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MH-17: Victory in Europe

MH-17: Victory in Europe. Victory In Europe- Strategic Overview. Germany’s Leadership & army’s quality/quantity decline: Logistics & re-supply almost non-existent By contrast - Allied capability & tactical/Ops skills rise: Quantity in all areas even more superior

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MH-17: Victory in Europe

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  1. MH-17: Victory in Europe

  2. Victory In Europe-Strategic Overview • Germany’s Leadership & army’s quality/quantity decline: • Logistics & re-supply almost non-existent • By contrast- Allied capability & tactical/Ops skillsrise: • Quantityin all areas even more superior • Logistics, $$$ resources & industrial capacityunmatched • Overall cumulative impact => wear Germans down • Air War: during 1944 (Feb-May) => Allied victory: • Allies forcefully defeat Luftwaffe => • Achieve air superiority & interdict German Logistics: • At the same time Allied air protects its Logistics

  3. Allied Advances- Strategic Overview • Sea Control established (inaddition to air superiority): • Amphibious landing at Normandy successful • Infantry advance (once established) unstoppable • Break-out from beachhead soon followed • Logistic/re-supply uninterrupted (Air & Navy protect) • Intel collect, analysis, & deception superior & exploited • Joint/combined military coordination much improved => • Especially between Anglo/American forces • Although rivalries continue to exists – example? • East & West advance on Both fronts => • Squeeze Germany ever more in the middle: • Actual penetration of Germany’s borders approaching • June 44: Russians cross into greater Germany from the East • March 45: Western Allies cross the Rhine

  4. Air War – US Defeat of Luftwaffe (1943-44) • BritishBomber Commandattacks on Berlin: • Encounter much difficulty & suffer high casualties • US 8th & 15th Air Force attack deep inside Germany: • Fighter escort provided by long range P-51s • US target focus of raids (Feb-May’44) => • German Aircraft industry • Battle of attrition ensues: • Both sides suffer high causalities

  5. Results of Strategic Bombing Raids • Raidsfail to achieve objective: • Stop Germany’s fighter product • German fighter production actually increases • But quality of fighter declines • Also forced to close other A/C production lines • German Air Defense (Night Fighters) weakens: • Suffer high casualties => Defense becomes unsustainable • By May’44 US owned the sky over Germany at night

  6. Air Support for Operation Overlord • Battlefield preparation: • By April=> Operation Overlord was ready • Air Marshall Tedder & the scientists SollyZuckermann designed a plan to isolate Normandy • Planning & preparation Aims: • Maintain secret logistic build-up & preparation • How? (Essential pre-condition to success of landings?) • Essential pre-condition to success of landings: • In addition to tactical surprise through effective OPSEC • Air Superioritythroughout Channel area =>why? • Allow allies to establish ?______________________(How?) • Through ?______________of enemy aircraft attempting to fly in

  7. Airmen Attitude Toward Overlord • Airmen attitude toward plan for OverlordAir support? • Air Marshall Harris? • ?______________- attempts to exploit Political concern of Fr civilian casualties • Ironic (given his outspoken support for area bombing) • General Spaatz? • Prefers to continue strikes on ?___________with shift to ?_____________ • Ike’s & Tedder’s response? • ?______________: • POL & interdiction of enemy transportation system • Zuckerman’s analysis addressing Harris’ objections? • Failed to take current ?______________ __________results now in effect • Airman eventually fell in line: • Transportation infrastructure interdiction successful • Air contribution key to allied victory in France: • Denied Germany its re-supply & re-enforcement capability

  8. Allied POL offensive • Luftwaffe staff also concludes their POL is a good allied target: • May’44 8th AF attack synthetic POL plants • Heavy allied causalities result • But ULTRA validates POL as a credible target: • Decryptedmessage traffic reveals negative German reaction • Germans redistribute air defense systems to protect POL • Impact: by late July: • German Aviation gas down by 98% • Air defense restricted & no air/ground training: why? • Not enough ?______________, Aircraft and ?______________

