS with higher bidding price as the winner to utilize a part of or all of the spectrum

  18. System Model • : price , the bandwidth of the service • cost per unit of spectrum , bid • : Acceptance Probability • assume are constants • Demand Function www.1kejian.com

  19. Proof for Incentives of Partial Spectrum Sharing • Consider the situation of one PS • When , , the revenue of PS1 • Let the partial derivative , we have

  20. Proof for Incentives of Partial Spectrum Sharing • When , , the revenue of PS1 • Let the partial derivative , we have

  21. Proof for Incentives of Partial Spectrum Sharing • When , • If , the PS can achieve • more interests by utilizing the common shared spectrum. Thus, incentives for Spectrum Auction exist.

  22. Game Model • Payoff Function of • Assume that is uniformly distributed on

  23. Supermodular Game • Once is fixed, the best response can be derived from the first order derivative. So we can reduce the original game to find to a reduced problem of finding • We have , so this • Game is a Supermodular Game • Nash Equilibrium exists

  24. My Future Work • Extend this problem to multiple PSs other than a scenario with only 2 PSs • An efficient algorithm should be proposed • Consider more effective auction mechanisms 

  25. Thank you！ Weijie Liu Shanghai Jiao Tong University

  26. Q & A Weijie Liu Shanghai Jiao Tong University

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