  9. Western Campaign – Italy (Oct 1943- June1944) • Allied drive stalled at Gustav Line by late ’43: • Allies attempt by-pass by amphibious landing at Anzio • Operation Shingle: • Planning & execution shortfalls • Also missed opportunity • Operational Objective: • Cut off German supplies • Force Germans to withdraw • MG Lucas’shesitation=> • Allowed Germans to shift from a vulnerable position & was soon relieved • Result: allies stalled & other attacks fail at high cost in CAS until May’44

  10. Allied Tactical Success • 11 May: Allied Offensive successful after 3 days: • Free French break-thru Gustav Line over Mountains to east • Other penetrations soon follow • VI Corps(w/new CMDR- MG Truscott) finally breaks out of Anzio: • Attacks German 10th Army who is forced to withdraw to North • LTG Mark Clark orders VI corps to turn NW to liberate Rome (5 June): • Clark thus allows 10th Army to escape • Reason: Politics, publicity, ego, and glory • Allies continue to press Germans who withdraw slowly North => • Fall back in fighting withdrawal to Gothic Line • Germans continue to resist by exploiting weather & mountainous terrain

  11. Normandy Invasion- Dieppe Lessons • Bitter lessons learned at port of Dieppe (Aug’42): • Failure of British commandos & Canadians teach Allies what? • Ports normally too well defended & just too hard • Dieppe’s failure applied to planning for second attempt at cross channel invasion: • Invasion requires extensive planning, logistics, OPSEC, & force • Over the beach invasion at unexpected spot more likely to succeed

  12. Normandy Order of Battle • Allies: 21st Army Group (Monty): • US 1st (Bradley) Army & • Brit 2nd (Dempsey) Army • 36 infantry + 3 Airborne Divisions (2.9Million troops) • 7000 ships, landing craft, & GFS • 12.8K aircraft (Air transport & CAS) • Germans: OB West (Rundstedt) • 7th & 15th Armies: • Armor Corps (reserve) • 58 Divisions (1.9 Million troops) • 561 ships • 919 Aircraft (many not operational)

  13. Normandy- Planning & Objectives • Plans & Objectives: • Major challenge for logistics planners? • Right mix of ammo & fuel (miscalculated at onset- how?) • Need more ?______initially and more ?______ later during break-out • Transportation & follow-on support & build-up needed • Operational Priorities & Considerations: • Essential to secure initial foot hold: • Secure foot hold needed for subsequent breakthrough attempt • Protect build-up by screening German response • Who is tasked to ensure above is accomplished? • 82nd & 101st Airborne Divisions • GermanDefensive Strategy (disunity over tactics): • 1. Rommel: stop Allies at beaches (static forward defense) • 2. Rundstedt: mobile defense (inflict high causalities) • Concentrate on main allied thrust • What factors would affect all of above the most?

  14. Friction, Battlefield Prep, & Execution • Friction: • Factors affecting both sides during landing include: • Weather & affects of tactical surprise=> in turn all impact: • Landing, CAS, & ABN ops • Battlefield preparation: • Allied air interdiction => secure protected zone for troop landings • Beach landing sites: • Numerous obstacles (courtesy of Rommel) • NCDUclearance ops (52% CAS & 7 Navy Crosses)

  15. Execution- at 0001 on 6 June 1944 • Airborne operations commence: • Objective: secure vital bridges in rear • Link up later with amphibious force • Para & glider troops widely spread out • 82nd & 101stmove to objectives at 1st light • Pre-dawn NGF & air strikes lift at 0600 • 0630: seaborne forces land across 5 beaches • British landings go generally IAW plan • But HQ adheres rigidly to plan’s timeline • Missed opportunity to take Caen early on • American landings: • Strong resistance met at Omaha Beach • Arty & small arms fire pin down 1st & 29th ID • By 1100 NGF make German barrages abate • Troops cross to dunes & establish footholds • By end of D-day: 155K troops landed • Allies established firmly on Continent

  16. Results • Allies establish new front • Steadily press Germans back • Ike’s Assessment of Normandy landings & later breakthrough: • Very difficult because: • Quality of German soldier • Superior German tactical skills • Nature of Northern France terrain • Thick hedgerows conceal threats • Weather (overcast skies- problem?) • Reduced visibility for Air support & CAS • Also key lost opportunities: • British over-caution preventing early capture of Caen on 1st day: • Rigid devotion to plan’s timeline over-rode tactical opportunity & ground truth

  17. Breakout - Operation Cobra • Allied attack concentrated on German defenses at St. Lo • Massive Air Strike (8th AF) to soften German defenses: • Friendly fire at front line: • Infantry pay heavy costs of this advance when bombs fall short • (LTG Lesley McNair killed by friendly air strikes) – why? • Inaccurate CAS on perpendicular run • (Bad weather blamed in part) • Key command changes: • Ike activates 12th Army Group (General Omar Bradley): • 1st Army(Hodges) • 3rd Army (Patton)

  18. Key Allied Penetration- Aug 1944 • Aug 1 Allies attack thru Avranches bottleneck: • Turn West to capture St. Malo, Brest, & Lorient: • Operational value of these objectives questioned • Soon ordered to turn East toward Mortain: • Hitler plans counter-attack: with Kluge leading it • Ultraalerts allies of threat to US 1st Army • Bradley preempts Kluge attempt to cut off US 1st • Allied airpower pound Germans throughout day • Kluge now vulnerable to Allied encirclement • About to be caught inFalaise Pocket- • What happens? • Missed opportunity: • Bradley & Monty fail to coordinate & close off gap in Falaise Pocket in time • Many Germans able to escape Falaise Pocket • 5th Panzer, 7th Army, & Panzer Group Eberbachescape to east to fight another day

  19. Allied Advance Toward the Rhine • Ike’s Original Plan: • Conduct supply build-up then proceed on broad front to Seine • But with stunning allied advances on the ground posed: • Key Question becomes: continue or halt? • 1. Factors for halting: allow Allies to re-supply & consolidate • 2. Factors for continuing: exploit current momentum • Next question: if decision is to proceed – then how? • Two options: ?_______________(original plan) orsingle ?_______________ • (Who was for the latter)? • Ike’s decision (29 Aug): • Original Plan?_______________ front until logistics run out • But extra weight (POL) given to 1st Army on Northern axis: • Result: 21st Army Group benefits at Patton’s 3rd Army’sPOL expense

  20. Tactical Objectives & Command Relations • Tactical Situation & Objectives: • 1. Montytake Antwerp & drive towardRuhr • 2. Bradley’s 12 AGis spread across the the front of theArdennes: • Hodgesdrives North whilePatton goes toeast Metz • Command Relationships: • 1 Sept: Ike assumes command of Ground Campaign • (Over Monty’s strong objections) • Both 21st Army Group & 12th Army Groups now report to directly to Ike

  21. Monty’s Complaints & Errors • Monty continues to complain about lack of adequate logistic support: • Proposed Bradley halt & divert his fuel • But Monty missed key opportunity at Antwerp • Opportunity tostrike decisive blow & go a long way to end war - what/how? • Failed to secureScheldt water way for enabling use of Antwerp as re-supply port: • Significance of this key missed opportunity-? • Logistics base to supply Allied advance • Monty advanced to Belgium & captured Brussels on 3 Sept 44: • 4 Sept Monty’s 11th Armor Div seized Antwerp in tact: • Monty ‘s failure to take Scheldt at Antwerp allowed 15th Army to escape to east & delay opening of forward resupply port at Antwerp • Monty was focused on what upcoming operation employing a single thrust across Rhine?

  22. Operation Market-Garden- Order of Battle • Tactical Sit & OOB: • Market (Air): 3 1/2 Corps: • 82nd, 101st, Poles 1st para, & British 1st ABN • Aircraft & glider force • Garden (Ground): • XXX Corps & misc. support • German Forces: • 11 SS Panzer Corps • Just redeployed to Arnhem • 9th SS Panzer Division • 10th SS Panzer Division • Student’s 1st Parachute Army • 15th Army(recently escaped from Holland)

  23. Plans & Objectives • Strategic & Operational Objectives: • 1. Shock Germany already on ropes out of war • 2. Conduct powerful strike into heart of Germany, then proceed to Ruhr Valley • Tactical Objectives: • Airborne forces secure key bridges to facilitate XXX corps strike: • 1.EindhovenBridge over lower canal • 2.SonBridge* over Wilhelmina Canal • 3. VeghelBridge over Zuit Willems Canal • 4. GravesBridge over Maas (Meuse) • 5. NijmegenBridge over Waal river • 6. Arnhem Bridge over lower Rhine

  24. Concept of Operations • Mission: • Market: conduct airborne assault into Germany • Secure 8 Bridge heads over 3 rivers & 4 canals until relieved • Garden: XXX Corps (LTG Horrocks) conduct thrust across lower Rhine • Relieve airborne forces within 2-3 days • Battlefield preparation: • Intelligence analysis: • LTG Browning (I ABN Corps) ignored panzersreported around Arnhem by his G-2 • General attitude: “don’t rock boat” • Monty threw caution to wind • Over optimism as momentum for op builds

  25. Airborne Targets: Execution Graves Nijmegen Son

  26. Execution (Arnhem): Intel & Friction • Brit 1st ABN dropped 6 miles from the objective (Bad aircrew advice) • Friction’s role:Murphy’s lawran against Allies: • Panzer SS Army soon arrived with superior fire power • Made holding key bridge by lightly armed airborne troops at Arnhem until relieved by XXX Corps highly unrealistic • XXX Corps64 miletransit to ETA at Arnhemunderestimated • 36 hour delay taking Nijmegen precluded timely arrival & relief • Lt Col Frost’s DSO citation describes his Battalion’s actions at Arnhem best

  27. Results & Analysis • Tactical defeat at a high cost • Sacrifice of good troops • 8000 out of 10,000 of 1ABN Div • Little to show for it (morale) • Severe consequences of over optimistic Cmdrs ignoringUltra, Photos & HUMIT • LTG Browning summed it up best: • Arnhem was “A Bridge too far”

  28. Collapse of GermanyAir contribution – 3 prongs: • 1. AM Tedder’s stressed unified & focused campaign: • Objective: German Transportation system • 2. AMHarris’sobjections: • Insisted strategic bombing of cities the best objective • Agreed to use Rail system as Aiming point compromise • 3. GenSpaatz argued for POL targets as primary: • Transportation as secondary targets • Result: Steady then rapid decline of German transport system: • Distribution of coal cut off from rest of Germany • No means of transporting out of Ruhr Valley

  29. Battle of the Bulge- Order of Battle • Background: • Impact of successful air campaign: • Logistics & POL cut off by allied air • Germanys’ industrial economy collapsing • Forces desperate measures • Hitler’sbig gamble: Surprise counter-offensive • Order of Battle: • Army Group B (FM Model) => • 500K troops & armor: • 5th & 6th Panzer Army & 7th Army • US 12th Army Group (Gen Bradley) • 655K troops, armor, & air support • US 1st & 3rd Armies & • 82nd & 101st ABN as strategic reserve

  30. Plans & Objectives: “Wacht am Rhein” • Strategic, Operational, & tactical Objectives: • 1. Antwerp – split allies & capture key allied re-supply point • 2. Capture fuel dumps to allow advance (!) • Concept of Operations: (Map) • Battlefield preparation: • Concentration behind Ardennes forest (extreme OPSEC): • SOF invade behind US frontlines • Capture key choke points • Spread confusion in allied rear Dietrich Manteuffel Brandenberger

  31. Execution • Germans achieve operational & tactical surprise: • Initial tactical success –with mixed results later • Strong initial US resistance at weak points delay German advance • Eisenborn Ridge, St. Vith, & later- Bastogne • Isolated units perform heroically • Allies don’t panic & counter-attack effectively • Allied cooperation superb & well coordinated • 101st hold Bastogne • BG McAuliffe: “Nuts” to surrender • Patton’s 3rd Army relieves Bastogne

  32. Offensive Stalls &Bulge Results • Germans halted well short of objectives • Most forward SS Panzer units are cut off from their LOCs • Weather clears- allied air attacks • Germans lose the tactical & operational initiative • Just one column of 5th PZ reaches Meuse at Dinant (eve of 24 Dec) • Allied air & ground soon force German retreat: • By mid-Jan Allies push line back • German casualties: 100K • Strategic impact: No more Reserves • Allied casualties: 82K (15K POWs)

  33. Germany- Collapsein the East • Soviets launch two offenses during same period: • 1st Belorussian& 1st Ukrainian Fronts => • Breakthrough between Warsaw & Carpathian mountains • Central portion of Eastern Front • In the North => 2nd & 3rdBelorussian Fronts attack => • East Prussia & Pomerania

  34. The Hitler Factor • Factors hindering German Commanders: • Hitler’s interference with Operational decisions => • Create confusion & undermine Ground Commander’s initiative • Results in disaster for Germans Forces: • Germans become rapidly overrun & surrounded • Survivors scramble West in desperate retreat • Soviets invade & exact harsh revenge on Germans

  35. Germany- Collapse in the West (Jan-Feb 1945) • Germany’s defenses unravel at rapid pace • Patton’s 3rd Army & Hodge’s 1st race east to Rhine • Soon cross Rhine into Germany • Monty finally is ready • Breaks thru in North • Combines w/American advance south of Ruhr: • Germany’s situation becomes hopeless

  36. Final Collapse • By April 1, 1945: • Model’s Army Group Bencircled within Ruhr: • Only scattered pickets of Nazi fanatics left to oppose advance • German troops surrender in droves • Soviet forces press toward allies w/German in middle • 25 April: Soviets & US units toast each other on Elbe: • Germany is now cut in half with no where to go • 30 April: Hitler commits suicide as Russian press in • WWII in Europe is over

  37. WWII: Assessment • Germany simply out manned and outgunned: • More significantly: out supplied (logistics) • Fighting major industrial or more populous foes: • (US, Britain, USSR) • US could out produce all combined • Allied Air=> destroys Ger. transport system by late’44 • Germany war economy simply collapsed • w/o POL => Luftwaffe can’t fly & tanks can’t move • No tactical or operational mobility to fight • Allied #s overwhelm Germans on both East & West fronts: • Hitler compounded problems by “rudder orders” from rear • His tactical, operational, strategic direction made bad sit. worse • Esp. by refusal to allow Cmdrs to withdraw soon to be encircled • Hitler contributed much to their Army’s destruction • NTL => Hitler’s iron will forces fight to bitter end

  38. WWII: Assessment- 2 • Wehrmacht’s tactical/op skills prevail in early years: • But soon=> German leadership & tactical/op skills decline • In contrast, allies leaders, Op/Tactical skills improve • Allies learn hard & bitter lessons well • All above surpassed by allied #s & logistic superiority • Allied firepower & industrial capacity only grows w/time • Allied integration of infantry, tanks, arty & air excellent: • Impact: extends allied power projection capability • Makes invasion at Normandy & breakthrough possible • Momentum gathers & makes drive to Germany unstoppable

  39. WWII: Assessment- 3 • Joint-combined ops very effective under Ike’s leadership • Excellent coalition builder as supreme allied commander • Allied Intel (Ultra) & effective deception ploys: • Exploited German mistakes to seize opportunities • Patton’s “paper army” in London concern to OKW • Impact: tied down German Reserves during invasion • Gave false indication of allied landing at Calais; • Costs of WWII- in addition to soldiers: • WWII killed 10s of millions of innocent people: • 50-60 million died & great material damage inflicted • Also set stage for 45 more years of Cold War

  40. Back-up Slides

  41. Breakout - Operation Cobra • Allied attack concentrated on German defenses at St. Lo • Massive Air Strike (8th AF) to soften German defenses: • Friendly fire at front line: • Infantry pay heavy costs of this advance • (LTG Lesley McNair killed by friendly air strikes) – why? • Inaccurate CAS • (Bad weather blamed in part) • Key command change: • Ike activates 12th Army Group (General Omar Bradley): • 1st Army(Hodges) • 3rd Army (Patton)

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